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Note on Conventions
Throughout this text, when quoting original source materials, I have 
provided the Chinese characters after the translation. All translations, if 
not marked otherwise, are my own. As a matter of consistency, I have 
opted to render the original text passages in the simplified character 
script that is used in mainland China, even where quoting from sources 
written in the traditional character script favoured in Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and many overseas communities. I have made this choice solely on the 
ground that this book focuses on events organised in mainland China, 
and not to suggest a personal preference for a specific character script.
For short Chinese phrases, I have provided transliterations in Pinyin. 
I have done so only for key phrases or terms (like ‘harmony’ or ‘China 
Dream’), important organisations (like Chinese Central Television or 
the Shanghai Expo Organisation Department), and for Chinese names. 
For longer passages of Chinese, I have provided only the characters. My 
reasoning is that readers capable of reading Chinese will not require a 
transliteration, and that readers who do not read Chinese will not benefit 
from it either.
Throughout the book, I have followed the Chinese convention of 
placing surnames before given names, e.g. ‘Xi Jinping’. I have made 
exceptions only where persons are commonly known by English names 
(e.g. ‘Jackie Chan’). In cases where names are more commonly spelled 
using transliteration schemes other than Pinyin, I have followed those 
common conventions (e.g. Chiang Kai-shek).
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1  Introduction: Making Sense 
of China’s Spectacles
It is 2009, a year after the Beijing Olympics, and I have made my way 
across northern Beijing, past one of the massive ring-roads, to a large 
block of office buildings that sits not too far from the Olympic axis — a 
long stretch of asphalt, greenery, and event buildings that cuts across the 
city in an extension of the old north-south connection that the Forbidden 
City forms with its gates. New construction sites are again blossoming 
around the area, only a year after much of the city was remodelled to host 
the mega event. Three new metro lines were constructed in the run-up to 
the games. More will follow. 
I am looking down from an office window at the traffic jam below, 
people milling across overpasses in the blazing heat. The passers-by 
are not yet wearing particle masks. The full scale of Beijing’s pollution 
has not made it into the public conscience in 2009. While I am sipping 
a cold soft drink, one of the organisers of the Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony shows me images from the event’s press book. She flips to a 
picture of actors representing Confucian scholars, accompanied by an 
explanation of the quotation they recite: ‘all those within the four seas 
can be considered his brother’. Another picture shows the huge painting 
scroll that displayed examples of pre-modern Chinese ingenuity like 
paper, pottery, and bronze casting. 
‘Our goal was to brand the Chinese nation’, says my host. ‘We had 
two keywords that we were going to showcase: harmony and civilisation’. 
I turn to the page that shows serene martial artists in white attire 
performing the elegant movements of Taijiquan below the large digital 
canvas that circled around the top of the stadium, where animations 
cascade downwards like a waterfall, in reference to a famous poem by 
Li Bai. Another page shows the stadium at a distance as fireworks form 
smiley faces in the sky above. 
‘Many people abroad felt the Beijing Olympics were controversial’, I 
point out. The torch relay had been accompanied by protests, by calls to 
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boycott the Games. Then Chinese students abroad responded with their 
own protests, meant to defend the event. The confrontations between 
the two protest groups quickly turned the public relations campaign 
into a security exercise. How did people perceive those conflicts here, 
I ask. She explains that these negative reactions came as a shock to 
many. Thousands of people had volunteered. They were hoping to show 
visitors their home and what China had become. ‘Of course they were 
disappointed about the criticism. In their view, all they had wanted to do 
was throw the world a giant party’. 
The Beijing Games were a source of major pride in China’s capital, 
and generally for people across the country. It is easy to see why. Chinese 
society had undergone massive transformations over the preceding 
decades, and the event marked a high-point in economic and political 
developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Official slogans 
about China’s ‘hundred-year old Olympic Dream’ resonated with many 
Chinese citizens, especially since such phrases evoked images of an 
earlier China that had violently and disruptively modernised amidst wars 
and foreign colonial interventions. Now, in the 21st century, past national 
struggles and humiliations had finally led to a moment of national 
rejuvenation and international recognition. China was finally hosting 
the Olympic Games, an event that epitomised modern internationalism. 
When the fireworks lit up Beijing’s night sky on the auspicious day of 8 
August 2008, at eight o’clock, it marked for many a watershed moment in 
modern Chinese history. China had returned to the world stage.
As students of the Olympic Movement have pointed out, the Games 
were never just about sports. From the first modern Olympic Games in 
Athens in 1896 to the present day, the Olympic Spirit has been loaded 
with political meanings, and it has been used extensively as a public 
diplomacy tool (Cull 2008: 120-128). The Olympic Games in Beijing 
were special in that they were hosted by a state that some academics 
argue exerts a comprehensive ‘control of symbols’ (Price 2008: 11), or at 
least tries to do so. Indeed, the Beijing Olympics fit into a larger state-
led strategy that involved numerous high-profile events along with 
media coverage that utilised advanced 21st-century information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). The PRC leadership had developed 
a new and improved public relations approach (see Brady 2008). In 
the eyes of China’s propaganda experts, China’s increasing economic, 
political, and cultural relevance in the world needed to be matched with a 
communication strategy that would alleviate suspicions about a potential 
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‘China Threat’ while simultaneously showcasing the leadership’s policies 
to a domestic audience. 
Large-scale staged spectacles have been a corner stone of this 
communication strategy. Aside from the Beijing Olympics in 2008, 
the PRC government also organised a massive parade to celebrate the 
60th anniversary of the PRC in 2009 and a six-month World Exposition 
in Shanghai in 2010, spending billions of RMB in the process. Each of 
these endeavours has been hailed by China’s state media as the grandest 
and most impressive event of its kind. In the propaganda of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), these events remain crucial markers of China’s 
domestic and international success. Later spectacles would follow this 
template. Examples include the 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, the 
90th anniversary of the CCP in 2011, the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 
2016, and the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the PRC in 2017, 
but also the recent tradition of holding parades on 3 September, which 
the state designated a national holiday in 2015 in order to commemorate 
the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Then there is the 
ongoing Olympic dream, extended to yet another occasion: at the time of 
writing, the city of Beijing was preparing to host the 2022 Winter Olympic 
Games.
This book explores the politics of China’s staged spectacles, especially 
those that the PRC organised between 2008 and 2010 under the leadership 
of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (i.e. during the ‘Hu-Wen administration’). It 
examines various attempts to showcase a modern China through large-
scale, mediated mass events, and it asks how different actors position 
themselves during such events to intervene in public discourses and 
experiment with mechanisms of networked governance. Throughout 
this book, I refer to such events as ‘networked spectacles’, and in this 
introduction I spell out the core theoretical considerations that drive 
my study of these events. I also discuss the practical implications of 
my conceptual arguments, laying out the materials I have used and the 
methods I have deployed to analyse China’s networked spectacles. The 
chapter ends with an overview of the book and its main arguments. First, 
however, allow me to examine how others have made sense of China’s 
most prominent staged spectacles.
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1.1	 Why	China’s	staged	spectacles	matter
China’s high-profile spectacles have generated no small amount of 
controversy. Observers outside China have at times voiced harsh criticism 
of such events, arguing that the Chinese authorities are manipulating 
public opinion to obscure their political agenda at home and abroad. 
In reference to the PRC’s relationship with the Sudanese government, 
US critics christened the 2008 Beijing Summer Games the ‘Genocide 
Olympics’ (Farrow & Farrow 2007). Others called for boycotts to 
highlight deficiencies in the PRC’s human rights record (see the various 
contributions in Worden 2008 for examples and discussions). 
The PRC anniversary that took place a year later became an even 
stronger focal point of foreign criticism, with many journalists seeing 
the large-scale military parade that rolled across Tiananmen Square as 
evidence that China was returning to its Maoist past. The Financial Times 
interpreted the event as harking back to ‘Mao, Marx and the Military’ 
(Dyer & Anderlini 2009). The German news magazine Spiegel Online 
(Lorenz 2009), reminded of parades in North Korea, argued that ‘this 
was not the modern China, whose functionaries wear Armani suits and 
invest in international hedge funds. This was a deeply conservative China 
...’. The BBC (2009) quipped that China was ‘holding itself a Party... a 
Communist Party’. 
When the Shanghai World Exposition opened its gates to visitors 
in 2010, the anxieties continued: the large, red China Pavilion quickly 
became a symbol for the perceived new assertiveness of the Chinese 
government. Foreign observers pointed out that the ‘massive structure ... 
looms, coolly, over the entire site’ and ‘practically hangs over the Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan pavilions’ (Minter 2010). The design, size, 
and location of the pavilion even led some to view it as evidence that the 
leadership was expecting the whole world to pay ‘tribute to the emperor’ 
(Master 2010). 
While foreign news reports interpreted the events primarily through 
the lens of authoritarian politics and Maoist clichés, scholarship on 
China has tried to add more nuance, though academic studies have also 
at times criticised China’s mass spectacles for presenting simplistic 
and potentially manipulative narratives. Barmé (2008: 86), for instance, 
concludes his discussion of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony and 
its presentation of China with the assessment that the event presented ‘a 
flattened vista of its own history’. Brady (2009: 6) compares the Beijing 
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Olympics to a magician’s sleight of hand and interprets the event as part 
of a larger campaign of ‘mass distraction’, an attempt to use economic 
growth and mass entertainment to gloss over domestic problems; 
a modern-day version of the infamous Roman imperial practice of 
providing the subjugated masses with bread and games. 
Interpretations of the Shanghai Expo have also at times been severe, 
with William Callahan (2012: 257) criticising the various participants for 
creating ‘a stable harmonious utopia that combines global capitalism 
and Chinese civilisation’, and for reproducing racist and sexist themes. 
Similarly, Nordin (2012a: 246) asserts that at the expo ‘there is only 
one Future, and it does not welcome contestation’. Both Callahan and 
Nordin acknowledge that Shanghai also contained counter-stories to 
the perceived monolithic narrative of the expo, but they see these stories 
taking place elsewhere, for instance in the discussions of intellectuals, in 
the arts, or in the interpretations of critically-minded expo visitors, not at 
the event site itself.
These accounts draw attention to the many ways in which staged 
spectacles in the PRC deploy advanced public relations techniques as 
means of persuasion, if not manipulation, and they remind us that such 
events frequently construct problematic master narratives in the service 
of particular interests. Indeed, there is much to criticise about how these 
events portray contemporary China and its politics, just as there is much 
to criticise about Chinese politics in general. In terms of civil liberties, 
the PRC ranks among the poorest countries in the world. The liberal 
American organisation Freedom House (2017) regularly classifies China 
as ‘not free’, with the country scoring only 15 out of 100 potential points 
in the human rights organisation’s 2017 score for ‘Freedom in the World’. 
In terms of political freedoms, Freedom House awarded the PRC only a 
single point out of 40 in its 2017 assessment. 
It would be a mistake to belittle or ignore such concerns, or the many 
challenges that the PRC faces today, even though such scoring exercises 
arguably force an understanding onto politics that is rooted in American 
and European self-perceptions of ‘freedom’. The consequent judgements 
frequently say more about those who are judging than about those who 
are thus judged. Such criticism also at times risks obscuring how complex 
the PRC’s social and political environment actually is, and it does not 
always sufficiently acknowledge the degree with which this environment 
continuously changes. This problem extends to discussions of China’s 
staged spectacles and the diversity of their messages. We can learn 
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much from these events, beyond the stories of perceived domination 
vs resistance. Jeffrey Wasserstrom (2016: 9-17), for instance, fruitfully 
compares the PRC’s efforts to host the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai 
Expo with the efforts by the State of Japan to host the Tokyo Olympics 
and Osaka Expo some 40 years earlier. He discusses how China and Japan 
each tried to use such events to overcome the legacies of their modern 
histories, and the parallels with Japan are indeed striking (see Wilson 
2012). I will return to their relevance in the next chapter, but what matters 
here is that mass spectacles can be important windows into domestic 
and international politics. As Callahan (2010) points out in his account 
of how political communication features in China’s security policies, ‘the 
opening ceremony of Beijing’s Summer Olympics can tell us much about 
the political direction of China’s rise’ (ibid.: 1). 
Others have similarly made the case that understanding political 
communication in China is crucial for understanding the politics of the 
country as a whole. Frank Pieke (2016) makes this clear in his discussion 
of how the CCP has been innovating and updating its ideology since 
1978. To Pieke, the Party has been extraordinarily skilled at constructing 
messages meant to convince the wider public of the CCP’s legitimacy to 
rule China: ‘communist ideology is the constantly evolving fruit of highly 
specialized creative work that compellingly presents these messages as 
conveying the only possible correct understanding and evaluation of 
reality’ (ibid.: 25). China’s networked spectacles have been an important 
site for negotiating these messages, and I believe we should heed Pieke’s 
advice that ‘those who want to understand what the Party has to say had 
better suppress their scepticism and learn this language and its referents’ 
(ibid.). 
Staged spectacles in China are an ideal place to study such 
communication codes. Taking a closer look at how different actors 
produced these events, and what was actually communicated through 
them, promises to shed light on the rich roles these events play in 
contemporary Chinese politics. Indeed, as others have pointed out, these 
events are relevant in a number of ways, for instance as opportunities for 
implementing infrastructure and urban planning projects (Dreyer 2012, 
Sun & Ye 2010), as incentives for increasing tourism (Yu et al. 2012), as 
attempts to affect public opinion (Chen 2012, Cull 2008), and as vehicles 
for legitimating the politics of the day (Brady 2009). 
I will discuss these dimensions in detail, but I will also make the 
case that staged spectacles in China showcase two important dynamics 
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that are too often overlooked, and that make these events what I 
call ‘networked spectacles’: elaborate mass events, designed to be 
aesthetically striking, that offer various actors the chance to reconfigure 
organisational and ideational networks in the service of their respective 
political projects. The first dynamic that creates these networked 
spectacles is that China’s authorities have generally transformed politics 
into a mixture of hierarchical and collaborative processes that involve a 
wide range of networked actors and that are highly flexible, adaptive, and 
consensus-seeking; China’s networked spectacles are as much examples 
of these politics as they are sites of innovation where networked forms of 
governance can be tested. The second dynamic is that the diverse actors 
involved in China’s networked spectacles use their unevenly distributed 
communicative resources and skills to construct and reshape the very 
meanings of politics, which makes these events ideal sites for tracing 
how Chinese politics are shifting. In short, the PRC has re-invented itself 
and its modes of governance for the 21st century, and its networked 
spectacles have been important testing grounds and sites of innovation 
during that process, providing real-world laboratories to test different 
approaches to power, legitimation, and meaning-making.
1.2	 Power	in	networked	politics
How, then, should we conceptualise these attempts to recalibrate 
politics through networked spectacles? This question is closely tied to 
issues of power, and to how power works in complex societies. To gain 
purchase on such processes, I find it helpful to view these spectacles 
as examples of networked politics, and to turn to the work of network 
scholars for theoretical and empirical insights into how people interact, 
communicate, and generate meanings through their interactions. 
Throughout this book, I will draw from three intellectual projects that 
each deal with networks: the macro-sociology that fuels arguments about 
how power works in network societies, the micro-sociology that informs 
discussions about so-called interaction ritual chains and actor-networks, 
and the communication theory of conceptual blending, which explores 
how actors make meanings out of complex networks of mental concepts.
In what follows, I will explain each of these projects in turn, followed by 
a practical example from China. Readers who are less interested in these 
theoretical discussions of how we might create our societies through 
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networked communication processes may of course skip ahead to the 
methodological foundations of this book (section 1.6) or the overview 
of its sections (1.7). Throughout the subsequent chapters, I have tried 
to avoid unnecessary academic jargon, and I have compiled definitions 
of core technical terms such as ‘conceptual blending’, ‘interaction ritual 
chain’, or ‘networked spectacle’ in the glossary for easy reference. I would 
nevertheless recommend bearing with me for the conceptual detour I 
have provided below, as it covers the basic mechanics of contemporary 
political communication, along with a discussion of the intellectual 
traditions that inform my analysis of such communication. 
Before proceeding with this theoretical account, a word of caution is in 
order. Each of the three fields I have drawn from here (macro-sociology, 
micro-sociology, and communications theory) makes assumptions 
about what society is and what scholars might emphasise to best 
understand it. Some of these premises may at times seem inconsistent 
or even mutually exclusive. For instance, is it empirically correct to say 
that ‘China is organising a spectacle’? Or, rather, is it correct to aggregate 
social interactions between individual human beings into larger, unified 
organisations such as nation-states, corporations, and so on, and to then 
treat those organisations as actors in their own right? Who is really ‘acting’ 
in such cases? Macro-sociologists may at times find it acceptable to use 
shorthand to describe what organisations are doing, whereas micro-
sociologists frequently consider such simplifications to be anathema. 
To give another example of conceptual disagreement: regardless of 
who or what qualifies as an agent, it is widely accepted throughout much 
of the so-called social sciences that such agents then act within pre-
existing structures such as material, social, and ideational constraints. 
The choices of decision-makers reflect their knowledge of the world, 
the financial restrictions they labour under, the norms they have been 
socialised into, and so on. However, it remains contested how strongly 
agents create and change these structures, and whether such structures 
can be agents in their own right (can a social norm act upon somebody, 
or is it really other people enforcing that social norm and creating 
social pressure through their interactions?). Such issues have led some 
sociologists to argue that distinctions between agency and structure are, 
in fact, a false dichotomy to begin with (Collins 2004: 570, Latour 2005: 
202-203).
Such issues go to the heart of disputes between structuralists (who 
assume structure exists before and outside human experience) and 
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poststructuralists (who argue that all structures are constraints of our 
own making), as well as various strands of functionalists (who believe 
that every structure has a social purpose). My goal is not to trace these 
debates and their intellectual history here; interested readers may turn 
to a number of useful introductions, e.g. Belsey (2002), Elliott & Lemert 
(2014, especially chs 5 to 7), Han (2014), the tongue-in-cheek Palmer 
(1997), and — specifically on Foucault’s transition from structuralism 
to post-structuralism — Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982/2014). Instead of 
discussing these various schools of thought in detail, I will shamelessly 
poach disparate traditions to highlight commonalities that I believe can 
be fruitfully put to work to understand China’s networked spectacles. In 
this, I will remain committed to what might be called a critically realist, 
poststructuralist view of society, in which people use their perceptive, 
cognitive, and affective faculties to constantly create and revise the 
symbolic resources through which they make sense of their existence, in 
interactions with each other and the material world.
A useful starting point for understanding these processes comes 
from macro-sociologists like Manuel Castells, who try to explain the 
broad processes that shape our societies today. Castells (1996/2010) 
proposes that we view society as a ‘network society’. He envisages this 
network society as diverse actors, such as states, enterprises, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which pursue their agendas within 
advanced communication and information networks. Importantly, 
Castells (2009) describes two kinds of powerful activities that actors 
pursue in network societies, and he calls these activities ‘switching’ and 
‘programming’.
In Castells’ view, networked actors frequently create or sever 
connections between themselves and others, which allows these actors 
to configure the network in line with their goals and projects. The ability 
to exclude actors from a process, for instance by denying them resources 
or information, is indeed a form of power, as is creating new connections 
and enabling interactions (see also Lukes 2005). This then is what Castells 
calls ‘switching power’: the ability of actors to create or sever ties within 
a network.
The second crucial kind of activity ‘programmes’ a network with 
specific value, that is: with a rationale that then fuels and constrains the 
actions of the various networked actors. ‘Programming power’ is the 
ability to spread certain discourses through a network, for instance by 
circulating symbols and statements among networked actors that imply 
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certain assumptions and invite participants to accept these as common 
sense. 
The two types of power frequently work in tandem, with actors trying 
to switch themselves into networks or creating connections between 
disparate networks to position themselves to then programme these 
networks with their own discourses. Take, as an example, the logic of profit 
that infuses financial networks and guides the behaviour of organisations 
within markets (see Harvey 2007). It was arguably an extremely effective 
move of neoliberal economists during the 1970s and 1980s to manoeuvre 
themselves into close proximity with sympathetic politicians, and for 
powerfully positioned political actors like Margaret Thatcher, Ronald 
Regan, or Deng Xiaoping to in turn spread the economic rationale of 
market capitalism through their own policy-making networks across 
vast segments of their network societies, by either using existing ties 
or ‘switching’ on new ties that would connect traditional markets with 
e.g. education or health-care networks. Infusing these newly connected 
networks with discourses of productivity, personal responsibility, 
austerity, and profit-rationales effectively forced participants in those 
disparate sectors to re-orientate their activities in relation to the values 
of the market. 
Castells’ conceptual work provides a useful entryway into how 
power works during such complex processes, since it highlights how 
agents, power, and communication are related. In this, it shares certain 
similarities with the arguments of German macro-sociologists such as 
Ulrich Beck (2005), who argues that in late modernity power is no longer 
just the ability to win the game of politics but is enmeshed with the ability 
to define the rules of that game, leading to a complex ‘meta-game’. There 
are also potential points of overlap with Jürgen Habermas’ work, who for 
instance argues in the Theory of Communicative Action (1981/1995: 473) that 
the ‘systems’ of the market and the state ‘colonize’ the various sectors of 
our ‘lifeworld’ — a process reflected in the increased commercialisation 
and bureaucratisation of more and more aspects of our lives. Viewing 
these processes as networked politics enables us to see the ‘systems’ 
behind these processes as groups of interlinked actors within the market 
or the state who switch themselves into other social networks to try and 
govern them with their values. Castells’ theory also connects with French 
poststructuralism, e.g. with Michel Foucault’s (1977/1995) argument that 
people construct, through communication, the background knowledge 
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that informs their social practices and institutions, an argument I will 
return to below. 
To speak of switching and programming in network societies is indeed 
an apt metaphor for how communication and power work in complex 
societies; however the idea of the network society also suffers from 
several problems: it depicts the networked processes as the outcome of 
an ‘information age’ or ‘global age’, which problematically assumes that 
history is divided into ‘ages’, when scholars have repeatedly shown that 
this idea is itself a modern construct (e.g. Mumford 1967: 22, Graeber 2004: 
54). Instead, interactions between people have always created ‘networks’, 
and they continue to do so in contexts that can be decidedly low-tech. 
What is more, Castells’ network analogy also potentially reproduced 
the problematic assumption that advanced ICTs create processes that 
take place in ‘virtual realms’, removed from material interactions and 
conditions, when really our interactions remain firmly tethered to the 
material world and our places in it. Finally, Castells remains frustratingly 
abstract on the exact, practical workings of power in networks: how 
exactly does an actor ‘programme’ a network with value? What chain of 
events has to unfold in order for such an activity to succeed? 
To be fair, Castells has revisited and refined some of his earlier work 
(e.g. 1996/2010) to show how the processes he describes are embedded 
in political economies, and his later arguments (in Castells 2009) about 
how powerful, entrenched actors like states and corporations configure 
networks provides a useful corrective to the impression that his work 
favoured only progressive underdogs who strove for social change. 
Nevertheless, the exact workings of networked power remain vague. I have 
tried to provide an account of how programming and switching power 
might be understood as actors calibrating the administrative privileges 
of specific networks (Schneider 2018: ch.8), and I still believe this is an 
appropriate metaphor where communication networks are concerned, 
but more work needs to be done to unpack how human interactions take 
place in, and ultimately calibrate, different kinds of networks.
1.3	 How	actor	networks	assemble	society
Some of the most meticulous and insightful studies of such interactions 
come from sociologists and anthropologists who explore the intricacies 
of everyday life. These studies update and extend the work of three 
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influential thinkers: Emile Durkheim (1912), who focused on the way 
that social rituals turn the mundane into the sacred; Clifford Geertz 
(1973/2000), who stressed that human beings inhabit ‘webs of symbols’ 
that they themselves create; and Erwing Goffman (1959, 1967, 1974), who 
showed how people act out their face-to-face interactions on ‘stages’ with 
different publics. 
Combining these insights to varying degrees, scholarship in micro-
sociology has made the case that what we call ‘society’ is actually disparate 
sets of highly contextual networks that actors construct through their 
recurring inter-subjective activities. In this understanding, subjects 
are formed through the chains of interactions they experience, leaving 
individuals with ever-changing, situational identities. As Collins (2004: 
26) writes:
Agency, which I would prefer to describe as the energy appearing 
in human bodies and emotions and as the intensity and focus of 
human consciousness, arises in interactions in local, face-to-face 
situations, or as precipitates of chains of situations.
In this view (ibid.), participants in a specific situation ‘charge’ their 
interaction with emotions, giving it meaning and making it memorable. 
As actors fill shared moments with specific relevance, they frequently 
outsource their associations and sentiments to cultural artefacts (see 
Sperber 1996). In this way, they create objects that come to stand for the 
original experience and that can at times become, to use Durkheim’s 
terminology, sacred (Collins 2004: 69). This, then, is how group cohesion 
comes about: through actors engaged in rituals. Collins describes such 
rituals as mechanisms ‘of mutually focused emotion and attention 
producing a momentarily shared reality, which thereby generates 
solidarity and symbols of group membership’ (ibid.: 26). As I will show 
throughout this book, networked spectacles are sites of precisely such 
rituals.
These micro-sociological arguments about how human interaction 
creates meaning are not merely theoretical abstractions; they have 
practical implications. Rather than accepting concepts like ‘culture’ 
or ‘society’ as pre-existing realms that influence human processes, 
these approaches prompt researchers to ask how such realms are really 
constructed, and in the process to pay close attention to the details of who 
is doing what, and in which situations. Micro-sociology consequently 
Introduction: Making Sense of China’s Spectacles 31
provides an important corrective to macro-sociological accounts, which 
have been criticised for ‘the error of describing how things happen in the 
social world without mentioning how people might make them happen, 
or, indeed who the people are who make them happen’ (Billig 2013: 142). 
Empirical studies in the micro-sociological vein have yielded insightful 
results, including how scientists conduct scientific experiments (Latour 
& Woolgar 1979/1986), how people use specific technologies like the 
internet in their everyday lives (Miller & Slater 2000), how economists 
think about and ultimately create financial markets (MacKenzie 2006), 
or how and why people smoke (Collins 2004: ch.8), to give just a few 
examples. 
Despite the many differences between these studies, they share a 
commitment to tracing how actual people enact sociality and meaning 
through their interactions, and they consequently align fairly well 
with the research programme that Bruno Latour (2005) has proposed 
under the banner of ‘actor-network theory’. To Latour, scholars should 
indeed follow the actors closely, trying to ‘catch up with their often wild 
innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has 
become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it 
fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that 
they have been forced to establish’ (ibid.: 12). He further proposes that we 
extend the reasoning of Goffman’s work to map how people interact with 
one another and, importantly, to trace how they interact with various 
objects, and how objects in turn interact with each other. 
This leads Latour to redefine the meaning of ‘actor’ as ‘any thing that 
does modify a state of affairs by making a difference’ (ibid.: 71, emphasis 
in the original). He argues that the following should then be the new 
default position for social inquiry: ‘that all the actors we are going to 
deploy might be associated in such a way that they make others do things’ 
(ibid.: 107, emphases in the original).
Latour sees these associations as playing out as a network, as a ‘a string 
of actions where each participant is treated as a full-blown mediator’, 
meaning that people and objects act upon, and in some way transform, 
others in the network (ibid.: 128). If traced carefully, such a network is 
precisely the context in which actions take place. This is one of Latour’s 
most intriguing observations, since it moves away from the idea that 
context exists outside interactions, instead seeing it as something that 
has to be explained as part of the situation itself. ‘Context’ is the span of 
traceable interactions within a network (ibid.: 202). These interactions 
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may not be ‘local’, in a geographical or even temporal sense (for instance 
an event in the city of Shanghai in 2010), but they constitute the network 
within which ‘a bewildering array of participants is simultaneously at 
work’ and ‘which are dislocating their neat boundaries in all sorts of ways, 
redistributing them away and making it impossible to start anywhere that 
can be said to be “local”’ (ibid.).
Again, these conceptual concerns have practical implications. Latour 
(ibid.: 147) writes the following about actor-network theory:
Its main tenet is that actors themselves make everything, including 
their own frames, their own theories, their own contexts, their 
own metaphysics, even their own ontologies. So the direction to 
follow would be more descriptions [of these processes].
To fully understand what power is, and how it works, we need to examine 
closely how different actors assemble the social, i.e. how they act upon 
each other, and how these actions create cultural objects that act upon 
others in turn. Networked spectacles are perfect arenas for exploring 
such complex interactions, as they are occasions during which actors 
come together to create social realities; indeed, it is telling that Latour’s 
seminal book Reassembling the Social (2005) has as its cover an illustration 
of men planning and constructing the Madagascar exhibition at the 
1900 Exposition Universelle in Paris. It is at sites like these that people 
assemble social relations and cultural meanings.
1.4	 Meaning-making	in	networks
Micro-sociological accounts of networks and interaction ritual chains 
provide detail-oriented accounts of how humans assemble ‘societies’, 
but they go beyond the mere interactions between people and things. 
As Collins (2003: 1382) argues, they also make a contribution to our 
understanding of cognition:
Interaction ritual is a full-scale social psychology, not only of 
emotions and situational behaviour, but of cognition. Rituals 
generate symbols; experience in rituals inculcates those symbols 
in individual minds and memories. 
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This is then a powerful entry into the processes that generate meanings 
and imbue them with emotions in the human mind. As I will show, actors 
at networked spectacles frequently produce, draw from, or relay what 
Müller and Kappas (2011) have called ‘pathos formulae’. Following the 
work of German iconographer Martin Warnke (1980), Müller and Kappas 
outline how specific symbols such as handshakes between politicians 
become such tropes, i.e. recurring patterns of signs that, based on a 
previously established social convention, connect to specific meanings. 
Such tropes then become anchored to specific sentiments, allowing 
actors to mobilise them in efforts to trigger emotional responses.
The question of how humans generate their sociality is then also closely 
linked to questions of how meanings become associated with cultural 
artefacts, imbued with sentiments, and spread through communication. 
On this issue, it is worth following Müller and Kappas’ example and 
turning to scholarship on media and communication.
Throughout this introduction, and indeed throughout this book, 
I refer to the complex communication processes that both inform and 
are generated by networked spectacles as ‘discourses’. Drawing on 
Michel Foucault’s influential work (especially 1965/1988, 1977/1997, and 
1978/1990), I understand ‘discourse’ to mean a set of statements through 
which communicating agents systematically construct and share their 
knowledge of the world, in turn creating the raw materials from which 
they and other actors then go on to form yet more discourse. Importantly, 
discursive statements reproduce and often re-enforce assumptions about 
the world that become ‘naturalised’ as ‘common sense’, meaning that 
they become unquestioned truths among certain groups of actors.
Much of Foucauldian discourse theory (e.g. Foucault 1978/1990) 
highlights how communication is struggle over what should be 
considered true (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982/2014, Howarth 2000). 
Every time any of us makes a statement, be it verbal or non-verbal, we 
draw from a pool of social conventions and shared meanings in order to 
‘make sense’. In doing so, we either reinforce those social conventions 
and collectively accepted beliefs, or we challenge what others consider to 
be common sense. 
This is not merely a communication exercise: through their 
interactions, actors turn the assumptions that inform their discourse into 
actual institutions, for instance when actors adopt certain ideas about 
mental health or about crime to then create the rationale for treating 
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mental disorders in certain ways (Foucault 1965/1988), or for constructing 
particular kinds of prisons (Foucault 1977/1995).
Discursive struggles over what should constitute truth are crucial 
to how societies become constituted. Communication is very much 
an interplay between status-quo-oriented actors who contribute 
to  ‘hegemonic’ discourses and attempts by agents of social change 
to challenge established truths with ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourses, 
for  better or worse. I will discuss a number of examples in this 
book  where these  dynamics are indeed at play, for instance when 
human rights organisations challenge the Olympic narrative of 
China’s central  government, or when foreign expo pavilion organisers 
intentionally create counterpoints to the official Shanghai Expo narrative. 
Nevertheless, viewing discourse solely as struggle would not capture the 
full complexity of communication processes, especially not in dynamic 
and multifarious cases like networked spectacles, which is precisely why 
I have drawn so heavily from network theories to conceptualise how 
discourse might work during such events. Social and discursive practices 
are interlinked with each other through the networked interactions of 
diverse actors, many of whom negotiate and collaborate with each other 
as they go about making meanings. Not all of these interactions are 
struggles.
Discourse analysis is strongest when it examines textual evidence, 
but networked spectacles are media events: they compile written and 
verbal statements with elaborate (and often dynamic) visual and acoustic 
arrangements for dissemination to diverse mass audiences. What is more, 
these arrangements take place over extended periods of time, across 
dedicated spaces like Beijing’s National Stadium, Tiananmen Square, or 
the Shanghai Expo territory along Shanghai’s Huangpu River, and they 
frequently rely on visitors and audiences, as well as media professionals, 
to collaboratively construct discourses through interactions with each 
other and with media contents. 
To study the communicative dimensions of such interactions, I have 
drawn from semiotics, especially the work of Umberto Eco (1979) and 
Charles Sanders Peirce (compiled in Hoopes 1991). Whereas discourse 
analysis looks at the statements that cultural products contain, semiotics 
unpacks these statements to show how they consist of assemblages of 
signs: things that stand for other things, such as a visual representation 
that denotes an ‘apple’, or that by extension connotes a specific company 
that produces digital devices. By identifying and tracking signs, semiotics 
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reveals how different actors create, re-appropriate, and re-invent the 
visual, acoustic, and textual building-blocks that form ‘multi-modal’ 
discourses (Kress & Van Leeuwen 2001), such as those that circulate 
through China’s networked spectacles.
Both discourse theory and semiotics have been criticised, e.g. by 
Collins (2004: 27 & 52), for their perceived tendency to outsource too much 
of the human meaning-making process to external, structural realms, 
such as the history of ideas (in the case of discourse theory) or sets of 
cultural codes (in the case of semiotics). In this line of argument, both of 
these approaches tend to return to structuralist assumptions, bypassing 
the people who are creating the signs and discourses through their 
continuous chains of interactions. While such warnings are well taken, 
they nevertheless risk dismissing these schools of thought too quickly. 
Foucault’s later work shifts away from his earlier structuralist leanings, 
and semiotitians have likewise updated their research programmes 
to emphasise the social element in communication processes and link 
social practices back to the meanings of signs (e.g. Kress & Van Leeuwen 
2006 and Van Leeuwen 2005). 
It is indeed not hard to see how the core arguments in discourse 
theory and semiotics can be brought into fruitful dialogue with the 
works of micro-sociologists, whose own reasoning (e.g. Collins 2004: 
63) is frequently similar to that of critical theorists like Foucault. After 
all, communication is also an interaction ritual, one in which actors 
creatively combine signs to generate meanings. 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) call these kinds of activities ‘conceptual 
blending’, and they make a strong case for understanding them as creative 
efforts that take place in agents’ mental spaces. These spaces ‘contain 
elements and are typically structured by frames. They are interconnected 
and can be modified as thought and discourse unfolds. Mental spaces can 
be used generally to model dynamic mappings in thought and language’ 
(ibid.: 40). The authors go on to provide involved models of how networks 
of meanings can be juxtaposed to create new meanings, often in ways 
that seem effortless and ‘natural’ to those participating in the process, 
even though ‘it takes all of our cognitive powers to have common sense’ 
(ibid.: 54). 
In practice, Fauconnier and Turner’s approach entails identifying the 
sets of meanings that actors pull together as they construct their discursive 
statements, and it involves exploring how these actors then manipulate, 
combine, and frame symbolic elements in distinct ‘input spaces’ to yield 
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a ‘blended space’ in which they can then explore novel meanings. As an 
example, Fauconnier and Turner (ibid.: ch.3) discuss a riddle, originally 
presented by Arthur Koestler (1964), in which a monk travels up a holy 
mountain one day, and then back down a few days later. The puzzle: is 
there a time on each of those days at which the monk occupies the same 
space on the path? Answering this question requires a mental leap in 
which we imagine the monk moving up and down the mountain on the 
same day, effectively encountering himself somewhere in the middle. 
Fauconnier and Turner use this act of counterfactual reasoning to show 
how human thought frequently relies on concepts and relations in one 
‘mental space’ (the journey up the mountain) and concepts and relations 
in another (the journey down the mountain) to create new meanings in 
a ‘blended space’ that existed in neither of the two inputs (an encounter 
between two monks).
A number of interesting things are happening in this example, and 
I can recommend following the authors’ thoughtful explanations in the 
original (ibid.: 39-50). Two aspects of their argument are particularly 
worth stressing here: that networks produce emergent properties, and 
that these properties can be studied empirically.
A fundamental characteristic of a complex system such as a social 
or conceptual network is that it ‘exhibits nontrivial emergent and 
self-organizing behavior’, meaning that complex processes generate 
outcomes that are more than the sum of the parts that originally went 
into the process (Mitchell 2011: 13). Importantly, emergent properties 
cannot be predicted. A good example is evolution (see Fauconnier & 
Turner 2002: 55), which is a complex process combining drifts in genetic 
materials with the dynamics of natural selection over extended periods of 
time. Biologists would be hard pressed to say how any given species will 
evolve next. This is not merely a practical matter of missing data: even if 
scientists had all the possible data points that feature into the complex 
process of evolution, the dynamics of these factors would create new 
properties that can never be predicted. Complexity defies prediction, in 
practice as well as in principle (Mitchell 2011: 33). That said, complexity is 
not arbitrary, and it can be explained. After all, biologists are indeed able 
to show scientifically how different species have evolved. 
Social and political interactions are also complex, as are psychological 
processes: when two people meet and interact, events unfold 
dynamically. A sudden memory leads to an awkward silence; laughter 
ensues even though a joke fell flat; someone has a new thought, based 
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on an unexpected association with something someone said, etc. When 
meanings mesh, new stories are told and new ideas emerge. In any complex 
network, the outcomes of such processes will remain unpredictable, but 
they can be traced and explained if we follow the actors and how they 
assemble symbolic resources into new meanings. As these assemblages 
become repeated and redeployed, they potentially turn into tropes, and 
in extreme cases into background knowledge and ‘frames’ that provide 
the resources for the next rounds of meaning-making. The theory of 
conceptual blending then provides a useful entry into how networked 
interactions construct and relay beliefs. 
1.5	 An	example	of	discursive	innovation:	the	mascot’s	butt	crack
To give an example of actor-networks and the discourses they generate, 
consider a string of interactions that unfolded during the Shanghai 
Expo in 2010, and that generated new meanings about the event. In the 
run-up to the expo, the authorities issued a call for designs of the event 
mascot. They then commissioned the Taiwanese designer Wu Yong-jian, 
who created the blue comic character Haibao (海宝). The Shanghai city 
government then rolled out a public relations campaign that strongly 
featured the mascot, covering advertising spaces across the city with 
posters and putting up statues of the blue Haibao (see Figure 1.1). 
The mascot design itself already illustrates important characteristics 
of conceptual blending, and we could ‘dip’ into the social interactions 
at this point to analyse how the mascot combines different ‘inputs’: 
it integrates the Chinese character for person (ren 人) and various 
associations with the city of Shanghai (the blue colour of the sea, the idea 
of a wave, the character for ‘sea’, hai 海, which also forms the second part 
of the city’s name Shanghai) to create something new: a personification 
of the event. 
Actor-networks lend themselves to such explorations of meaning-
making at ‘nodes’ of the network, and indeed any part of the interaction 
chains may be worth unpacking, depending on the questions that are at 
stake. In this case, I am interested in a communication process that took 
place after the authorities established the mascot as a symbol of the expo.
On 22 March 2010, and in the first instance unrelated to the expo, a 
group of Chinese citizens published a letter to the Chinese authorities 
demanding that it deregulate the internet and enable Chinese users to 
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freely access websites through search engines. On the evening of the same 
day, and probably as a response to this letter, the search giant Google 
followed through on earlier threats it had issued to stop its censoring 
practices in the PRC. The company abandoned its mainland search 
engine www.google.cn and redirected all traffic from that site to its Hong 
Kong equivalent www.google.hk, where the mainland’s censorship laws 
do not apply (an almost minute-by-minute breakdown of the events of 
that day is recounted by Johnson 2010).
Back to matters of the expo: on 22 April 2010, the influential blogger, 
novelist, race-car driver, and enfant terrible Han Han (韩寒; see Strafella 
& Berg 2015) published on his blog a mock interview with himself about 
the Shanghai Expo, ostensibly to pre-empt journalists from asking him 
about the event. His comments were relayed through the internet and 
received coverage in domestic and foreign media; they would later be 
taken down from his blog, though copies are still available online (e.g. 
Han 2010). 
One of the questions Han Han asks himself in the interview is how he 
feels about the World Fair’s 2010 mascot Haibao. His answer (translated 
in Goldkorn 2010):
Figure 1.1: Haibao statues in Shanghai, 2010. Image © F. Schneider 2010.
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Haibao has given people a really bad headache. I’m not even 
talking about his image, just his design. Haibao’s original two-
dimensional design has created a really difficult problem for 
those tasked with making him three dimensional: what should his 
backside look like? Does he have a tail? Does he have a butt? Does 
he have a butt crack? These are all unknown. That’s why we can see 
towering Haibao statues whose fronts are all the same, but whose 
backsides, you will discover, may or may not have butt cracks. But 
recently, there are more without butt cracks because the butt cracks 




Importantly, the Chinese word for ‘butt crack’ (gugou 股沟) sounds 
similar to the transliteration for ‘Google’ (guge 谷歌), creating a tongue-
in-cheek analogy between the mascot and China’s information politics. 
The core statement remains implicit, though that does not make it 
any less provocative: due to the government’s cyber politics and the 
departure of Google, China now resembles a person that lacks an anus 
and consequently has to process its faeces internally. 
I have illustrated the interaction and meaning-making process in 
Figure 1.2 below. The lower part of the figure traces a number of important 
actors and how they interacted: the authorities, the designer, the Haibao 
symbol and statues, Google, and of course Han Han and the interview he 
issued. Again, each of these interactions might generate new questions 
and empirical analysis, expanding the network further, for instance to 
explore how China’s central government creates and implements the 
censorship laws that affected Google, or the competitive dynamics in 
China’s search engine market that made it a reasonable move for Google’s 
executives to abandon their mainland endeavours. I have not added this 
kind of complexity here, since my concern is with Han Han’s analogy, 
which is modelled in the top part of the figure.  
One input space draws its signs from the Shanghai expo discourse 
and the symbolism of its mascot; it reflects social interactions between 
the Shanghai-based expo office, the designer, and the various cultural 
products associated with Haibao. Another input space draws from the 
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recent events surrounding Google’s departure from China and the 
company’s relationship with the PRC central authorities.
 Below these two circles and the semiotic components they contain 
is a ‘generic space’ that contains commonalities between the two: each 














































Introduction: Making Sense of China’s Spectacles 41
contains an actor with a physical representation (Haibao’s body vs. 
China’s territory); each speaks of a lack (Haibao statue’s lack of a butt 
crack vs China’s lack of free search engines); in each case, something is 
processed (food vs information). The generic space is where the analogy 
is constructed. 
Finally, Han Han’s analogy invites his audience to ‘project’ selected 
analogous elements from the inputs to the ‘blended space’, which I have 
represented as the top circle. Here, the reader recombines the available 
signs with the help of the frame that Han Han has made available through 
his narrative, and this is what forms the discursive statement: on the 
eve of hosting an important international event, China is becoming 
more inward-looking. Note how this meaning is made plausible by 
the elements that the actor draws from: the expo symbolism and the 
wordplay involving the corporation’s name. At the same time, the result 
is indeed more than the sum of the parts: neither input contained the idea 
of defecation, for example. This meaning becomes available during the 
interpretation because conceptual blending, as Fauconnier and Turner 
(2002: 48) write, encourages pattern completion, meaning that ‘we see 
some parts of a familiar frame of meaning, and much more of the frame 
is recruited silently but effectively to the blend’. Not having a butt crack 
is one thing, but the important cognitive leap is to imagine what would 
happen if someone did not have a butt crack, and to then extend that logic 
to an entity that is not itself a person, and that most certainly does not 
have a humanoid anatomy (here: a country).
This example illustrates how micro-sociological processes create 
opportunities for actors to generate discourse, and how one specific 
actor draws from semiotic resources and cognitive frames to creatively 
assemble new meanings, which are injected back into networks 
where they may serve as political interventions. I will showcase and 
analyse numerous such examples throughout this book, along with the 
idiosyncratic processes that unfold as different actors get their hands 
on the communicative building-blocks. It is, for instance, by no means 
the case that Han Han’s analogy allows for only a single interpretation, 
though certain interpretations are certainly more plausible in light of the 
frame that the author ‘flags’ for his target audience. This is then also true 
for official statements and symbols. As I will show, actors at networked 
spectacles expend a great deal of effort to disambiguate (and sometimes 
intentionally obscure) their messages by encouraging certain blended 
meanings to emerge through their semiotic manipulations.
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1.6	 Analysing	networked	spectacles
How, then, should such a study proceed? I have so far discussed the 
conceptual assumptions that fuel my analysis of networked spectacles, 
moving from theories of networked social interactions to accounts of 
how communication generates meaning. As I have pointed out, these 
theoretical considerations have very real practical implications: they 
focus attention on people, the cultural objects they produce, and the 
interactions that ensue between actors in successive situations. I have 
also suggested that we explore social and discursive processes by tracing 
the concrete activities of networked actors, the ways in which they 
assemble meanings in the form of cultural artefacts, and how they then 
feed the discourses that these artefacts relay back into the networks. 
In this book, I will apply this logic to China’s networked spectacles, 
concretely to the large-scale, staged events that the PRC organised during 
the Hu-Wen administration: the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008, the 
60th Anniversary of the PRC in 2009, and the Shanghai World Exposition 
in 2010. 
My goal is twofold: firstly, it is to establish what kinds of stories these 
events told, what kinds of messages they contained, both for domestic 
and foreign audiences, and who shaped these messages. Secondly, it is 
to explore how these events served the CCP as watershed moments in its 
political, economic, and cultural development of China, and how they 
provided crucial sites for networked actors to field-test, calibrate, and 
perfect their approach to governance. 
To this end, my study will focus on how different actors produced 
the three networked spectacles, constructed their discourses, and 
reworked networks of ideas in the process. Empirically, I have analysed 
the production and dissemination processes by conducting interviews 
with event planners, organisers, officials, journalists, and other media 
workers who were involved in creating the events. I have augmented the 
insights from those interviews with a close study of official documents, 
news reports, and academic accounts. These resources form the basis for 
my analysis of actor-networks and the interactions they enabled.
Where primary materials came into play, I have conducted discourse 
analyses of the statements that these materials contained (if not noted 
otherwise, all translations are my own). As pointed out above, the 
strength of marrying micro-sociological work with discourse analysis and 
semiotics is that this move encourages scholars to view communication 
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as contributing to a continuous flow of knowledge, assembled by 
senders of messages according to socio-cultural conventions (or codes) 
and transmitted to recipients who decode and interpret the messages. 
Understood in this way, we can capture such processes and analyse 
them empirically. We can ask: who constructs what messages, and what 
resources do they draw from during their interactions, to make those 
messages intelligible and (possibly) convincing to specific audiences? 
Answering this question will then also provide insights into the power 
dynamics that govern networked spectacles in China, and into the 
communication strategies that different actors adopt in order to shape 
the discourses at such events in line with their own ideas, world views, 
and interests.
Importantly, networked spectacles are created for mass consumption. 
They are mass spectacles. This means that the meanings they generate are 
by no means arbitrary, even if they are highly diverse. In order to function 
as mass communication, networked spectacles need to communicate 
their messages in such a way that the broadest possible audience will 
interpret and understand their meanings in similar ways (see Carroll 
1998 for a discussion). This is not to say that different audience members 
may not come up with extremely idiosyncratic interpretations of what 
they are witnessing, but it usually means that such idiosyncrasies are 
rarely intended and not normally widespread. Where they are, this 
exception then deserves special scrutiny. Discourse analysis, semiotics, 
and conceptual blending provide useful methods for in turn exploring 
such unexpected meaning-making processes. It is then possible for 
researchers to analyse media products and cultural expressions in a way 
that can distil the most readily available meanings as well as interesting 
discursive innovations.
By breaking discourse down into discursive statements and then 
systematically analysing the components, it is possible to reconstruct the 
assumptions that informed the discourse. It is these methods that enable 
critical discourse research to shine a spotlight on the power relations 
that actors reinforce by establishing certain beliefs as part of a generally 
accepted worldview (see the contributions in Wodak & Krzyzanowksi 
2008 and Wodak & Meyer 2009). But how should analysts deal with the 
methodological challenges that the complexity of networked spectacles 
creates? Mass communication processes like those that take place at 
networked spectacles combine various different discourses, and they do 
so in different modes and through different channels of communication. 
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Discursive statements frequently connect several topics, or what 
Siegfried Jäger (2004) calls different ‘discourse strands’. For instance, 
statements about the connection between environmental sustainability 
and pre-modern Chinese philosophy, such as those that could be found 
at the Shanghai Expo (see chapter 6), become coherent when they appeal 
to collectively recognisable knowledge about the individual topics and 
their relationship. A study of networked spectacles then needs to remain 
sensitive to discursive juxtapositions and intertextualities, and this 
is why I have drawn from the conceptual blending approach outlined 
above which, together with the toolboxes from discourse analysis and 
semiotics, informs my qualitative study of meanings at China’s networked 
spectacles.
In practice, I home in on diverse cultural products and sources to 
map how actors interweave ‘strands’ of discourse and generate meaning 
on such occasions. My study of the political discourses that the events 
communicate covers broadcasts of the events, news articles, event 
merchandise, exhibits, staged performances, cultural products like films 
and interactive displays, the physical spaces and buildings where the 
events took place, as well as official media guides and public relations 
materials.
As I have noted above, and as this list of sources also suggests, discourse 
does not consist solely of written or spoken text. It incorporates a large 
array of visual and acoustic cues, as well as the technical affordances of 
the media through which actors communicate. In practice, exploring 
these dimensions meant logging communication processes in protocols 
such as those that film studies scholars use (Korte 1999) or creating 
geographical representations of particular sites. It also meant venturing 
to those sites and participating in events, most notably during the 
Shanghai Expo, where I spent three weeks conducting first-hand research 
throughout July 2010.
1.7	 Overview	of	the	book
This book is organised into nine chapters. To provide context for this 
book’s analyses and arguments, the next chapter discusses the relevance 
of networked spectacles, both in China and elsewhere. How should we 
make sense of large-scale events like parades or festivals, particularly 
when societies use mass-delivery technologies to frame these events and 
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disseminate their political messages to large numbers of people, as is the 
case with world expositions or Olympic Games? What distinguishes a 
large-scale event from a mass event, and what happens when mass events 
become mediated and turn into media events? What roles do such events 
play in modern politics, how do they reproduce or challenge the logic of 
modern economic production, and how do they accommodate specific 
approaches to communication and didactics? By drawing attention to 
recurring historical patterns in large-scale staged spectacles, for example 
in comparison to past cases like the Tokyo Olympics and Osaka Expo 
in Japan, the chapter shows why organising such events has become a 
crucial part of Chinese political communication.
Chapter 3 recounts how a diverse range of political actors designed 
and organised events such as the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai 
Expo. The chapter first discusses the relationship between the Chinese 
state and the Communist Party, and how different agencies from these 
domains commission and control China’s networked spectacles. It then 
goes on to show that this process is not a simple matter of top-down 
‘governing’, but rather of collaborative ‘governance’ – an approach that 
later continued to inform the political practices of the PRC under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership. To illustrate how this process works, the chapter 
analyses how different actors planned the Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony, how the authorities managed the Shanghai Expo territory, and 
what went into organising a national pavilion at that Expo. The chapter 
concludes with the argument that China’s networked spectacles are 
examples of ‘cultural governance’, that is: of attempts to regulate society 
collaboratively by regulating the symbolic galaxy in which actors then 
enact their politics. 
Following this discussion of how different actors create and regulate 
China’s networked spectacles, chapter 4 turns to the meanings that 
official actors try to programme into the events. The chapter proceeds 
chronologically, first examining the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony, then the 2009 PRC anniversary parade, and finally the Shanghai 
Expo with its iconic China Pavilion and the official exhibitions that this 
building housed. Finally, it discusses how official media products such as 
news reports, films, and documentaries framed the events, specifically 
the 2009 anniversary. As I show, the various official actors used the trope of 
China’s ‘Road to Revival’ to tell stories of national rejuvenation, creatively 
deploying for instance young children and recognisable elements from 
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historical golden ages to locate contemporary China on a modernist 
time-line of progress. 
A crucial component of this linear narrative is the notion of the 
Chinese nation. Official actors evoke this imagined community through 
their use of nationalist symbolism, but they also programme and re-
programme what that nation should stand for at the start of the 21st 
century. Chapter 5 first discusses the relevance of nationalism in the 
Chinese context, and the ways in which actors communicate nationalism 
through mass media. It then explores how the Chinese authorities in 
charge of propaganda design and disseminate the key terminology 
of the nation, and how practices to define official ideological ‘watch 
words’ (known in Chinese as tifa 提法) also extend to visual cues and 
their emotional anchors. The chapter then examines how official actors 
use recognisable symbols to ‘flag’ national attachment during the PRC 
national anniversary, and it examines the rhetorical moves they make to 
suggest that the nation should be viewed the same way one might view 
a close, lovable family member. Next, the chapter takes a look at how 
China’s networked spectacles constructed the nation as an ancestral 
land, drawing from historical elements to create a national narrative. 
Finally, the chapter returns to some of the conceptual considerations I 
outlined in this introduction, asking how these practices might invite 
participants to join in the experience of nationhood, for instance during 
an event like the world fair, where visitors playfully experiment with their 
status as national citizens in an imaginary, miniature world.
Chapter 6 returns to the ways in which China’s networked spectacles re-
imagined the past, specifically how they evoked pre-modern philosophy 
and culture to fill contemporary political concepts like ‘harmony’ (hexie 和
谐) with meaning. I first discuss what role pre-modern ideas have played 
in contemporary China, and how they have been used by different groups 
of actors to promote either cosmopolitan or nativist visions of Chinese 
modernity. Next, I explore the harmony discourses that the Beijing 
Olympics opening ceremony and the PRC anniversary parade relayed 
to audiences, focusing on how the Hu-Wen administration’s concept 
of a ‘harmonious society’ became translated into domestic and foreign 
contexts, for instance by arguing that the PRC’s government is inherently 
peaceful due to its embrace of a long-standing tradition of harmony. This 
discussion is followed by an analysis of how official actors involved in 
constructing the China Pavilion at the world expo used classic Chinese 
sources to intervene in harmony discourses and creatively reinvent what 
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a ‘harmonious society’ should stand for. Finally, the chapter shows how 
the China Pavilion’s core exhibitions imagined harmony in hypermodern, 
urban terms, and how these imaginations became the backdrop for 
decidedly neoliberal arguments about how harmony should imply being 
individually responsible for one’s behaviour.
While chapters 4 to 6 trace how official actors contributed to 
meanings that emerge from networked spectacles, chapters 7 and 8 
turn to the question of what happens when non-official actors get their 
hands on the semiotic resources that official discourses relay. Chapter 
7 asks what becomes of such building-blocks of meaning when they 
start to travel to foreign contexts. It first reviews how ideas about nation 
branding and soft power have informed the official attempts to steer 
meaning-making of Chinese cultural products outside the mainland, 
and it then examines how these attempts can become hijacked by actors 
with very different agendas. Following this discussion of explicit counter-
discursive activities, the chapter takes a closer look at how foreign actors 
reproduced the semiotic components of official nationalist discourse 
to create advertisings for their products. Using the example of Coca 
Cola commercials, it turns out that such activities generally promote 
similar nationalistic parameters to those that the authorities endorse, 
but that they also subtly shift meanings in new directions, for instance 
by infusing available networks of meaning with commercial rationales, 
deploying nationalist stereotypes, or adding a cosmopolitan twist to their 
representations. Finally, the chapter explores how a discourse that was 
carefully designed to generate ‘soft power’ was broadcast on television 
outside the mainland, specifically how two different Taiwanese stations 
made sense of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony.
Chapter 8 extends this analysis of multifarious meaning-making by 
asking how different non-official actors tried to use China’s networked 
spectacles to intervene in domestic Chinese discourses. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of theoretical arguments that envisage 
spectacles as powerful semiotic machines that effectively abolish the 
audience’s ability to distinguish between reality and fiction. In contrast 
to this view, I present various examples of how actors at the Shanghai 
Expo reprogrammed meanings either to directly challenge or subtly 
shift what they perceived of as ‘dominant’ discourses. This included 
foreign national pavilions that aimed to persuade Chinese visitors of 
their ideological positions, but also the officially commissioned theme 
pavilions in which private domestic and foreign actors collaborated to 
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make meanings that did not fit with the official narratives of, for instance, 
the China Pavilion. This became particularly visible at the exhibition 
dedicated to showing visions of the future, where audiences were thrust 
into a utopian space that confronted them with ambiguous artistic 
imaginations of hypermodernity. Finally, the chapter turns to a case of 
domestic actors intervening in political discourses during a networked 
spectacle, specifically looking at the way that publications by the Southern 
Media Group in Canton took official discourses on the day of the PRC 
anniversary to create ambivalent statements about the Chinese nation, 
inviting readers to either follow the familiar nationalist framework the 
authorities promoted or step into alternative interpretations that opened 
up the potential for radically different blends of meanings regarding the 
Chinese nation at that particular moment in history.
To conclude these analyses, chapter 9 summarises the findings 
from the various chapters and emphasises the two main arguments 
of this book: that China’s recent networked spectacles can shed light 
on the frameworks of meaning that inform politics in the PRC today, 
and that such events can help us understand in what ways politics and 
communication generally intersect in complex, modern societies. Aside 
from highlighting how the studies in this book might provide conceptual 
insights into 21st-century networked politics, the conclusion also stresses 
the continuities between China’s networked spectacles during the Hu-
Wen period and the discursive efforts that Xi Jinping’s administration has 
subsequently made in its attempts to govern contemporary China.
2 Arriving on the World Stage
In the summer of 2010, I had reserved several weeks of research time to 
visit Shanghai and explore the expansive Expo territory. Media coverage 
both in China and abroad had reported on the many superlatives that 
marked the event: it was meant to be the world fair featuring the largest 
number of nations, the largest territory, and the most visitors. The city 
itself was plastered with expo posters and public service announcements, 
some extolling the virtues of a ‘better city, better life’ — the official 
slogan of the event — while others used the expo as an occasion to 
promote specific institutions or companies. One large poster announced 
that ‘soldiers and civilians welcome the expo hand in hand’ (军民携手
迎世博); another advertised ‘harmony alcohol’ (Hejiu 和酒), a drink that 
according to the ads also proudly witnessed previous national events such 
as Hong Kong’s return to the PRC, the establishment of direct flights to 
Taiwan, or the Beijing Olympics (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Advertisement for ‘Harmony Alcohol’ during the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition. 
Image © F. Schneider 2010.
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As I was travelling on the recently constructed metro line number 8 
south to the expo stop at Yaohua Road, TV screens blasted expo news 
at commuters: ‘330 million visitors so far’, ‘temperature outside now 40 
degrees Celsius’, ‘visitors should stay in the shade; drink plenty of liquids’. 
At the stop, I filed through the underground tunnels with the crowd, past 
the security check and main entrance, and up onto the walkway spanning 
the ‘Expo Axis’, an elevated concourse that ran from the southern Pudong 
entrances north across the territory. The red China Pavilion towered 
to the east, commanding immediate attention, and beyond it lay an 
impressive landscape of futuristic constructions. To the west, behind the 
large Expo centre and the theme pavilions, bizarre buildings rose before 
the backdrop of the massive Lupu Bridge. Below, thousands of people 
were lining up to enter popular exhibits, pouring into the shaded areas 
to escape the sun, marvelling at the grand edifices all around, snapping 
selfies, and filming the vistas on their mobiles. The lights, the sounds, 
the super-sized attractions, everything seemed designed to overwhelm. 
The Shanghai World Exposition was a spectacle, a large-scale staged 
event that is organised in such a way that it has a profound impact on 
participants, due to its elaborate designs and multi-modal aesthetics. 
It was also a ‘mass’ event, in that it mobilised large numbers of people, 
and it relied on these masses to truly become spectacular. What is 
more, the spectacle was ‘networked’, bringing together a diverse array 
of actors who would plan, organise, execute, and ultimately embody the 
expo experience, which created a challenge, but also an opportunity to 
experiment with various ways of handling such complex interactions. 
Throughout this book, I use the term ‘networked spectacle’ to describe 
major sports events, national celebrations, and international exhibitions, 
but what precisely characterises such events? In this chapter, I discuss 
how scholarship has traditionally made sense of staged events, what 
role mass mobilisation plays in that context, and what happens when 
events are mediated, for instance through broadcasting technologies. 
While many of these discussions also relate to spontaneous events such 
as natural disasters, accidents, and unanticipated social revelations, my 
focus here is primarily on carefully organised and widely anticipated 
staged spectacles. 
An important question in that context is what makes an event a 
‘mass event’? What distinguishes, for example, a private birthday party, 
a friendly game of dodge ball, or a museum exhibit from a national 
anniversary, the Olympic Summer Games, or a world’s fair? Intuitively, 
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the simple answer would be that it is the scale, and the degree to which 
an event is relayed through mass media such as broadcasting, that makes 
it a mass event. This indeed captures crucial dimensions of mass events, 
but it does not tell the whole story.
The experience at the Shanghai Expo I have described above provides 
a glimpse into the impact that a mass event can have on visitors. My first 
visit to the event left me, frankly, awestruck. I have since heard many 
visitors and participants report a similar sense of wonder when they 
recall their visits to the site; a sense that they were witnessing something 
extraordinary. This sense of amazement is a crucial part of networked 
spectacles more generally.
What, then, makes networked spectacles tick? One important 
observation about these spectacles comes from sociologists who have 
studied mass events, and who have argued that they constitute a specific 
‘genre’ of collective human activity that has much to do with ‘modernity’. 
Another important insight stems from media studies scholars, who point 
out that media technologies shape the meanings of organised media 
events, that basic narrative templates turn them into shared stories, and 
that such processes create a wellspring of collective symbols that form 
a ‘symbolic universe’ (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 92-108). This ‘galaxy 
of symbols’, as Rydell (1984: 3) calls it, is then deployed to various 
ends. Finally, we should keep in mind that such events have profound, 
transformative social impacts and that varying stakeholders try to use 
them for their own political or commercial purposes. Together, these 
considerations then provide the foundation for understanding how 
and why the Chinese authorities have placed such a high premium on 
organising these types of events.
2.1	 Mass	events	and	modernity
To have better purchase on the workings of networked spectacles, 
this chapter explores the meanings of terms like ‘mass’, ‘media’, and 
‘spectacle’, moving from discussions of organised large-scale events 
to mediated spectacles, and examining along the way what makes 
sport events, parades, or world fairs the highly political affairs I refer 
to as networked spectacles throughout this book. First, it is prudent to 
ask what marks an event as a ‘mass’ event. I have suggested above that 
the answer might simply be scale. After all, a group of friends playing 
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music together is a decidedly different ‘happening’ from a rock concert 
with an audience of thousands. However, it is not the scale alone that 
‘massifies’ events. Scale is a shorthand; a container for a set of complex 
processes that inform how such events work. The scale of an event has 
organisational and social consequences, it is linked to the broad public 
appeal that organisers attempt to build into such an event, and it has 
psychological implications for those who participate in it. 
All of these dimensions are closely tied to modernity. Modernity is a 
set of human actions and cognitive frameworks that imply certain ways 
of going about life. Where they are adopted, these modern ways of life 
have profound implications, radically restructuring our world across at 
least five dimensions, all of which are interconnected: economics, the 
environment, politics, society, and thought. 
Economically, modernity emphasises industrialisation, urbanisation, 
and economies of scale. It implies increased connectivity between natural 
resources and chains of production, and widespread dissemination of 
material goods for rapid increases in welfare. These results, and the many 
shortcomings or ‘distortions’ that accompany them, can be brought 
about by a variety of mechanisms, be they centrally planned or derived 
from the capitalist model of ostensibly free markets. 
The construction of modern economies is closely intertwined with 
urban development, industrial construction, and resource extraction, 
which in turn recast our natural environment in often radically new ways, 
with all the detrimental environmental impacts associated with invasive 
human activity. The scale of these changes has led some scholars to refer 
to our current historical period as the Anthropocene, an age in which 
humans affect their global environment more than that environment 
affects them (see Duara 2015). 
Politically, modern modes of organisation combine territorially 
defined participatory politics and hierarchical decision-making 
structures to make it possible to govern the large numbers of people 
required for advanced industrial production, that is: the ‘masses’. Much 
as with economic models, the challenge of governing large populations 
across expansive territories has generated diverse strategies, some 
authoritarian, others democratic, but all tied to the invention of the 
nation-state, a quintessential technology of modernity (see Gellner 
1983/2006). 
Socially and culturally, modernity creates pressures to reform 
or wholly abandon previously influential institutions, removing or 
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revamping the power of clans, families, temples, and churches, relegating 
many communal activities to the ‘private’ realm, and transferring power 
and the responsibility over public activities to the increasingly complex 
system of the nation-state. 
This then also entails a conceptual rethinking of what society is and 
how people fit into the modern world. Modernity implies that human 
history is a linear progression through time, driven by philosophical 
enlightenment as well as scientific and technological progress, notably 
progress in the areas that ‘shrink’ our world (e.g. transportation and 
communication), and it prompts a number of ideological innovations 
meant to weave the disparate, disruptive elements of modernity into 
a coherent explanation of the world that suggests a fundamental yet 
inevitable breach with the times that came before.
Viewed this way, it should be clear that modernity does not neatly mark 
a specific historical phase or era. As I have discussed in the introduction, 
scholars of modernity have pointed out that the very idea of historical 
‘ages’ or ‘eras’ is itself an invention of modernity (e.g. Graeber 2004), 
and I have suggested elsewhere (Schneider 2018: ch.2) that it might be 
fruitful instead to think of modernity as a ‘mode’ of social arrangement 
that has spawned a set of conceptual and practical technologies. This 
mode interacts across different times and places with other modes (e.g. 
‘tradition’, ‘the digital’, etc.), imbuing each locale with modern rationales 
about how life should be organised, but also creating an endless array 
of variations on the modern theme (see also Gluck 2011, Hobwbawm 
1983/2013), even if many modern assumptions have their origin in a 
specific ‘Euromodernity’ (Dirlik 2011c: 4) derived from enlightenment-
era experiences dating back roughly three centuries (see also Dirlik 
2011a). As a consequence, many contemporary societies strive to be 
‘modern’, and yet, for example, Chinese modernity is not quite the same 
as American modernity, British modernity, Japanese modernity, and so 
forth. This is the result of complex human acts of social assemblage. 
The reason I sketch these contours of modernity here is that the 
very idea of a ‘mass’ event is a decidedly modern affair. It is through 
the modern mode of thinking that artists, politicians, merchants, 
dissidents and so on invent the mass public in the first place; modernity 
opens up innovative ways for actors to inspire group cohesion, provide 
entertainment, teach certain lessons, illustrate their beliefs, and make 
a particular social reality plausible. As Collins (2004: 1647) writes, large-
scale sporting events are, for instance, ‘scheduled, predictable, and 
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contrived (using a ritual technology to generate what might be considered 
an artificial ritual experience), and they bring together a community that 
has no other coherence, and no other purpose, than the experience of the 
peaks of ritual emotions itself ’. 
Of course, pre-modern societies also featured large communal events, 
such as pagan festivals and religious celebrations (see Dowden 2000: 178-
179 & 202-203), or contests like the ancient Olympic Games or Roman 
gladiator matches (see the various contributions in Christensen et al. 
2014, particularly Dunkle 2014, Fagan 2014, and Kyle 2014). There are 
indeed parallels between these precursors and later mass events, which 
often pick up on traditional themes and tropes to then reinvent them in 
contemporary contexts. However, pre-modern antecedents that involved 
large numbers of people are themselves better classified as ‘large-scale 
events’ rather than as ‘mass events’, since the latter take on new qualities 
in terms of organisation, participation, and social relevance. During 
mass events, actors incorporate and tie together various elements of 
modernity, which sets these events apart from earlier examples. Take 
the idea of the international event: pre-modern events in ancient Athens 
or Rome, for example, may to some extent have been multi-cultural, 
drawing participants from diverse locales in the Hellenic and Roman 
worlds, but such spectacles were never ‘inter-national’ (i.e. taking place 
between nations) — the technology of the ‘nation’ had not yet been 
invented, and an ‘international’ order emerged only at the onset of 
modernity (Anderson 2006), after the late middle ages in Europe (Gellner 
1983/2006). 
In that sense, the mass event is itself a modern technology, and as 
such it requires a number of ideational and organisational changes to 
the templates that pre-modern events arguably provided, for instance 
recasting participants as ‘the masses’, designing the event as a vehicle for 
popular mobilisation, presenting the event as ‘historic’ and as an instance 
of ‘progress’, and tying its organisational practices to the nation-state 
and modern forms of industrial production. 
This close link between mass events and modernity has ensured 
that these events have become a calling card for signalling modernist 
credentials. This is the case for national mass events like parades and 
mass assemblies, which serve to mobilise large numbers of people in the 
name of a modern cause while also signalling the citizenry’s ostensible 
support for that cause. Military parades are a good example of how 
a mass event template has become adopted and shared as a genre of 
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modernity (see Figure 2.2), even among actors who would otherwise 
insist that their modern projects shared very little in common. Despite 
variations in execution and message, the general format and iconography 
of contemporary American, French, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, or North 
Korean national celebrations overlap eerily with each other, as well as 
with past mass events organised e.g. in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, 
or Mao’s China. A good example of this is military parades. It would seem 
that a society does not qualify as a modern nation if its state does not 
march its means of exerting violence across urban boulevards and squares 
at regular intervals. It should come as no surprise that those who agitate 
on behalf of radically nativist modern projects, for instance Donald 
Trump, are so enamoured by such displays of state power. Indeed, the 
lack of such events in countries like contemporary Germany and Japan 
often gives both foreign and domestic pundits with conservative, realist 
leanings cause to lament that these nation-states are not (yet) ‘normal’ 
members of international society.
Figure 2.2: Parades on France’s Bastille Day, 14 July 1790 and 2014. Image (left): Wikimedia Commons 
2017; Image (right): Pierre-Yves Beaudouin 2014 (both Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0). 
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bastille_Day_2014_Paris_-_Color_guards_034.jpg) 
It is not just national mass events like military parades and state 
anniversaries that provide modernist certification. Events like Olympic 
Games and World Expositions similarly offer organisers the opportunity 
to showcase their relevance on the world stage in a widely accepted and 
shared international format. It is a mark of honour and respect to be 
awarded the chance to host one of these prestigious events, and host 
cities and countries use such occasions to boost their own ‘brand’. This 
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has real social and economic consequences, which I will return to below, 
but the relevance of international events is to no small degree symbolic. 
East Asian examples are illustrative in this regard: in Japan, the 1964 
Tokyo Olympics were a watershed moment in the country’s post-war 
reconstruction. The event signalled to the international community that 
the State of Japan had moved on from its wartime past and was ready 
to be a member of the international community. Moreover, the Olympic 
Games provided an opportunity to redesign the city of Tokyo in ways that 
would revitalise its symbolic relevance as the country’s post-war capital 
(Tagsold 2010). Six years later, the Osaka World Exposition extended this 
sense of a fresh start, showing off futuristic architectural designs and 
technological innovations that would herald a new era of prosperity and 
respect for modern Japan (Wilson 2012). 
South Korea’s government attempted to follow the Japanese example 
in 1988 by hosting the Olympic Games in its capital Seoul. The leadership 
had initially hoped to legitimate its dictatorial politics, though the event 
later turned out inadvertently to have created a stage for the democratic 
opposition further to promote South Korea’s political transition 
towards electoral reform (see Bridges 2008 and Larson & Park 1993), 
demonstrating how modern mass events can become arenas for complex 
domestic political assemblages. 
The PRC leadership seems to have at least implicitly modelled its 
approach to international mass events on Japan’s example as well. As 
Wasserstrom (2016: 10-11) writes:
China’s leaders might have, at least in private, considered the Tokyo 
1964/Beijing 2008 analogy compelling on several levels — even if 
their suspicion of a historic adversary (and present competitor) 
made them reluctant to voice this sentiment openly. China, too, 
had been rapidly climbing the global economic hierarchy and 
wanted to move higher still. It was preparing to follow its turn at 
the Olympics with its own Expo ... China’s own modern history 
had seen moments of such destructive extremism (the Great Leap 
Forward) and defeat (Japanese invasions in the 1930s) that, by 2008, 
it had good reason to want to put those experiences far behind it.
The Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Exposition showcased, in 
quick succession, images of a hyper-modern China that was ready to be 
a responsible partner in world affairs, and this imagery in turn promised 
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to legitimate the leadership’s model of development, ‘one that is neither 
purely state socialist nor free market, but that advertises a vision of 
success for the twenty-first century’ (Fernsebner 2010: 669). 
The international mass event is an excellent format for generating 
a sense of membership in the international community, among both 
domestic and foreign audiences, since it provides an opportunity to 
present locally produced cultural and political discourses using an 
internationally acceptable grammar and iconography. Events like 
Olympic Games and World Expositions come with a range of international 
community markers, whether in the form of institutionalised rituals such 
as flag raisings, the playing of anthems, and other ceremonies, or in the 
form of background processes that have established themselves as ‘best-
practice’ procedures, e.g. commercial sponsorships, advertising, and 
diplomatic protocols. To demonstrate literacy in this language of the 
mass event is tantamount to being initiated into the club of respectable 
modern nations. 
2.2	 Common	themes	in	mass	events
The close connection between mass events and modernity imbues them 
with a recurring set of themes, which often interact in contradictory ways. 
These themes are most visible in the discourses that mass events produce 
— in press announcements and speeches, in exhibits and ceremonies — 
but they can run deep through social interactions, informing how agents 
produce, stage, and experience such events. Scholars of mass events have 
examined the many modernist dimensions of event discourses in great 
detail, with Maurice Roche (2003) arguably providing the most thorough 
discussion in his seminal book Mega-Events and Modernity. I will confine 
my brief overview to some of the most common and most hotly-debated 
dimensions: the legacies of imperialism and colonialism, and the ways 
these legacies are implicated in racist and sexist practices; capitalist 
themes, particularly in their neoliberal guise, with their close connection 
to representations of modern science, technology, and design; and the 
ubiquitous tensions between nationalism, internationalism, supra-
nationalism, and cosmopolitanism.
Many mass events have their roots in imperial projects of the 18th 
and 19th centuries. This is certainly true of the bombastic grand military 
parades popular for example in Victorian England, Napoleon’s France, 
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Tsarist Russia, or the Prussian-led German Empire. Urban sites like the 
Arc de Triomphe in Paris or Horse Guards Parade in London remain 
monuments to such traditions. Yet imperialist themes have also been 
at the core of many large-scale exhibitions: the modern world fair may 
have officially started as a national exhibition in 19th-century France and 
England, but the format was intimately tied to, and in some instances 
coterminous with, imperialist ambitions that stretched far beyond the 
respective domestic context. 
In fact, displaying faux native villages of exotic colonial lands and 
the goods and peoples of fantastic ‘Oriental’ places was a hallmark of 
exposition culture (see Qureshi 2011), for instance at ‘imperial expos’ and 
insidious colonial ‘human zoos’ (see Figure 2.3). Examples include the 
exhibits at the 1851 Great Exhibition in London with their breakdown of 
foreign cultures into colonial resources and raw materials (Greenhalgh 
2011: 98 & 103), the ‘displays’ of actual Apache and Igorot tribespeople 
at the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis (Gilbert 2009), or 
the many ‘Völkerschau’ colonial events in Germany, where organisers 
like zookeeper Carl Hagenbeck showcased ‘savages’ from Austronesia, 
Lapland, Northern Africa, or Greenland (Dreesbach 2005). Examining 
American expositions at the close of the 19th century, Rydell (1984: 6) 
writes:
World’s fairs existed as part of a broader universe of white 
supremacist entertainments; what distinguished them were their 
scientific, artistic, and political underpinnings. Whether or not 
they were the most important sources for shaping racial beliefs, 
they certainly were among the most authoritative. International 
expositions, where science, religion, the arts, and architecture 
reinforced each other, offered Americans a powerful and highly 
visible, modern, evolutionary justification for long-standing racial 
and cultural prejudices.  
Roche (2003: 57-64) has chronicled similar practices in Britain, 
highlighting the dominance of imperialist themes during a series of 
expo events in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, culminating in the 
1924/1925 British Empire Exhibition in London’s Wembley Park. His 
assessment of the ideological thrust of such events is worth quoting here 
in full (Ibid.: 60):
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... imperial expos were ideological vehicles used to impress 
national publics, and also to present an image to other 
imperialist powers. They typically displayed the cultures of their 
colonies as different, exotic and interesting, but also as flawed, 
inferior, stagnant or otherwise ‘in need’ of the imperial nation’s 
intervention to control their destinies. Connected with this they 
typically developed and promoted a uniquely national ‘civilizing 
mission’ ideology involving notions of the imperial nation’s 
scientific and technological superiority enabling them to create 
tangible improvements and ‘progress’ through transformation 
and land use, culture and people in the colonies. The British, 
French and Americans all had their own particular versions of 
this ‘progress-bringing’ ‘civilising mission’ as a thematic running 
through and connecting both their imperial expos and their more 
conventionally internationalist expos.
Imperialist ambitions and colonial practices infused the world fair genre 
with strong racist and orientalist currents, relaying the host country’s 
‘civilising mission’, and often putting the naked bodies of ‘primitives’ 
on display to fuel European and American colonialist rationales. It has 
been one of the core criticism of world expositions that such racist, 
and frequently sexist, fantasies remain undercurrents in contemporary 
iterations, albeit in subtler guises. William Callahan (2012: 256), for 
Figure 2.3: Colonial Exhibitions and Human Zoos. Left: Image titled ‘Chief El Capitano and Archers in 
Negrito Village’, 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition (Missouri History Museum, public domain); Right: 
Poster for the 1928 Human Zoo in Stuttgart (public domain). 
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instance, outlines the recurring practice at the Shanghai Expo 2010 of 
telling ostensibly cosmopolitan stories of intercultural exchange through 
the trope of inter-civilisational marriages between European or American 
men and Chinese women, reproducing subtle power relations through 
gendered and racially charged stereotypes, ‘suggesting that this is the 
proper global harmony of East and West’.
Imperialist and colonialist representations with their many insidious 
racist and sexist themes have indeed continued to shape the narratives 
of mass events throughout their history, but they have also interacted 
in complicated ways with other themes, for example when proponents 
of universal suffrage or of workers’ rights promoted more egalitarian 
ideas through sports or exposition genres. Indeed, mass events are 
full of such tensions, which should not come as a surprise: such events 
provide diverse social and political groups access to conduits of power 
(Roche 2003: 39), providing microcosms in which the social, political, 
and economic contradictions of the times come to be reflected. In a way, 
they allow actors to create what Jameson (2007: 15) has called ‘utopian 
enclaves’: spaces in which alternatives to the mainstream can be imagined 
and acted out. 
This is particularly evident in the way capitalism informs mass events 
and their depiction of modernity. Organising mass events is made 
possible through state and industry investments, and capitalist actors 
in turn use these events to turn a profit while simultaneously promoting 
discourses that justify their preferred modes of production and 
consumption. These discourses are often steeped in modernist tropes of 
technological progress, urban development, and large-scale industrial 
or urban achievements (factories, edifices, bridges, etc). Just take as an 
example the industrialist exhibits that are regularly placed at the centre 
of modern world expositions (see Figure 2.4 for a historical example). 
What is more, mass events generate ‘box office’ revenues and function 
as trade shows, create big business opportunities for merchandising and 
advertising, and are also generally flanked by commercial activities in the 
tourism industry (Yu et al. 2012). 
Yet as unabashedly capitalist as these events may be, they also provide 
spaces to reassess prevalent modes of development, for instance by 
moving away from economies of scale and emphasising ecologically 
sustainable local production and consumption patterns. They also offer 
unions and labour groups an opportunity to promote their causes, and 
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they shine a spotlight on the relationship between professional and 
amateur activities, for instance in sports.
Another recurring thematic tension surrounds the role of nations at 
mass events. Nationalism is very much on display at world fairs, where 
‘national pavilions’ have been a core feature since the 1876 Philadelphia 
expo (Roche 2003: 45). During Olympic Games and other large sporting 
events, contests are frequently framed as standoffs between national 
teams or athletes. A case in point is the antagonism that frequently 
accompanies competitions between East Asian national football or 
baseball teams (see Mangan et al. 2013), but such nationalist antagonisms 
also fuel sports spectatorship more broadly. The fervour that medal 
tables generate among supporters of Olympic national teams serves as 
a reminder of this nationalist dimension in an ostensibly cosmopolitan 
sports endeavour (see Van Hilvoorde et al. 2010). As Rowe and his 
colleagues write (1998: 133), ‘there is surely no cultural force more equal 
to the task as creating an imaginary national unity than the international 
sports-media complex.’
Figure 2.4: Quintessential Modernity: The ‘Gallery of Machines’ at the 1889 Exposition Universelle 
Internationale in Paris. Image in the public domain through the US Library of Congress (tag: PD-old-
auto-1923).
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Many mass events are decidedly inter-nationalist in this sense, 
meaning that they portray the world as naturally divided into nations 
that compete — but also cooperate — with each other on fair and equal 
terms. Nations, their states, and the idea of ‘countries’ are often conflated 
at mass events, and Penelope Harvey (1996: 50-51) has made the case that 
this is not per se a contradiction, at least not within the European and 
American model of society that provides the conceptual building blocks 
for modern mass events. She writes:
The model depends upon a metaphor of scale, whereby the larger 
unit, whether this is taken to be a national or an international 
community, reproduces the form of its constituent parts. Both part 
and whole function as self-contained, coherent, bounded entities 
which are mutual transformations of each other through simple 
principles of aggregation and disaggregation. These principles 
of equivalence between social units (individuals, nations, states, 
etc.) tend to naturalize a particular form of sociality in which each 
individual unit is deemed to hold a particular identity which can be 
represented and contrasted with other similar units. Thus, while 
individual units differ from each other, there is an equivalence in 
this difference. 
However, international mass events have also been instrumentalised 
in the name of supra-nationalist endeavours, most notoriously by Nazi 
Germany, but also during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the 
United States of America each tried to co-opt the Olympic movement 
as part of their superpower ambitions (cf. Roche 2003: 112-115). Such 
attempts have at times departed radically from the egalitarian and 
individualist models of sociality that Harvey describes, and it is an 
open question whether contemporary iterations also betray such supra-
national motives: some observers have for instance made the case that 
Chinese mass events are instances of a wholly different supra-national 
world model (see Barabantseva 2009, 2012), one that starts from the 
level of ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia 天下; see Zhao 2005), and then extends 
cosmological rationales to various other relations (e.g. between state and 
citizen, between husband and wife, between father and son). 
I will return to such arguments in later chapters, especially in 
chapter 6, but it is important to note here that the constituent parts and 
themes of mass events do not always connect neatly. This is apparent 
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from the tensions between nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses: 
sitting  alongside inter-nationalist and supra-nationalist themes, mass 
events also have a dimension that emphasises unrestrained transnational 
exchanges between individual people, civil society groups, and 
enterprises. 
Take, for example, the theme of the Beijing Olympics, which explicitly 
envisaged an event that would bring transnational participants and 
audiences together as ‘One World’ sharing ‘One Dream’, or the way that 
the Shanghai Expo mascot I discussed in the introduction uses the Chinese 
character for people (ren 人) as inspiration. In a similar vein, the 2010 
expo logo resembles three people holding hands, forming the Chinese 
character for ‘world’ (shi 世). Such thematic choices sit awkwardly next 
to nationalist flag-raising ceremonies at sporting events and displays of 
international power hierarchies in the form of exposition pavilions. 
In all of this, modernist conceptions of science, technology, and 
design run through the mass events, conceptually connecting discourses 
of neoliberal capital, industrial nation, and cosmopolitan citizens of the 
world. Parades and ceremonies frequently feature floats, performances, 
or speeches that evoke technological development and progress, but 
the most arresting visual representations of this discourse are found 
at world expositions, where organisers create futuristic visions of what 
society should become. Again, these visions are never entirely unified. 
Greenhalgh (2011: 235) points out how ideas about design and architecture 
have created contradictions at post-war world expositions:
Most [expos] were the site of tensions between a number of visions 
of design and architecture: design as a means of supporting 
an expanding capitalist economy, design as a disinterested art 
form, design as a vehicle for political propaganda, design as an 
enlightenment tool for the creation of a better world. More simply, 
they celebrated the clash of material pragmatism with idealist 
utopianism. Never was the desire to improve the world more 
completely intertwined with the determination to make money. 
Mass events indeed weave together civilisational messages with nationalist 
glorifications, racist prejudices, and sexist stereotypes, but they also 
juxtapose and contrast seemingly dominant visions of materialist, 
capitalist modernity with alternatives: with idealistic design choices, 
promises of egalitarian futures, and spaces for diverse interactions. This 
64 Staging China
makes mass events highly complex, multifaceted, and ultimately messy 
affairs that are, in Greenhalgh’s words, ‘all too human’ (ibid.). But how do 
visitors interact with these many thematic tensions, and what happens to 
this complexity once mass events turn into media events, that is: once actors 
with access to mass media distribution networks relay meanings about 
such events, turning them into ‘high holidays of mass communication’ 
that hang ‘a halo over the television set’ (Dayan & Katz 1994: 1)?
2.3	 From	mass	event	to	media	spectacle
I have so far discussed mass events, that is: large-scale events designed 
and staged to attract mass participation by mobilising modern subjects as 
citizens and/or consumers. The genre of the mass event has traditionally 
been patronising in its messages, often explicitly and unapologetically 
so: opening ceremonies, parades, and exhibits are meant to teach, to 
showcase, to convince, and sometimes to preach. An open question is 
whether these didactics can have the desired effect, but also how the 
planned and organised mass event ‘travels’ as it is communicated more 
widely, using modern information and communication technologies 
like newspapers and broadcasting. What happens when the mass event 
becomes a media event? 
Arguably the seminal work on media events is Dayan & Katz’s 
(1994) study of ceremonial events that are televised live, such as sports 
competitions, royal weddings, state funerals, high-profile diplomatic 
exchanges, and so on. As Dayan & Katz show, such events become a crucial 
part of public life. The broadcasting becomes an almost sacred moment 
that commands the attention of national and international audiences. 
It interrupts and disrupts everyday activities, but it does so in a highly 
planned and advertised fashion, which in turn makes televised events an 
excellent vehicle for community building, political discourses, and the 
construction of historic moments. Dayan & Katz outline the stories that 
govern such media events, which they classify into ‘contests, conquests, 
and coronations’; each of these genres provides communicative and 
narrative tools to create arguments about contemporary society and 
inspire various kinds of loyalty.
Dayan & Katz’s account was pathbreaking at the time of its publication, 
and even though its cases and its singular focus on television may seem 
anachronistic now, the many insightful observations about how audiences 
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experience historic events through television can tell us much about 
mediation and media psychology. As Sonnevend (2018: 125) writes in her 
appreciation of Dayan & Katz’s book, ‘there are still moments that glue 
millions and occasionally billions to screens, there are still events that 
are discussed for years to come, setting a standard for future occasions’. 
I will pick up some of these threads below, in my discussion of media 
priming and framing, but I will otherwise depart from Dayan & Katz’s 
work in two important ways. Firstly, I trace many of the social and 
discursive practices surrounding mass events to domains that lie outside 
television broadcasting (for a similar update of iconic events in the 
context of transnational mediation see Sonnevend 2016). TV still plays 
a major role in how audiences experience mass events today, but so do 
digital reproductions of, interventions into, and alternatives to the classic 
broadcasting process, e.g. in the form of edited DVDs or Youtube videos. 
I have also analysed cultural products such as exhibitions, newspaper 
articles, online commentaries, PR materials, and so on, which requires 
attention to wider realms of mediation. 
Secondly, and maybe more crucially, my interest goes beyond 
mediation; it lies with the various ways in which actors negotiate, 
collaborate, but also contest and challenge the meanings that get 
assembled at mass events. I am interested in how this multitude of actors 
uses mass events to experiment with and establish forms of governance. 
This is arguably a dimension that Dayan & Katz sidestep, and it is for this 
reason that my own analysis focuses primarily on networks.
Nevertheless, mediation is an important component of contemporary 
mass events, and the term ‘media event’ rightly draws attention to this 
dimension. Much of what was true for televised mass events at the time 
that Dayan & Katz published their work remains true today. For instance, 
it is important to call into mind the different audiences that play a role 
during mediated events. 
As Rauer (2006: 260) explains, ‘audiences’ interact with mediated 
events and their messages at three levels. The ‘first-order audience’ 
includes the people who witness the event first-hand, for instance the 
visitors to a world fair or the stadium crowd at a sports event. Members 
of this audience are an important element of the spectacle, since they 
participate directly and become part of the performance or activity. 
Their interactions create the kind of ‘entrainment’ that Collins (2004: 
85) discusses: bodily experiences, often based on collective rhythmic 
activities, such as cheering, laughing, applauding, enacting a ‘wave’, 
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hugging, singing, etc, and which create a large part of the emotional 
dynamics that make networked spectacles so powerful (see also chapter 
5 in this book). As Collins writes (ibid.: 75), ‘this is essentially what the 
lure of the game-spectacle is all about: the pleasure of those moments of 
having one’s own emotions raised by a noisy crowd expressing the same 
thing.’
The ‘second-order audience’, following Rauer (2006), consists of the 
media workers who filter, rework, and relay the event on the ground. These 
specialists create the mass-media product that will then circulate through 
media networks, providing semiotic signposts for how to understand the 
event, and blending different potential meanings to create discourse. 
Through these interactions, media workers of course also witness the 
staged spectacle as participants, making choices as to what elements to 
represent and in what way, and their interactions can lead them to feel 
swept away by the entrainment that the event encourages. Second-order 
actors of this sort are not removed from the spectacle, they do not stand 
outside it as disaffected observers; they are part of the events interaction 
ritual chains. 
Finally, the ‘third-order audience’ consists of viewers and readers 
who experience the event through media, e.g. through newspapers, 
radio, and television broadcasts, and increasingly through digital relay 
technologies associated with the internet. Importantly, these audience 
members are not passive consumers either; they blend various meanings 
as they experience the mediated event, and they interact with others, 
relaying their impressions through their bodily reactions and discursive 
statements, for instance as they watch the event unfold in a pub, celebrate 
it at a friend’s place, read about it in the news while sitting in a café amidst 
strangers, or comment on it at the office after having watched it at home, 
alone, with a cold alcoholic beverage.
In that sense, all of these actors, whether they are part of the first, 
second, or third order audience, collaborate in creating the discourses 
through their actions, for example by cheering or booing (first order), 
by assembling information and commenting on the event (second 
order), or by discussing the event with other media users (third order). 
Today, digitally enabled third-order audiences may even feed their own 
discourses back into the media production cycle, for instance when 
commenting on Youtube videos, ‘liking’ certain articles on social media, 
or micro-blogging live and directly to members of first-, second-, or third-
order audiences as events unfold in real time.
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Rauer’s distinction between different orders of audiences is a 
reminder that networked spectacles involve a staggering number of 
people, in different roles, who all participate in constructing discourses. 
This is not to say, however, that the meanings that emerge through such 
events are arbitrary, or that generating these meanings is a free-for-all. 
Not all participants are equal. Organisers of networked spectacles have 
the power to set the guideposts within which discourses are subsequently 
constructed, and gatekeepers in the mass media are positioned at crucial 
nodes in the complex communication networks that allow them to decide 
if and how the event is relayed to a mass audience. 
I have discussed above how network theory might shed light on how 
power works during these processes. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I want to point out two interrelated mechanisms that allow media 
workers to create the mediated event and assemble its discourse in 
ways that encourage specific interpretations. These are the ability firstly 
to construct the event as a spectacle and secondly to rely on certain 
psychological mechanisms to affect other actors: priming audiences with 
symbolic meanings, setting the news agenda once the event occurs, and 
framing the issues that revolve around the event. 
2.4	 Programming	the	spectacle
Mass events are a genre of entertainment, but they are also what Jäger 
(2004) has called ‘discursive events’; they are opportunities to highlight 
specific issues and revamp their meanings. There are of course many 
more types of discursive events than those I discuss in this book, many of 
which come to function as ‘natural’ rather than ‘formal’ rituals (Collins 
2004: 70). Natural disasters, wars and crimes, major accidents, or the 
activities of celebrities can all become discursive events in their own 
right. These are occasions for actors in positions of power to legitimate 
authority, rationalise social processes, and construct risks (see also Beck 
1992). 
Discursive events provide opportunities to politicise certain issues, 
i.e. turning them into problems that then require state action and the 
allocation of public resources (see Edelman 1988: ch.2). They can 
even lead to a process that scholars from the Copenhagen School of 
international politics have called ‘securitising’: the construction of issues 
as existential threats that require emergency measures that take place 
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outside the sphere of established rules (Wæver 2004). Discursive events 
can be occasions to stage a collective crisis.
These processes can play a role in any event that becomes relayed 
through discourses, mediated to a large audience, and constructed as 
spectacularly important. Mass events are particularly interesting in 
this regard because they are explicitly designed to be spectacular, and 
positively so. Such large-scale spectacles require a certain degree of ‘buy-
in’ on the part of the audiences. Mass events encourage participants and 
viewers to suspend their disbelief; they prompt audiences simultaneously 
to view the spectacle as exceptional while accepting its premise and its 
messages as so crucial that they potentially become unquestionable. 
Spectacles consist of discursive manipulations that invite audiences 
to switch off their critical faculties and embrace coherent yet artificial 
narratives, at least for a time. I believe this is what Guy Debord (1967/2010: 
12) meant when he wrote:
The spectacle presents itself as something enormously positive, 
indisputable and inaccessible. It says nothing more than ‘that 
which appears is good, that which is good appears’. The attitude 
which it demands in principle is passive acceptance which in fact 
it already obtained by its manner of appearing without reply, by its 
monopoly of appearance.
To Debord, the degree to which he believed society had embraced the 
spectacular was a matter of profound concern. While one might take 
issue with Debord’s interpretation of spectators as passive audiences, 
much of his criticism is worth taking seriously. 
That said, it is also important to acknowledge that spectacles are able 
to generate a ‘monopoly of appearance’ only because they are highly 
appealing and indeed rewarding. They have to be, otherwise they would 
not succeed. Witnessing and experiencing a spectacle is profoundly 
gratifying, since it promises to sweep us up in a comfortable, immersive 
bubble of fun and wonder. This is why we are able to engross ourselves in 
theme parks, fun fairs, blockbuster movies, page-turner novels, triple-A 
video games, and so on. The spectacular is enjoyable, both on a personal 
level and as a social event. Our interactions at such events imbue them 
with meaning and ‘emotional energy’ (Collins 2004: 68), which makes 
them memorable.
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However, spectacles contain within them two major elements that 
make them ideological, in the pejorative sense that they promote a false 
consciousness of social relations that ultimately threatens to reinforce 
systems of oppression. The first issue here is that the spectacular is 
created through material processes that are frequently linked to acts of 
exploitation, e.g. when modern spectacles like theme parks or blockbuster 
movies are created within a capitalist economy that enables commercial 
elites to extract profits by deploying wage labour. Our pleasure as members 
of the audience is built on numerous invisible moments of alienation for 
those who are producing the spectacle for us: the builders and teamsters, 
caterers and technicians, turnstyle workers and cleaning personnel, and 
the many people who had to make way for the gentrification of entire 
event territories, e.g. through forced evictions. 
The second issue is that spectacles artificially construct a sense 
of significance; spectacles do violence to anyone setting priorities 
in their lives that differ from those that the spectacle dictates. As a 
practical example, just try to avoid the attention-vortex of whatever TV 
series, sporting event, or celebrity scandal currently demands public 
engagement. It can be done, but it comes at the price of communal 
judgement and potential social isolation. These two dimensions of the 
spectacle have been a matter of serious concern for scholars of popular 
culture, fuelling much criticism by French poststructuralists like Debord, 
but also by critical theory scholars from the Frankfurt School or British 
Cultural Studies. In this line of argument, spectacles are designed in ways 
that reproduce inequalities while encouraging conformity.
Regardless of how we assess the power of pop-culture spectacles, my 
point here is that similar operations are at play in politics more broadly. 
As Edelmann (1988: 7) writes, ‘regimes and proponents of political 
causes know that it takes much coercion, propaganda, and the portrayal 
of issues in terms that entertain, distort, and shock to extract a public 
response of any kind’. He goes on to explain how spectacles generate 
meanings, presciently foreshadowing the discussions about ‘post-truth’ 
and the nature of fact that would emerge three decades later (ibid.: 10):
Accounts of political issues, problems, crises, threats, and leaders 
now become devices for creating disparate assumptions and 
beliefs about the social and political world rather than factual 
statements. The very concept of ‘fact’ becomes irrelevant because 
every meaningful political object and person is an interpretation 
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that reflects and perpetuates an ideology. Taken together, they 
comprise a spectacle which varies with the social situation of the 
spectator and serves as a meaning machine: a generator of points 
of view and therefore of perception, anxieties, aspirations, and 
strategies.
Edelmann has political events in mind, such as elections, debates, 
scandals, and the like, but the dynamics he describes are similar to those 
that characterise the spectacles I examine in this book. For instance, 
the ways in which Olympic Games or World Exhibitions make certain 
discourses salient and the degree to which they infuse recognisable 
symbols with pathos follow the patterns that Edelmann has identified for 
explicitly political spectacles. However, not all of Edelmann’s spectacles 
are planned and staged as ‘media events’, to return to Dayan & Katz’s 
(1994) terminology. The difference is that media events are designed as a 
kind of public holiday. They are intentional interruptions of everyday life. 
2.5	 The	psychology	of	networked	spectacles
In contrast to discursive events like natural disasters or high-profile 
political scandals, the kind of networked spectacles I have in mind are 
planned and staged well in advance. They retain the characteristic of 
other media spectacles, but the way in which they are designed allows 
organisers and media outlets to expose audiences over extended periods 
of time to the symbols and messages that relate to the event. These events 
function like public holidays that interrupt what people perceive as their 
normal everyday activities, as Dayan and Katz have shown (1994: 7 & 11-
12, emphasis in the original):
... advanced notice gives time for anticipation and preparation 
on the part of both broadcasters and audiences. There is an active 
period of looking forward, abetted by the promotional activity of 
the broadcaster. ... The interruption, when it comes, has been 
elaborately advertised and rehearsed. It entails a major commitment 
of manpower, technology, and resources on the part of the 
organizers and broadcasters. It comes not as a complete surprise 
— as in major newsbreaks — but as something long anticipated 
and looked forward to, like a holiday. In order to make certain that 
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the point of this ritual framing will not be lost on the audience, 
the broadcasters spend hours, sometimes days, rehearsing the 
audience in the event’s itinerary, timetable, and symbolics. Even 
one-time events can be ritualized in this way.
Dayan and Katz describe here what social and political psychologists call 
‘priming’ (see Iyengar et al. 1982; Domke et al. 1998), that is: an attempt 
to anchor meanings, associations, and emotions through continuous 
exposure to certain signs. Priming takes places over long periods of time 
and in often banal ways (Billig 2009), for example through continuous 
low-key interactions with national flags or the symbols we encounter on 
coins, bills, stamps, and other everyday objects. 
Through priming, we are each socialised into a shared cultural 
repertoire, a minimal consensus of what should be ‘normal’ background 
knowledge across a society. Actors involved in staging networked 
spectacles draw from this repertoire, and they also seed new symbols 
that circulate in the run-up to the event, until these symbols become 
recognisable stand-ins for the event itself. Mascots and flags are good 
examples of this, and I will discuss a number of cases related to China’s 
networked spectacles in the subsequent chapters, especially in chapter 
5, which explores national symbols. Importantly, state agencies, large 
corporations, and in particular mass media organisations are in a position 
to establish and circulate seemingly banal symbols that can become the 
foundation for a spectacle’s iconography, generating the ‘monopoly of 
appearance’ that Debord was concerned about.
Once symbols and their meanings have entered into the accepted 
collection of background meanings, they can be used strategically to 
evoke certain feelings and create particular effects. They become available 
as a resource for cultural production, and they provide a convenient set 
of anchor points for the construction of the public agenda (see McCombs 
2004). By covering major events in the TV news or on newspaper front 
pages, media organisations draw attention to the events, increase their 
salience, and turn them into the kind of special holidays that Dayan and 
Katz (1994) have analysed. Continuous priming constructs the event as a 
historic moment in the minds of potential spectators, and once the actual 
occasion arrives, it becomes reasonable that the event would monopolise 
public life. 
There is then a two-fold connection between priming and agenda-
setting: on the one hand, the news media can fulfil their agenda-setting 
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role only if there already is a public consensus about the general relevance 
of the impending spectacle. As McCombs (ibid.: 13) writes: 
the public is not a collective automaton passively waiting to be 
programmed by the media. The pattern of media coverage for 
some issues resonates with the public. For other issues, there is 
no relevance.
That relevance is constructed over long periods of time, and it is 
negotiated between a multitude of actors. On the other hand, the media 
workers and journalists who make the networked spectacle salient in 
public discourse need themselves to be convinced that the event warrants 
that kind of coverage. That conviction may be grounded in commercial 
rationales, organisational incentives, or ethical considerations, but it 
is also primed over an extended period. Priming, in that sense, is the 
result of lengthy interaction ritual chains that involve recurring symbolic 
resources, but in such a way that these resources remain the focus of low 
levels of attention, moving them progressively into the ‘background’ of 
social rituals. As members of their societies and as the ‘second order 
audience’ of the networked spectacle, journalists are thus socialised 
into the meanings that relate to the event, much like anyone else; their 
decisions on whether or not then to report the spectacle is informed by 
the understanding of its historic importance that they have arrived at in 
the run-up to the actual event.
The final mechanism through which networked spectacles act as 
‘meaning machines’ (Edelmann 1988: 10) is through a process that 
communication scholars call framing. Whereas agenda-setting is the 
act of convincing people that a particular issue is worth thinking about, 
framing is the act of pushing a particular interpretive framework on that 
thought process. It is an activity through which agents try to guide the 
perception, understanding, or interpretation of a piece of information 
by drawing on a set of signs and forcing a specific code onto the 
communication process. 
To give a practical example, it makes a difference whether I speak 
of digital technology in language that suggests individual liberty, 
empowerment, and progress, or if I speak of the same technology in 
language that suggests deteriorating social relations, cultural or moral 
decline, and mental illness. Similarly, consider how a news source can 
warp the discourse on refugees arriving in a country by seeding its report 
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with words like ‘flood’, ‘hoards’, ‘chaos’, etc., as opposed to ‘chance’, 
‘energetic’, ‘skilful’, and so on. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 43 & 120) 
describe how most meaning-making processes utilise ‘frames’, by which 
they mean that actors ‘recruit’ certain basic concepts or relations from 
exiting cultural tropes and entrenched background knowledge into their 
conceptual efforts. These processes need not be sinister, but in mass 
communication actors frequently deploy frames strategically, trying to 
invite audiences to accept the meanings that these frames imply as self-
evident. 
Spectacles themselves become frames in this way, not just through the 
use of certain word groups, but also through the use of visual and acoustic 
cues. This is how Beijing’s Olympic Summer Games can become either 
an example of ‘One Dream’ or ‘the genocide Olympics’. Framing enables 
people, or groups of people, to tell certain stories about the spectacle. 
What is more, the ‘meaning machine’ that is the networked spectacle 
pulls together so many different discourses that it becomes the ideal site 
for framing all manner of issues. Environmentalism, economics, culture 
and society, politics... any topic that can legitimately be associated with 
the spectacle can become the subject of elaborate framing work, allowing 
different actors to create their preferred interpretation of the issue. 
Recall how actors at imperial expos framed their colonial ambitions: 
presenting foreign peoples as ‘savages’ and using the language of the 
civilising mission were precisely what generated a discourse that could be 
deployed in support of imperialist practices and that frequently overrode 
any potential ethical concerns, ultimately encouraging contemporaries 
to view these practices as dictated by common sense. 
To sum up, I believe it is helpful to view networked spectacles as 
complex assemblages of meanings whose range extends much farther 
than the sites of the event itself. They are, as Latour (2004) would argue, 
never entirely ‘local’. Through various media technologies, the discourses 
about the event and the issues related to it travel to much broader 
audiences than the people ‘on the ground’. The events become occasions 
for discursive work within widespread networks. 
It would be easy now to view these spectacles as technologies of mass 
persuasion, especially since they are at times intended to be precisely 
this. The Chinese government, for instance, is unapologetic about 
the idea that news media should ‘guide public opinion’, a phrase that 
implies a moral imperative of the party and state to frame issues of public 
relevance, and this rationale extends to China’s networked spectacles. 
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The many interlocking mechanisms and layers of communication 
that these spectacles draw from may even suggest that they are indeed 
powerful tools of indoctrination, especially in the hands of a leadership 
that is so strongly focused on didactic ‘thought work’ and strategic 
communication. However, this would be a misrepresentation of how 
communication works and what role different people play during such 
events. As Roche writes in his discussion of early world fairs (2003: 76-
77):
Expos, particularly imperial expos, clearly involved the production 
of ideological and propagandist discourses by powerful elites 
intended to ‘inform’ and ‘educate’ (or, more cynically, dominate 
and/or hegemonise) the masses in general and the new urban 
industrial working and middle classes in particular. However, 
the messages themselves were often ideologically complex, were 
carried in spectacular symbolic and dramatic forms open to 
varied interpretations, and their effects on public attitudes were 
also complex and ambiguous. ... Rather than seeing this simply 
as ideological propaganda intended to fool the masses, it is more 
realistic to see much of this as expressing the perceptions, values 
and idealism of contemporary elites, authentically expressing the 
fact that they were as ‘fooled’ (if this is the language we must use) 
as the masses by the almost magical productivity and powers of the 
new capital-labour relationship they had constructed.
I have quoted this passage in full because I believe Roche is right when he 
warns against overestimating the potential of mass events to ‘fool’ specific 
target audiences. This is precisely why the terminology of discourse 
theory and conceptual blending is helpful: discourse is communicated 
background knowledge; we all rely on such knowledge, and it can prime 
us with assumptions, focus our attention on certain issues, and frame 
the way we discuss them. This is not, however, to say that we are slaves 
to discourse. Discourse also enables, though it arguably enables different 
actors to very different extents. Occasions like networked spectacles 
allow some agents to position themselves politically and re-calibrate 
political discourses in ways that are beneficial to their personal or 
organisational projects. Indeed, if we follow the logic of discourse theorist 
Michel Foucault, discursive practices interact in constant feedback loops 
with social practices. Being able to stage, engage with, and ultimately 
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use staged spectacles in certain ways is a matter of positioning oneself 
centrally in networks, enabling collaboration among allies, preventing 
perceived antagonists from taking part, and programming the interaction 
networks with discourse. In short: it is a matter of power.
2.6	 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how large-scale events enable diverse 
actors to interact with each other, create meaning, and ultimately 
experience entrainment: a process of bodily engagement that makes 
meanings memorable and powerful. Particular sites for such interactions 
are mass events, that is, staged rituals that encourage large-scale 
participation and that are closely tied to modern modes of being, thinking, 
and producing. Such mass events draw many of their practices and 
meanings from pre-modern antecedents, but they also differ markedly 
from such earlier events, relying for much of their meaning-making on 
modern concepts such as capitalism, the individual, the metropolis, or 
the nation, even as such concepts may not always fit together neatly.
With the advent of modern forms of communication, mass events have 
largely unfolded their relevance through the way that media organisations 
have mediated their meanings. Events like modern sports spectacles or 
world expositions are not merely experienced by first-order audiences ‘on 
the ground’, though this level of interaction is still crucial to generate the 
emotional force that such events frequently relay. Actors like journalists, 
producers, editors, camerawomen, and so forth, plug into event networks 
and relay their own discourses to much broader audiences, who in turn 
draw conclusions about the event and its themes based on these media 
resources, but also through their interactions with other actors across the 
various ‘orders’ of audience.
Staged spectacles like national anniversaries or the Olympics sit on top 
of social interactions, background knowledge, and the idiosyncrasies of 
human psychology. As such, they promise actors who are able to position 
themselves centrally in a spectacle’s production and dissemination 
network to seed selected symbols, make certain discourses salient, 
and encourage meaning-making within specific frames. Networking a 
spectacle is a matter of power. 
This is not to say that the discursive and social processes of a 
networked spectacle can be dictated and controlled ‘top down’. The idea 
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that the networked spectacle can serve as an effective vehicle to guide 
opinion may nevertheless be enticing to stakeholders, whether these 
actors are well-meaning or not. The activities of such stakeholders, for 
instance within the state or among branches of industry, invite complex 
interactions that range from negotiation and collaboration to resistance 
and rejection. In China, the ruling party has creatively sought to channel 
these interactions for its own purposes, and it is these processes of 
governance to which the next chapter turns.
3  The Governance of China’s 
Networked Spectacles
At the office of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony organisers, 
I am going over the scenes of the event with a member of the creative 
group who was involved in putting the various elements of the massive 
performance together. We have just discussed how the team turned the 
two concepts ‘harmony’ and ‘civilisation’ into meaningful messages for 
audiences that might not know much about China, and this has led us 
to the question whether certain parts of the team’s original plans had 
not made the final cut. I tell her how I had learned that an earlier plan 
to include large shadow puppets had to be scrapped (China.org 2008), 
and that there had been speculations abroad that this was because these 
‘monster puppets’ in the shape of terracotta warriors would have seemed 
too threatening (see Barmé 2009: 80), that there were concerns that 
foreign audiences would associate them with an ominous, martial China. 
‘No, that’s not what happened’, she laughs. The lighting would not have 
worked, she tells me. 
I must seem sceptical, because she laughs again, reassuring me that 
this is really what happened. She points out that there had indeed been 
careful oversight from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to check that no 
elements of the ceremony would clash with official public diplomacy 
ambitions, and that elements of the ceremony were also screened 
for foreign audiences. This was why there had been no dragons in the 
ceremony. In the view of the organising committee, foreign viewers would 
see dragons as mostly evil creatures, like those that populate Tolkien’s 
fantasy world; in China, dragons are creatures that bring luck. But that 
meaning does not travel, she tells me. As for the shadow puppets, the 
problem was not political, but purely technically: ‘we just couldn’t get it 
to work’.
It is not my intention to establish what ‘really’ happened in the 
case of the cancelled shadow theatre performance. More importantly, 
the discussion shows how arguably innocuous issues can become 
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highly political during networked spectacles, and how they can lead 
to speculations about how authoritative actors dictated meanings. 
However, the organisation of such events is frequently complicated, 
and the decisions that shape the final outcomes may not always be the 
result of calculated political strategising. China’s networked spectacles 
involved many actors with diverse ideas about what these events should 
communicate and how they should be set up, and this chapter turns to 
these complexities by exploring how various stakeholders organised 
influential spectacles in China. 
I begin by discussing the CCP’s cultural governance strategy, focusing 
in particular on attempts to augment traditional, top-down modes 
of propaganda and censorship with more horizontal components 
that outsource regulatory activities to private actors. I describe these 
organisational practices and strategies in the language of network 
theories that I introduced in the introduction, better to highlight the 
often creative and collaborative ways in which stakeholders are calibrating 
and reconfiguring complex political processes, and to make tangible 
how power works within these contexts. In subsequent chapters, I show 
what meanings and emotions these networked activities facilitate, but 
here I limit myself to the ways in which the authorities set the network 
parameters within which various actors then switch themselves and 
others into communication processes, and within which they attempt to 
programme the discourses that proliferate through the networks.
To illustrate these activities, the chapter first discusses how media 
and culture have traditionally been managed in China, and how the 
authorities have progressively changed their regulatory approach to 
the networked cultural governance strategies that today characterise 
political communication in the PRC. This also includes a discussion 
of how capitalist economic arrangements fit into this picture, and it 
addresses controversies over whether PRC governance strategies should 
be considered ‘neoliberal’. Next, the chapter analyses how various actors 
came together to create and broadcast the Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony, a process that reflects a strong interplay between state and 
non-state actors within the PRC’s regulatory set-up. Finally, the chapter 
shifts its focus to the Shanghai Expo, laying out what went into designing 
the exhibition territory and its pavilions. 
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3.1	 Media	politics	in	contemporary	China
Ever since its early days as a revolutionary party, the CCP has considered 
it part of its prerogative to manage culture and media. The reasoning was 
Marxist-Leninist: as China’s vanguard, it was the responsibility of the Party 
to reform not just the country’s means of production, but also the mind 
sets of its people. ‘Culture’ needed to emancipate the Chinese masses 
and immunise them against bourgeois ideology, so the argument went. 
China’s media workers consequently became charged with maintaining 
the ideological and spiritual wellbeing of the people. 
Under Mao’s rule, these activities fell under the broader banner of 
‘thought work’. Mao himself spelled out his understanding of culture 
in his famous speech in Yan’an (Mao 1942), and the arguments in this 
speech would remain programmatic throughout his rule. They would 
later find their most radically totalitarian interpretation during the 
Cultural Revolution, with Mao and his closest associates emphasising a 
strict vision of art and culture that allowed only orthodox socialist realist 
expressions in the service of perpetual revolution.
The imperative to manage culture and carefully regulate the activities 
of media workers has remained an important part of the CCP’s governing 
model, even after the PRC opened its doors and started its process of 
reform. China’s leaders may have abandoned many of Mao’s more radical 
ideas, replacing ideological orthodoxy with pragmatism, but the Marxist-
Leninist conception of culture on which Mao based his ideas remains 
influential to this day. Especially after the tumultuous events of 1989, 
i.e. the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the democracy protests in 
major cities across China that culminated in the Tiananmen Massacre, 
party leaders felt compelled to renew their role as the sole keepers of 
China’s ideological health. As Brady (2008: 1) has pointed out, ‘in the 
post 1989 period, propaganda and thought work have become the very 
life blood ... of the Party-State’; they have become an important way for 
the CCP to try and legitimate its continuing one-party rule.
In the post-Mao era, Chinese regulators have progressively updated 
the focus of their media management. The CCP has moved away 
from previous totalitarian ambitions to manage any and all cultural 
expressions. Instead, it now attempts to ‘guide public opinion’. Actors 
in the party’s sprawling propaganda system (see Shambaugh 2007) have 
creatively adapted to the challenges of a market-driven environment 
saturated with information. The party’s cultural management today 
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embraces an approach that cleverly combines, on the one hand, top-
down hierarchical decrees, advanced censorship techniques, and highly 
didactic propaganda with, on the other hand, more indirect interventions 
into Chinese cultural production and consumption processes.
An important factor in this has been the introduction of capitalist 
market principles, which have radically changed how China’s media 
function today. In the wake of the general economic reforms, the PRC 
opened its state-dominated industries to market forces and urged 
managers to experiment with a profit-oriented rationale and foreign 
management principles (for an introduction see Naugthon 2006: ch.4). 
This may at first sight contradict the CCP’s avowed commitment to 
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. However, the reasoning 
behind these market reforms remains in line with Marxism, even as it 
relies on an arguably provocative interpretation of Marx’s historical 
materialism. 
Rather than insisting on the Maoist idea that society needs to be moved 
through its historical, developmental phases by means of revolution, the 
Party now emphasised evolution. Drawing their lessons from successful 
advanced socialist countries e.g. in northern Europe, the reformers decided 
that China needed to experience fully what they viewed as the crucial 
historical stage before socialism: capitalism. Capitalism is an economic 
arrangement in which the means of production are owned privately and 
are worked by wage labourers, and in which goods and services are traded 
for profit in competitive markets, using a commonly accepted medium 
of exchange and following the logic of supply and demand. The idea was 
that, by strategically introducing the core elements of this arrangement 
into the Chinese economy, the contradictions of capitalism would reveal 
themselves, and as Chinese society worked through and addressed these 
contradictions, a gradual adjustment of production processes would 
unfold until society became fair and equitable. Managing this process 
and ensuring that it took the right shape would become part of the CCP’s 
raison d’être.
An open question, and a matter of some controversy, is whether — or 
to what degree — China is today capitalist. For the most part, the Chinese 
economy relies heavily on markets and the idea of private ownership to 
generate profits (see Zweig 2014: 204-205 and Naughton 2006: 301-304). 
The waters are muddied, however, by the large number of state-owned 
enterprises that operate in China and the continuing influence of the 
party and state in economic affairs. As Joseph Fan and his colleagues write 
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in their introduction to a compilation of studies that examine capitalism 
in China: ‘strategically placed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), SOE-
controlled pyramidal business groups, and ubiquitous party cells, party 
Secretaries, and party committees leave Lenin’s “commanding heights” 
firmly and exclusively under the control of the Chinese Communist Party’ 
(Fan et al. 2013: 2).
PRC leaders continue to insist that the country remains ‘on the 
socialist road’, but they have also qualified their ‘market socialism’ as 
having ‘Chinese characteristics’. Regardless of such labelling practices, 
the Chinese economy is effectively a market economy that relies heavily 
on capitalist structures, even if capitalism in China takes on a different 
shape from, for instance, that in North America or Europe. Then again, 
this is arguably an example of how adaptive capitalism is. There are many 
different capitalisms across Europe or the Americas as well, so it should 
come as no surprise that Asian contexts also feature diverse capitalist 
practices and arrangements.
A related question is whether China is ‘neoliberal’. Neoliberalism is 
an ideology that emphasises personal responsibility, efficiency, private 
property rights, and the presumed ability of allegedly unregulated, 
competitive markets to bring about the best in self-interested individuals 
(for a discussion see Treanor 2005). As such, neoliberalism promotes 
capitalism, though not every capitalism must necessarily be underpinned 
by neoliberalism. Nonini (2008) has criticised that scholarship frequently 
fails to appreciate this distinction, and that this leads to a conflation 
of the two concepts. He writes that the term neoliberalism ‘risks being 
used to refer to almost any political, economic, social or cultural process 
associated with contemporary capitalism’ (ibid.: 149). Similarly, Kipnis 
(2007: 387) asks, ‘does anyone ever describe non-neoliberal capitalism?’ 
Such criticism then also extends to China’s capitalism, which Nonini 
points out is strongly state-led and frequently accompanied by 
popular resistance against marketisation. He argues that ‘processes of 
neoliberalization are largely absent’ in China (Nonini 2008: 149) and 
questions whether ‘the Chinese population has widely incorporated 
neoliberal subjectivities and practices’ (ibid.: 147). 
Nonini is no doubt right that neoliberalism has by no means become a 
hegemonic ideology across China, and his interventions provide a helpful 
reminder that capitalism and neoliberalism do not necessarily collapse 
into one, globally shared economic and ideological set-up. He is also 
right that many CCP cadres explicitly reject and criticise neoliberalism. 
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For instance, a 2013 Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological 
Sphere (translated in ChinaFile 2013) warns against neoliberalism, 
alongside other foreign ideas such as democracy, universal values, 
and civil society. According to the document, neoliberalism celebrates 
‘unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and total 
marketization’; the authors go on to warn against neoliberal advocates 
who believe ‘macroeconomic control is strangling the market’s efficiency 
and vitality and they oppose public ownership, arguing that China’s 
state-owned enterprises are “national monopolies,” inefficient, and 
disruptive of the market economy, and should undergo “comprehensive 
privatization”’. The goal of neoliberal reasoning, according the 
communiqué, is to ‘change our country’s basic economic infrastructure 
and weaken the government’s control of the national economy’. 
However, does such commentary really mean that neoliberalism and 
its policies are truly absent in China today? The communiqué ironically 
trailed plans by the Xi administration to extend economic liberalisation 
(ibid.), so it might be wise to take the content of the document with a 
grain of salt. Aside from the fact that the document may not speak for all 
CCP cadres, its inventory of key terms also seems designed to conflate 
various challenges to one-party rule and turn them into a singular, 
loathsome antagonist: ‘the West’. Such practices to construct enemies 
and seed the descriptions with vapid hot-button terminology are not new 
in CCP rhetoric, but they say very little about the actual ‘current state of 
the ideological sphere’ which they claim to assess. 
I would argue that neoliberalism is now firmly part of the ideological 
mix that shapes politics in China (see also Joseph 2014: 160). Neoliberal 
discourse indeed informs many political, economic, and individual 
activities in the PRC. However, this is not to say that neoliberalism is 
‘hegemonic’ in China, but rather that regulators frequently combine 
neoliberal techniques with authoritarian and other managerial practices. 
Neoliberal policy is indeed frequently authoritarian, in China as much 
as elsewhere. In theory, such policies aim at deregulating economic 
processes, establishing free trade, and making social interactions 
more efficient; to achieve these goals, neoliberal policy promotes (at 
least nominally) austerity, privatisation, and a laissez-faire approach to 
the economy. However, in practice, neoliberal policy often consists of 
invasive audit cultures, expansive bureaucratisation, fiscal interventions 
that benefit the wealthy, and draconian state-backed violence, particularly 
when private ownership rights are in question (see also Graeber 2015: 31). 
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Harvey (2007: 19) calls this a ‘creative tension’, and he makes the case that 
‘when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite 
power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as 
to be unrecognizable’.
In the Chinese context, neoliberal policies are part of the governing 
toolbox that CCP cadres deploy to regulate life in the PRC. Frank Pieke 
makes this clear in his discussion of the PRC’s governance approach, 
which he calls ‘neo-socialist’. As he describes it, ‘under neo-socialism, 
innovative neo-liberal and home-grown governmental technologies cut 
right at the heart of the Party-state itself, serving to support, centralize, 
modernize, and strengthen the Party’s leading role in society’ (2016: 
loc243). The PRC’s media and cultural industries are prime examples 
of this combination of neoliberal and more traditional ‘governmental 
technologies’. Party and state leaders expect media organisations to 
function according to the same rules of the market that govern state-
owned enterprises in other sectors of the economy. At the same time, 
the CCP retains control of China’s liberalised media and cultural sectors 
through various governing mechanisms.
3.2	 The	CCP’s	cultural	governance	strategies
One might expect the imperatives of market liberalisation in China to 
undermine party control of the media, and such expectations have indeed 
informed much of the speculation, and at times wishful thinking, about 
China’s ostensible transition towards liberal democracy. As Pieke (2016) 
points out, and as I have also argued in an analysis of cyber politics in 
China (Schneider 2018: ch.8), it is unhelpful to imagine democracy as the 
inevitable endpoint of modern social development that is brought about, 
deterministically, by market forces, new technologies, free flows of 
people and information, or some other (neo)liberal MacGuffin. Instead, I 
have suggested that we turn to Lewis Mumford’s (1964) arguments about 
democratic and authoritarian technics, which political actors combine, 
juxtapose, and ultimately deploy in their attempts to manage social 
processes (see also Göbel 2011). Pieke (2016: 118) suggests something 
similar when he argues: 
Democracy and dictatorship are best used as shorthand references 
to a range of governmental technologies that can be combined 
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and recombined in real-life political systems regardless of their 
purported ideological charge.
This indeed seems to be the approach that the CCP has adopted in its 
reform efforts, and it extends to the party’s management of media 
and culture. In these contexts, the CCP management techniques 
encompass several interconnected strategies. One of these is for state 
institutions to intervene directly in cultural spheres. Such interventions 
are generally rare, since they can discredit regulators, draw attention to 
unwanted issues, and reveal the full scope (or limitations) of state power. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to issues that leading cadres consider to be 
‘sensitive’ (mingan 敏感), the CCP can rely on the full power of the state 
to censor unwanted discourses and infuse media networks with ‘correct’ 
statements. Sensitive issues include any kind of ‘yellow’ topic, i.e. 
pornography, violence, drugs, and gambling, which conservative cadres 
view as negative influences on the minds of the masses, and especially 
of youths. It also includes ‘black’ topics, i.e. politically sensitive issues 
that might challenge the rule of the party or endanger ‘social stability’ 
(shehui wending 社会稳定; see Sandby-Thomas 2011). Certain areas 
remain wholly blacklisted, most notably the so-called ‘three Ts’, which 
refer to the political status of Tibet and Taiwan, as well as the legacy of 
the Tiananmen Massacre. In other areas, the terrain of what constitutes 
an acceptable or unacceptable political topic can shift radically as former 
taboos become green-lit, usually as certain leaders or factions of cadres 
re-orientate their policy priorities in those areas, or — conversely — as a 
previously innocuous public debate threatens to get out of hand. At the 
time of writing, such shifts in priority characterised debates on topics like 
air pollution, food and work safety issues, corruption, and interpretations 
of certain episodes in China’s revolutionary past, but by the time this 
book goes to press the range of publicly acceptable discourses is likely to 
have shifted again. 
For Chinese media workers, this creates serious challenges as they try 
to manoeuvre China’s ever-changing discursive waters, while constantly 
being forced to balance the bottom line with the party line (see Zhao 
1998). This may very well be the point: the confusing mix of freedoms 
and restrictions creates uncertainties (see Hassid 2008) and a context in 
which actors need to manage themselves and act efficiently, which allows 
regulators to remain in the background and avoid intrusive interventions 
into the sector as much as possible. To this end, the CCP’s governance 
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approach selectively blends neoliberal rationales of self-discipline with 
traditional philosophical components and other discourses in an effort 
to encourage certain kinds of behaviour. Neoliberal discourses thus exist 
next to normative domestic discussions about the ‘quality’ (suzhi 素质) of 
citizens (see Anagnost 2004, Jacka 2009, Woronov 2009, and Sun 2009), 
which draw their reasoning from pre-modern Chinese thought. The 
various discourses can at times align, though Kipnis (2007) rightly points 
out that they do not always merge into a singular, neoliberal disciplinary 
formation. I will return to self-disciplining strategies below, and I will 
illustrate such discourses and practices in later chapters; in the current 
context, it is important to understand that actors in the media industry 
constantly have to adjust their behaviour to a moving, invisible line of 
what is permissible. 
A second technique for managing China’s media ecology is to rely 
on the market dynamics that the party has unleashed, and to leave it to 
commercial incentives to guide the behaviours of media and cultural 
producers. By liberalising sectors such as fashion and lifestyle, the CCP 
has allowed the incentives for producing acceptable content to shift 
away from overt state and party interventions. Instead, incentives now 
primarily come from the public demand for entertainment formats 
and the advertising revenues this demand generates, relayed to media 
workers in the form of viewer ratings, reader subscriptions, webpage 
views, retweets, and other metrics of business success. 
Where market incentives alone are not sufficient to guide how 
actors produce, share, and consume cultural artefacts, the party uses a 
number of indirect measures to retain control of public discourse. This 
includes the various channels through which CCP cadres remain linked 
to state agencies like news conglomerates, TV stations, museums, or 
production studios (see Lieberthal 2004: ch.7). Personnel management 
plays a particularly important role, and the party has the last word when 
it comes to assigning media workers to key nodes in China’s networks 
of cultural production. Editors, producers, journalists, and so on are 
frequently themselves party members, which means they are required 
to maintain party discipline, but even if they have not themselves joined 
the CCP, their positions depend on the good graces of party committees 
and superiors, who sanction behaviour through managerial techniques 
such as work assessments, promises of financial bonuses, chances for 
promotion, and the ever-present threat of demotion or redundancy. 
As the party experiments with new social management techniques, for 
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instance rolling out social credit management systems in numerous 
pilot cities (see Koetse 2018 and Liu 2018 for nuanced discussions), these 
incentive structures are bound to become more important yet.
In combination with market mechanisms and career incentives, the 
party further relays its ideological preferences through a sophisticated 
state licensing system that allows only approved non-state organisations 
and individuals to create and sell cultural content with mass appeal. The 
state then also maintains numerous regulatory agencies that specify 
what types of content can be disseminated in particular segments of the 
market, for instance placing legal limits on TV programming that goes 
too far in depicting the underbelly of society or that encourages too much 
audience participation. In this way, the party uses the state to define, for 
example, what can be aired during the lucrative prime-time period on 
Chinese television, which in turn creates commercial pressure for private 
producers to create only the kind of content that state-owned TV stations 
will buy and air during that period (I have discussed these dynamics in 
detail in Schneider 2012). 
The party’s media controls have then become largely indirect. The 
party has effectively positioned itself in such a way that it can inject the 
networks of cultural production with specific demands that will filter 
through lengthy chains of principals and agents down to private actors 
who have to conform to these imperatives if they hope to make a profit. 
Viewed at a distance, the CCP’s techniques of control have become 
more obscure, often leaving the impression that cultural producers are 
following the seemingly inescapable invisible hand of the market, but 
this should not detract from the fact that it is the party that leverages this 
logic to ensure politically acceptable discourses.
Closely related to these managerial techniques is the party’s 
willingness to outsource processes of cultural meaning-making to non-
official actors. This means soliciting the expertise of private production 
companies, public relations firms, advertisers, IT experts, and so on. It 
also means giving the consumers of media more leeway to make sense of 
the rich, diverse galaxy of symbols they face, and to provide sanctioned 
(and carefully monitored) spaces for peer-to-peer interactions, for 
instance through private social media corporations like Tencent or Sina. 
By setting the rules of these interactions at the macro level, the CCP is 
able to outline what is or is not acceptable discourse once these varied 
actors start circulating their own symbolic assemblages through the 
newly opened sub-networks of, for instance, social media. 
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Importantly, China’s leaders try to avoid overt coercion and instead 
attempt to negotiate and reason with media producers, consumers, 
and users in order to create a consensus as to what media management 
in China should achieve. In my own interviews with Chinese media 
workers, I found it telling how frequently even critics of the CCP’s media 
management made the case that, ultimately, some form of content 
control was necessary to ensure the moral guidance of audiences, who 
were frequently viewed as prone to spreading and believing incorrect 
information, especially in the form of so-called online rumours (wangluo 
yaoyan 网络谣言). These arguments about the dangers of spreading 
rumours seem to have gained further traction in the wake of anxieties 
in Europe and North America about ‘fake news’. Where actors remained 
unconvinced by such paternalistic and frequently alarmist reasoning, 
selected draconian measures against individuals or companies usually 
inspire the required level of self-censorship among media workers and 
consumers more broadly to prevent them from pushing the boundaries 
of the permissible too far — a tactic that is known in Chinese as ‘killing 
the chicken to scare the monkeys’ (shaji jinghou 杀鸡儆猴). 
Today, the CCP delegates much of the responsibility for media 
control to societal actors, many of whom seem willing to adopt the 
moral discourses that the CCP spreads through China’s networks of 
social interactions. My point here is not that media workers necessarily 
internalise, believe, or actively support these discourses; we do not know 
what ultimately goes on in people’s heads. My point is that these discourses 
create powerful guides to behaviour, and that actors reproduce them as 
acceptable statements on how cultural production should work in China. 
Importantly, it is not the discourses themselves that ‘act’ in this way; it is 
the set of people who are tied together in networks of media production, 
and who enforce the values of the network through a combination of 
administrative techniques, discursive statements, and peer pressure. 
Ultimately, the CCP’s political decision-making then comes to rest 
to no small degree on its ability to generate ‘consent elicited by the 
construction of shared meaning’, to use Castells’ words (2009: 12). Where 
agents are not convinced, they are confronted with the strong constraints 
that these shared meanings generate in conjunction with economic 
incentives. If reluctant actors do not wish to risk being isolated from 
important social interactions or losing the means to secure a livelihood, 
they need at least tacitly to comply with their assigned roles as keepers of 
moral rectitude.
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In this sense, the party’s regulatory activities are less examples of 
governing, i.e. of regulating society through policy decisions, enforced 
through executive branches of the state. They are more examples of 
‘governance’, that is: the regulation of society through indirect means 
that involve actors beyond the state (Stoker 1998). These ‘public-private 
collaborations’ (Donahue & Zeckhauser 2008) are not limited to domestic 
actors but include international organisations and enterprises as well. In 
the case of China’s networked spectacles, the result of these practices is 
a multi-tiered approach to event management in which party and state 
move in and out of organisational networks, at times regulating matters 
directly, at other times providing symbolic and discursive resources for 
non-state agents to make their own regulatory choices in line with the 
network’s overall mission.
Considering how strongly this approach relies on constructing 
cultural contexts through networked interactions and discursive moves, 
it seems appropriate to call it ‘cultural governance’, a term I am adapting 
from Michael Shapiro (2004) and William Callahan (2006) to refer to 
regulatory activities through which actors attempt to govern society by 
adjusting the cultural parameters in which politics take place (see also 
Schneider 2016). 
In the kind of complex communication networks that the CCP 
attempts to manage, power accrues with actors who are able to link 
different groups of people together, for instance by connecting media 
networks, trade networks, financial networks, logistic networks, security 
networks, and so on, and who are able to infuse those networks with 
their own values, meanings, and interpretations. While party actors are 
not the only relevant agents in China’s networked cultural sectors, they 
remain well positioned to exert such power.
3.3	 Organising	the	Olympic	opening	ceremony
How precisely the interactions between different actors generate the 
switching and programming power that Castells envisages becomes 
evident in the Hu-Wen administration’s approach to organising 
networked spectacles like the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo in 
the late 2000s. During the 2008 Summer Olympics, for instance, party and 
state agencies made effective use of their switching power to strategically 
delegate responsibilities and collaborate with non-state actors to manage 
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a complex, dynamic media environment. Take the example of the opening 
ceremony, which took place on 8 August 2008. 
The Beijing Olympics opening ceremony was designed to present 
China’s re-emergence as a Great Power to audiences both at home and 
abroad. It was a large-scale collaborative public relations effort that was 
initiated, coordinated, and executed by the Chinese state, under the 
leadership of the party, but which involved input from a variety of actors, 
ranging from numerous state agencies and CCP organs to private agents. 
To show how this process worked, I have traced the interactions 
between the different actors and the decisions they made, based on my 
interviews with organisers and media workers who had been involved 
in creating the event. These various stakeholders planned the opening 
ceremony for over four years, spending several hundred million RMB in the 
process. Under the auspice of the Ministry of Culture (文化部), a creative 
team came together as early as March 2004 to draw up a 20-page plan for 
the opening ceremony. Based on this outline, the ministry commissioned 
11 internal and 2 external proposals, which the creative team evaluated in 
2005 and 2006. The final synergy of the leading proposals drew from two 
themes: civilisation (wenming 文明), a theme that the organisers regarded 
as central to the original Greek Olympic spirit, and harmony (hexie 和
谐), a key political concept of the Hu Jintao administration, which I will 
examine in detail in chapter 6 (for a discussion of this concept see Barmé 
2009: 78). 
By April 2005, the team had refined the motto of the games, abandoning 
the earlier slogan ‘harmony is precious’ (he wei gui 和为贵), first in favour 
of the slogan ‘one world, one future’, and finally settling on ‘one world, 
one dream’. In early 2006, the director’s team under the leadership of 
renowned film-maker Zhang Yimou (张艺谋) came together for the first 
time to assess how the planning process should progress.
In September 2006, the Ministry of Culture created a sub-unit, the 
‘Opening-Closing Ceremony Department’ (奥组委开闭幕式工作部), 
which would become responsible for managing the cultural activities 
associated with the games. This department was headed by Zhang Heping 
(张和平), a Beijing-based arts professor and member of the Chinese 
People’s Consultative Conference. The size of this team fluctuated 
between 30 and 40 members. Their task was to oversee various working 
groups (production, public relations, and so on) and later coordinate the 
event with other state actors, such as the municipal police department 
and transit authorities. 
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The core unit within this department that designed, planned, and 
executed the actual ceremony was the ‘Opening-Closing Ceremony 
Command Centre’ (开闭幕式运营中心). During peak times, it 
employed up to 800 individuals. The members of this command centre 
refined the ceremony, developed the various acts, and expanded the 
event to include new themes such as environmental sustainability. In 
August 2006, two years before the event, the first rehearsals started. By 
the time the rehearsals moved to the final staging site in June 2008, the 
ceremony had expanded to include 20,000 performers. The scale of the 
project prompted members of the creative team to joke that the newly 
built National Stadium had been designed poorly, since it was almost too 
small to host all the performers.
As the actual event neared, the command centre ‘field-tested’ the 
opening ceremony and various related cultural products. For instance, 
the Fuwa (福娃; literally: ‘good-luck dolls’) were tested in elementary 
schools and kindergartens before becoming the official mascots of the 
event (for an analysis of the Fuwa’s symbolic meaning see DeLisle 2008: 
35). The opening ceremony itself was staged for three different groups 
of critics: a committee of art advisors that included film directors Chen 
Kaige (陈凯歌) and Lee Ang (李安) as well as US producer Quincy Jones; 
a group of Chinese citizens that was meant to represent all walks of life; 
and the responsible CCP Leadership Small Group, which at the time was 
under the direction of rising political star Xi Jinping. This last group also 
included members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose explicit task 
was to point out any aspects of the ceremony that might offend foreign 
audiences or relay a negative impression of the PRC’s foreign policy 
agenda.
Once approved, the final performance was prepared for telecasting by 
Beijing Olympic Broadcasting (BOB), a joint venture between the Chinese 
side (the official Beijing Olympics Committee for the Olympic Games, 
or BOCOG) and the Olympic Broadcasting Service of the International 
Olympic Committee (see Brownell 2008: 186). This joint venture used new 
broadcasting technologies that had themselves required various levels 
of negotiation and compromise to implement, for instance between 
creative and technical personnel (see Liang 2013).
Domestically, the visual discourse of the event, with all its possible 
interpretations, was disambiguated for viewers by China Central 
Television (CCTV) and its two commentators, who framed the visuals 
with carefully rehearsed statements that were scripted in advance and 
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meticulously rehearsed (see also Brownell 1995 for an earlier assessment): 
the phrases relay the official propaganda discourse without any random 
colloquialisms, and the intonations of the speakers also closely resemble 
those of actors giving official speeches or performing in socialist-realist 
theatre. The result was a series of official propaganda statements that left 
little doubt about how the proceedings were meant to be interpreted.
The Beijing Olympics opening ceremony illustrates how the CCP 
recruits various stakeholders to create a spectacle. In this case, the 
result was a well-rehearsed representation of the administration’s 
agenda to create a ‘harmonious society’, fusing traditional Chinese 
cultural symbols with images of a young and joyous China. I will return 
to the ceremony and the seemingly hegemonic narrative that the event 
relayed in the next chapter, but it should be stressed that regardless 
of how we assess the performance, the final cultural product was the 
result of complex negotiations in which the party took a leading role, 
but in which no single actor dictated the discourses top-down. Instead, 
CCP agents linked themselves and their party and state associates to 
private creative and technical personnel, creating the network that 
would provide the infrastructure for organising the various elements of 
this event. By providing the general guidelines within which state and 
private actors then collaborated, the CCP ensured that the final product 
struck all participants as at least acceptable, possibly even as convincing 
and worthwhile, and ultimately as a common-sense representation of 
contemporary China on the world stage.
3.4	 International	networks	at	the	Shanghai	Expo
A similar collaboration took place at the site of the Shanghai World 
Exposition two years later, though this collaboration included an even 
broader range of actors, foreign and domestic, who had to construct 
their public discourses within overlapping institutional frameworks. 
Most notably, these included organisers of national, corporate, and 
city pavilions, each comprising teams of core event managers, PR 
professionals, and diplomatic protocol officers, and later involving 
an array of logistics experts, architects, engineers, artists, and film 
directors. In many cases, the work of these teams started as early as 
four years before the actual event. When the expo opened its door to the 
public on 1 May 2010, between 200 and 800 different people had been 
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involved in designing, constructing, and administering each of the major 
expo pavilions, drawing on a combination of public and private funding 
in the range of 30 to 60 million Euros per pavilion. 
I will explain in more detail below how pavilion organisers and their 
teams negotiated the political and commercial interests that fuelled their 
event projects, but it is worth already pointing out here that they did so 
within the general guidelines provided at two levels of organisation: the 
regulations handed down by the Bureau of International Exhibition (BIE), 
headquartered in Paris, and the national and provincial regulations of 
the PRC, coordinated and implemented by the Bureau of Shanghai World 
Expo Coordination (上海世博会事务协调局), or Shiboju (世博局). The 
Shiboju was a temporary state institution composed of staff from various 
public security and logistics agencies in China, as well as foreign affairs 
and media workers, and it went about its organisational activities under 
the auspices of the CCP.
The Shanghai Expo illustrates how the Chinese state and the party 
managed complex cultural processes by taking an indirect approach and 
providing general rules of cultural production rather than attempting to 
regulate systems of meanings directly. While a delegation of the Shiboju 
checked all expo exhibitions in early 2010 to ensure that participants had 
not put any politically sensitive topics on display (e.g. references to the 
political status of Tibet or Taiwan), there were, to my knowledge, no 
major conflicts between the censors and the respective pavilion teams 
over exhibition content. The pavilion staffers and organisers I interviewed 
in 2010 were overall positive about their interactions with the Chinese 
organisers and censors, and they repeatedly told me that they had not 
encountered any overt criticism of their exhibits. 
This was true even for organisers who had intentionally designed 
their exhibitions as interventions into what they perceived as dominant 
Chinese discourses. An example was the Spanish pavilion, which told a 
postmodern, avant-garde story of Spanish modernity that clashed with 
official Chinese accounts of what modernity might mean. I will analyse 
these exhibits and the discursive conflicts they contain in detail in chapter 
7. Yet even organisers who had designed such provocative content noted 
that the Shanghai organisers were overall accommodating, finding for 
example no fault with didactically challenging exhibits. 
It is an open question why the authorities allowed such critics to 
prevail. The censors may not have understood the thrust of the argument, 
or they may have concluded that visitors would not be swayed by the often 
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fairly abstract, artistic interventions. Maybe they decided that letting 
some critics have their way would serve as an example of the host’s 
benevolence and inclusiveness. Whatever the motivations, the Chinese 
administrators effectively provided the space for discursive construction 
and then watched that construction unfold within the theme of the event, 
seemingly content in the knowledge that the various overlapping interests 
and institutional constraints would overall generate a core narrative; a 
narrative about a neoliberal, capitalist world in which nation-states exist 
in harmony and develop their economies through urbanisation and 
transnational trade, and in which the PRC functions as a central partner 
as it progresses on its road towards national revival.
 Indeed, many foreign participants at the Shanghai Expo shared at least 
some of the organisers’ basic assumptions about world fairs and their 
purpose, and they had no intention of rocking the boat with controversial 
or disruptive displays. To most exhibitors, the need for easily digestible 
public diplomacy outweighed any potential agenda of contradicting the 
discursive parameters that the domestic organisers had set for the event. 
Most pavilions at the expo integrated the neoliberal, internationalist 
message in part or as a whole into their own visions of a ‘better city, better 
life’, and communicative practices frequently remained located within 
this overarching expo discourse.
This is itself the outcome of networked practices: the Chinese 
hosts were able to create a network of agents who would be involved 
in organising this specific event, but this did not entail drawing the 
organisational framework up from scratch. Not all actors were new 
to the world-fair genre. Indeed, the Shiboju and its staff could rely on 
existing mass event networks, periodically maintained and reconfigured 
at international conventions, trade fairs, and of course the recurring BIE 
world fairs. National pavilion teams, for instance, were frequently staffed 
by experienced event planners and diplomats who knew each other from 
past events, and many maintained long-standing contacts with their 
colleagues in other pavilion teams. When I visited the expo, there was 
a sense of community among staff members, who frequently interacted 
with each other not just professionally but also socially. 
In that sense, the staff at the Shiboju ‘plugged’ themselves into 
existing networks, while also creating new linkages between potential 
partners and domestic actors. They managed to set the agenda for 
the event, but they did so using the symbolic and discursive resources 
that already permeated these networks, i.e. conceptual elements from 
94 Staging China
internationalist, cosmopolitan, and capitalist discourses. It should then 
come as no surprise that so many of the pavilion exhibits told similar 
stories, and that they seemed to reinforce key statements about the world 
at the start of the 21st century.
3.5	 How	Shanghai’s	Expo	territory	came	to	be	assembled
The sense that the Shanghai Expo told a coherent, unified story was 
arguably strongest at the level of the expo territory itself. As I have 
mentioned in the introduction to this book, visitors frequently commented 
on the geopolitics of the set-up. The event covered a space that was 
roughly ten times as a large as Disneyland Paris, and that stretched across 
two sites: the northern zones that were home to the pavilions of multi-
national corporations, Chinese state-owned enterprises, and the various 
urban best practice exhibits, and the southern zones that contained 
the national pavilions, theme pavilions, and exhibits of international 
organisations. 
With 189 national exhibitions, the expo relayed a strong internationalist 
discourse in which the central actors were nations and their sovereign 
states. Informed by this discourse, the expo territory became a miniature 
model of the world, which generated a sense of geography through the way 
that national pavilions were arranged in the expo space. Pavilions were 
clustered together according to the respective nation-states’ location in 
specific world regions such as Europe or Asia, loosely captured by zones 
A (Asia), B (Europe), and C (America and Africa). The expo territory 
also at times modelled geographical proximity between countries, for 
instance placing together the pavilions of Germany and Poland, Greece 
and Turkey, and Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. 
A major example of geopolitical representation was the Chinese 
national pavilion and its position vis-à-vis the pavilions of Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan. Looking at the China Pavilion from the east, visitors 
would find the ‘mainland’ represented by a massive elevated plateau on 
their left, with China’s red national pavilion next to the smaller exhibition 
buildings of the two special administrative regions. To the right lay the 
Taiwan Pavilion, separated from the mainland by a broad, elevated 
walkway that curved along the plateau much like the Taiwan Strait curves 
along the coast of China.
The Governance of China’s Networked Spectacles 95
Despite these representations of geography, the territory did not 
recreate any existing world map, e.g. of the Mercator type. Any world map 
that tries to represent earth’s geographical features in two dimensions 
is by its very nature warped, but the expo territory arranged countries 
into entirely original positions. This at times produced peculiar effects. 
For instance, Iran and North Korea, two states that former US-President 
Bush had made part of his ‘axis of evil’, were stashed away together in the 
far south-east corner of the territory. Japan and China were positioned at 
opposite ends of the zone that contained participant countries from Asia, 
while Russia became situated in the south-west of Europe. The African 
continent moved to the north-west of this simulated world. 
All of this was largely the outcome of administrative idiosyncrasies 
rather than the result of any overarching plan: the authorities allowed 
participants to select the exact position of their lot within the assigned 
zone on a first-come-first-served basis. What is more, the varying 
budgets of different participants defined what kind of lot they would be 
able to lease, allowing national participants to present themselves in 
pavilions of varying sizes (see Huang & Kuang 2010). This included the 
largest lots of 3,000-6,000 square metres (for participants who asked to 
build their own pavilions), medium-sized lots of 500-2,000 square metres 
(for participants willing to rent and then decorate an exhibition hall), and 
small exhibition spaces within larger joint halls, each measuring between 
200 and 325 square metres. 
The type of lot reflected what financial resources each participant 
country was able and willing to invest. The cost of self-built pavilions 
ranged from 30 to 60 million Euros, and that kind of budget was generally 
available only to wealthy OECD countries, which in turn shaped the 
picture of the world that emerged at the Shanghai Expo. To show what 
that picture looked like, it helps to imagine a traditional map of the 
world, and to then re-size each nation-state to reflect not its geographical 
territory but the size of its exhibition space at the expo. I have calculated 
these relations by combining the lot sizes provided in Huang & Kuang 
(2010) with my own extrapolations based on the official Expo map (see 
also Schneider 2014b: 104-105). The result is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Since the cartogram relates pavilion lot size to actual geographical 
territory, it by default produces an exaggerated effect where nation-states 
with very large or very small territories are concerned: countries such as 
the USA, Canada, Russia, and Australia appear exponentially smaller, 
despite hosting the largest type of national pavilion that was available, 
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whereas small countries such as the island states of the Caribbean take 
up correspondingly more space. Nevertheless, the figure reproduces the 
general impression a visitor would receive while travelling this miniature 
world, and two observations are worth noting in this regard.
Firstly, wealthy industrialised countries such as the European 
members of the OECD, Japan, and South Korea take up a significant part 
of the territory, while developing countries in the Americas, Africa, and 
Asia are marginalised. Secondly, the figure highlights the dominant role 
of the host. The PRC was represented at the event with a space of 160,000 
square metres (Xinhua 2008), which included the China Pavilion itself, 
the park area surrounding it, the provincial exhibition spaces located in 
the large hall within the plateau’s foundation, and technically also the 
Hong Kong and Macau pavilions. Throughout world fair history, host 
exhibitions have traditionally played a more central role than those of 
other participants — one need only recall the iconic relevance of the 
Eifel Tower at the 1889 Paris Exposition (Johnson 2002; Jackson 2008: 
46-49). Yet the massive presence of China at this event stands in marked 
contrast to the self-presentation of host countries at preceding world 
fairs. This is also reflected by the comments of the foreign pavilion 
organisers I interviewed, who argued that the Chinese authorities were 
portraying their nation-state as the centre of the world through the use of 
architecture and lot size regulations, and that the degree of hierarchy that 
this created was unique in recent expo history.
Such arguments illustrate how organisational practices and 
administrative choices, as idiosyncratic as they may be, shape physical 
Figure 3.1: The Miniature World of the Shanghai World Expo 2010. Image © F. Schneider 2013.
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objects (here: the physical environment of the expo territory), and how 
those who interact with that environment generate meanings about this 
experience. It is before this backdrop that discursive statements emerge 
about China’s rise as a Great Power at the centre of the world. Recall how 
such complex processes draw from sets of inputs as they systematically 
assemble a network of new meanings. Figure 3.2 maps the actor-network 
of this specific case and the conceptual blending process to which it gives 
rise.




































































The bottom of the figure provides an actor-network that tracks Chinese 
organisational processes (left) and foreign planning activities at world 
expos (right). At the centre of these Chinese efforts stands the ‘mega-
event flagship’ (see Deng 2013) of the China Pavilion, designed by an 
architectural and design team headed by He Jingtang. The design process 
is plugged into circuits of interaction between party and state actors, at 
the central and municipal levels, but ultimately they involve the Shiboju, 
or Shanghai Expo Office, and two of its subsidiaries, the Expo Group 
and the Land Holding Corporation (ibid.). These processes are in turn 
subject to the rules and regulations that the BIE has established for world 
expositions. They also connect with foreign planning activities through 
the Shiboju’s administrative procedures and, important in this specific 
case, the lot regulations for the expo territory. 
I will discuss below the processes that shape foreign pavilion 
constructions. Here, I am interested in the way that these chains of 
interaction create the final assemblages at the territory itself, and how 
the combination of towering China Pavilion, territorial arrangement, and 
foreign presence creates the impression of China ruling the world at the 
Expo (Minter 2010b). This rationale is mapped in the top part of the figure. 
One input space draws together categories and assumptions about the 
China Pavilion and its meanings, using concepts from Chinese politics 
and architectural design. The second input space bring together concepts 
related to the expo as an international event. Commonalities between 
these two meaning-making spaces are then combined, in the generic 
space, using the frame of geopolitics to turn buildings and territories into 
a miniature world of nation-states. Finally, a narrative emerges in which 
the map becomes coterminous with the territory: Shanghai’s Expo park 
is all under heaven, the China Pavilion is its imperial ruler, and foreign 
pavilions are delegates to the all-powerful imperial court. 
Note how the blended meaning establishes closure by introducing the 
idea of the imperial tribute system, a concept that is itself absent from 
the input spaces, but that becomes available thanks to the way in which 
the Chinese designers ‘flagged’ imperial history as a source of meaning-
making in their pavilion design (see also chapter 6). In that sense, this 
interpretation implies actors and intentions that are not borne out by the 
actual activities on the ground: foreign pavilion organisers had diverse 
assumptions and intentions about their presence at the Shanghai Expo 
that did not neatly fit into the idea of delegates to an imperial court. 
Chinese media workers and state officials remained committed to their 
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own discourse of how the PRC would never seek hegemony in the world, 
and the idea that the Communist Party might be part of a new feudal 
order would have been deeply offensive to party cadres. Yet, the complex 
interactions in the run-up to the event created territorial configurations 
that lent themselves to such a conceptual blend between expo pavilions 
and world politics, providing the resources for other actors such as 
foreign journalists to generate narratives of foreign dignitaries paying 
homage to an autocrat.
3.6	 Building	a	Shanghai	Expo	pavilion
I have so far discussed how Chinese actors tapped into existing 
organisational networks to organise the Shanghai expo, and how these 
processes allowed certain meanings to emerge about the geopolitical 
relevance of the expo territory. It is worth examining in more detail the 
chains of interactions that led to this outcome, specifically the activities 
of foreign participants as they planned and constructed national pavilions 
and exhibits. To explore this dimension of the expo, I interviewed 
organisers of various pavilions to trace how they assembled and managed 
their various exhibitions, and I have condensed these interviews to 
chronologically reconstruct how national pavilions generally took shape. 
Allow me then to describe the path of Alice, a hypothetical pavilion 
organiser, as she goes about overseeing the design, construction, and 
functioning of a large national pavilion.
Alice has a background in event management and tourism, and she 
has been working for a private company that organises exhibits and 
fairs. Over the past decade, she has been involved in various expositions, 
including world fairs. In 2002, she notes with interest that the BIE has 
awarded the 2010 World Exposition to the city of Shanghai. In the spring 
of 2006, the national government of the country where Alice’s company 
is located sends out a call for applications for its national pavilion at the 
impending Shanghai event. The pavilion will be commissioned by the 
country’s ministry of foreign affairs, and it will receive a combination of 
public and private funding. Alice gathers a team of creative designers, 
consisting of professionals from several companies that each specialise 
in separate aspects of the project: branding, interior design, architecture, 
and construction. Together, this consortium brainstorms how to connect 
the Shanghai Expo theme ‘better city, better life’ to the country they 
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mean to represent. They meet with government officials and advisors in 
academia, cultural sectors, and commerce to hear suggestions and inform 
themselves about any relevant requirements that core stakeholders might 
have.
Over the course of the year, Alice’s team draws up a draft proposal, 
which includes the conceptual framework for the pavilion and its 
exhibits, as well as a list of the companies with which the team will 
collaborate. In 2007, the government’s search committee conducts a first 
screening to check the feasibility of the various proposals, and later that 
year the committee narrows down the pool of applicants. Alice and her 
collaborators are shortlisted, and they proceed to develop their proposal 
in more detail until, in early 2008, the search committee comes together 
to make its final decision. The vote is in Alice’s favour, and she signs a 
formal contract to organise the country’s national pavilion. At this point, 
representatives from the national government also sign a participant 
contract with the BIE.
Now the practical work begins. The architectural bureau to which 
Alice outsources the building design process spends the rest of 2008 
planning the construction in detail, in line with the parameters set in 
the successful application. This also means contacting the Chinese 
authorities at the Shiboju and arranging the area on which the pavilion 
will later be built. Within the zone designated for participants from their 
specific geographical region of origin, Alice’s team is able to reserve one 
of the coveted spots along a main thoroughfare.
As Alice joins a delegation to Shanghai, she also registers her 
pavilion as a Chinese company, so that she can start sub-contracting 
Chinese suppliers for the construction process. In late 2008, she attends 
a ceremony to break ground on the expo lot in Pudong. At this point, 
the interior design team is already in continuous exchange with the 
architects. The pavilion will later feature large video installations, and 
filming for these sub-projects is also underway at this point, though most 
of the process of designing the actual exhibits and their contents does 
not start until early 2009, when the foundations of the pavilion have been 
laid down. 
During this time, Alice also organises surveys in China to see what 
the public there expects from this particular country’s national pavilion. 
This feedback, together with input from various government officials at 
home, is handed over to several famous artists who will realise their own 
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vision for the pavilion exhibits within the general outlines that Alice and 
her team provide.
Since the national pavilion will receive a substantial amount of its 
budget from the private sector, Alice has to negotiate both conceptual 
and practical issues with industry representatives throughout this phase 
of the project. 2009 starts fairly hectically, as Alice and her team meet with 
representatives of up to 30 companies and multinational corporations, 
carefully balancing the various needs and expectations.
For about the first half of 2009, the Chinese contractors are busy 
constructing the pavilion. Throughout this time, Alice and her colleagues 
coordinate practical matters with representatives of the Shiboju, ranging 
from transport to fire safety. Alice also collaborates with other pavilion 
organisers, many of whom she knows through her participation in past 
international events. Where the various pavilion organisers share her 
goals, she joins collaborative efforts to streamline bureaucratic processes 
between the foreign participants and the Shanghai side, for instance 
ensuring swift visa access and journalist accreditation for visitors from 
Alice’s country. At the same time, she represents her company’s interests 
by building personal relations with Chinese officials, and she occasionally 
bypasses the official Shiboju to get direct access to the departments that 
are responsible for issues such as logistics and transport.
By spring 2010, the largest part of the exhibit is installed, and the 
Shiboju is sending a delegation of censors to check that the content does 
not breach any PRC laws. Since Alice’s pavilion showcases her country as 
a potential trade partner and tourist destination for Chinese audiences, 
the exhibits are largely uncontroversial, and showing the Chinese 
officials around is a mere formality. Alice is nevertheless concerned about 
a modern history exhibit that a renowned activist-artist put together, and 
which she thinks might upset the censors, so she denies the delegation 
access to that part of the pavilion, claiming that the exhibit is still under 
construction.
As Alice prepares for the grand opening of the expo in May 2010, her 
pavilion’s exhibits are ready as planned. From April onwards, her full 
staff of caterers, press spokespersons, drivers, and guides is on site. 
Throughout April, they are going through trial runs with test audiences, 
and on 1 May 2010 the pavilion officially opens its doors to the public. Over 
the coming months the pavilion will not only see tourists file through the 
exhibits, but it will also host diplomatic, cultural, and trade delegations 
as well as journalists in its office spaces.
102 Staging China
At the end of October, when the massive spectacle finally comes to 
a close, roughly 50,000 people will have passed through the pavilion 
exhibits each day, 98 per cent of them Chinese. Alice will have hosted 
over 200 business events that attracted nearly 20,000 entrepreneurs. She 
will also have hosted more than 2,000 cultural performances, featuring 
hundreds of artists, and she will have welcomed about 8,000 VIP delegates 
over the course of the six months. These will have included several heads 
of state and about three dozen ministers or ministerial-level officials.
The process I have described here of course varies, depending on the 
country of origin. Between the 189 national participants at the Shanghai 
Expo, a couple of general differences deserve to be highlighted. Firstly, 
the numbers of visitors and delegations were not all as high as for Alice’s 
hypothetical pavilion, which I have modelled on the largest national 
pavilions, such as the Australian pavilion, which saw every tenth expo 
visitor pass through its exhibits (see Harrison 2010). Smaller pavilions 
saw far fewer visitors. 
Secondly, not all parties mustered the finances to host such a large 
pavilion, with many smaller countries opting for pre-built, standardised 
constructs, or for a booth in a larger exhibition hall. In some cases, the 
financial crisis had a major impact on pavilion finances. While most 
pavilions had earmarked funding years before the crisis hit, some had to 
significantly scale back their efforts as resources suddenly dwindled away 
in 2008 and 2009.
Thirdly, the degree to which pavilion organisers collaborated with, 
and relied on, commercial sponsors varied from pavilion to pavilion. 
Some pavilions were largely financed by their respective nation-state 
governments, usually through a combination of ministries, e.g. of 
commerce, foreign affairs, and culture. Others were financed solely 
through commercial sponsors (see below). The effects of such commercial 
financing also varied greatly. While some companies were happy to take 
a hands-off approach and simply contribute to the effort, in exchange 
for acknowledgement, product placement, and chances to participate in 
commercial endeavours at the final site, others had their own ideas about 
exhibit design and pressured pavilion organisers to arrange the exhibits 
according to their own rationales. 
Finally, the timing of the design phases and the importance of different 
stakeholders during these phases varied. For instance, the German and 
Japanese pavilions collaborated strongly with enterprises from their 
respective countries, closely integrating products and company narratives 
The Governance of China’s Networked Spectacles 103
into their exhibits and shows early on. Other pavilions, like the Spanish 
one, handed the core design responsibilities over to famous Spanish 
artists, who worked largely independently of government and industry 
control.
3.7	 The	discursive	horizons	of	networked	spectacles
Despite these differences, it is nevertheless useful in this context to 
conceptualise the decision-making process in the general terms I have 
narrated above, since such a description highlights what constraints the 
chain of interactions imposed on the organisers and their communication 
strategy. The construction of discourses at the Shanghai Expo took place 
within overlapping organisational networks, each with its own demands. 
These networks provided the institutional boundaries that defined what 
could and could not be communicated, and the creativity to design 
discursive statements was consequently limited to the realm where all 
institutional frameworks overlapped (see Figure 3.3); a space which I call 
the discursive horizon. 
The first set of constraints is located at the international level. The 
plans of expo participants have to conform to international institutions, 
in this case the general guidelines of the BIE, which is represented at 
the event by a steering committee. The BIE aims to ‘ensure the smooth 
running of the Expo’ (BIE 2011), and to this end it regulates the ‘rules 
and procedures concerning international exhibitions’ (BIE 1928/1988: 
Protocol §1). This means that the BIE controls, for instance, who is 
allowed to participate in a world expo, what qualifies as an acceptable 
expo theme, and what obligations the host and the participants have 
(ibid.: Conventions).
The second set of constraints is created by actors in the pavilion’s 
country of origin. The most readily apparent constraint is that the project 
has to adhere to a certain budget. As mentioned above, the US pavilion is 
an interesting example of how domestic legislation connects to pavilion 
finances: US federal legislation prohibits the use of public funds at world 
exhibitions (Minter 2010a), which created major planning difficulties 
for the US pavilion organisers and almost prevented the USA from 
being present at the event at all — an outcome that might have taken on 
powerful (and for the US embarrassing) new meanings within the context 
of the politically charged miniature world that the expo presented. In 
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addition to such legislative matters, the economic downturn of the world 
economy after 2008 also affected many pavilion budgets. For instance, 
the Polish pavilion had to reduce its scope fundamentally on short notice: 
whereas the building was originally supposed to feature an elaborate glass 
exterior, the organisers had to settle for a less expensive paper-cut design 
in the end, after their budget had been reduced by about 70 per cent. 
At the level of domestic constraints, the pavilion content also has to 
reflect the overall public relations strategy of the respective government 
and any relevant private sponsors, while simultaneously remaining 
committed to the vision that the various designers and artists pursue 
during their design work. This may lead to clashes between creative visions 
and the intentions of those who commissioned the pavilion, as was the 
case with the controversial Spanish exhibition designed by Basilio Martín 
Patino, who referred to the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and by Isabel 
Coixet, who displayed a disturbingly uncanny oversized animatronic baby 
(Expaña Expone 2010). Such factors provide the institutional framework 
at home.
Finally, the project has to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations, 
which include both national-level legislation and local regulations, as 
well as the overall theme that the Chinese organisers have set (in this 









Figure 3.3: Overlapping Institutional Frameworks and the Discursive Horizon at the Shanghai World 
Exposition. Image © F. Schneider 2019.
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implements through its various members. These members in turn range 
from officials in public security and foreign affairs to state media workers, 
party propaganda experts, university academics, and administrators from 
logistics administrations such as fire departments. Their interpretations 
of Chinese regulations, their organisational practices, and their plans for 
the overall expo form the third set of constraints to which all participants 
have to adhere.
Overall, the overlapping constraints create a limited area of 
possibilities for creating discursive statements, though it should also be 
pointed out that this bounded space still gives unlimited opportunities to 
combine symbolic elements into new and emergent meanings. Moreover, 
the various pavilion organisers and designers frequently reinterpreted 
or actively pushed back against certain constraints, expanding their 
discursive horizon in the process. Nevertheless, the incentives at 
networked spectacles like the Shanghai Expo were strongly stacked in 
favour of discursive assemblages that aligned with the host organiser’s 
vision for the event. 
3.8	 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined how various actors came together to 
organise the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony and the Shanghai 
Expo. These processes took place within complex networks that the 
Chinese authorities assembled domestically, and they were linked to 
existing international event networks. On the part of the ruling CCP, this 
involved long-standing practices of media management, including the 
various mechanisms through which the party manages state actors, and a 
number of ‘hard’ controls that state actors at times apply to processes of 
cultural production. It also, however, involved less intrusive measures that 
relied on public-private partnerships, delegation to non-state actors, and 
market forces. I have described this combination of strategies as ‘cultural 
governance’, an approach that attempts to regulate social processes by 
indirectly regulating the cultural resources from which those processes 
draw.
As a result of this approach, actors with at times different views and 
interests joined the process of assembling the events and their discourses. 
The PRC’s administration under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao seems to have been fairly content to let these attempts play out 
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within broad constraints, many of which coincided with values already 
imbued in the international networks with which actors were familiar.
In subsequent chapters of this book, I examine more closely how actors 
fed different, often contradictory discourses into China’s networked 
spectacles. Yet, despite complex and often antagonistic interactions, 
and despite the discursive ruptures and fractures that these interactions 
created (see chapter 8), there was also a sense that an overarching narrative 
emerged out of these events. The networked practices at spectacles 
like the expo reproduced many of the discourses familiar from genres 
like sporting competitions and world fairs. In the case of the Shanghai 
Expo, the idiosyncratic interactions of thousands of organisers and event 
planners led to an event territory that to many observers seemed like a 
miniature version of the world, inviting interpretations about China’s role 
in international politics that the PRC’s leadership may not have intended, 
and that in fact clashed with the state’s foreign policy strategy and the 
ruling party’s self-perception. Rather than view the PRC as a peaceful and 
responsible partner in international relations, foreign journalists and 
event participants continued to rely on frames of imperial ostentation as 
they blended available semiotic resources into their own meanings.
Collective meaning-making may then not always have coincided with 
official CCP discourses, and yet these official discourses are a central 
part of China’s networked spectacles. Before turning to some of the 
contestations that accompanied these spectacles, it is worth asking what 
state and party actors were communicating, and what relevance these 
official representations play in Chinese politics. These are questions that 
the next chapter explores.
4 Staging China’s Revival
It is twenty minutes past eight in the evening in Beijing, and millions 
of TV viewers across the world are tuned in to the opening ceremony of 
the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. In the recently constructed Bird’s Nest 
Stadium, a little Chinese girl dressed in a red dress takes the stage and 
sings a Chinese song: the Ode to the Motherland (Gechang zuguo 歌唱祖国).
The red five-star flag waves in the wind.
How the song of victory resounds, 
Praising our beloved motherland.





The camera closes in on the scene from a distance and slowly circles 
round the girl. It then cuts to the stadium floor, where children dressed 
in the traditional attire of China’s ethnic groups carry the PRC’s national 
flag across the stadium. Viewers of the state-run domestic network 
CCTV are informed in Chinese that ‘the air above the Bird’s Nest stadium 
reverberates with the loud praise for our motherland, while 56 ethnic 
minority children enter the hall, clustered around the red five-star flag’. 
The camera now switches back and forth between long shots of the flag-
bearers, extremely wide angles of the stadium floor (now bathed in red 
light), views of stadium spectators waving miniature Chinese flags, and 
low-angle shots of the singing child. The girl launches into the second 
verse of her song:
Across the high mountains, across the plains,
Across the surging Yellow and Yangtze Rivers,
This vast and beautiful territory 
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Is our beloved homeland.
We love peace, we love the homeland.







The 56 children have reached the far side of the stadium, where they 
hand the flag to eight soldiers. The men goose-step up red stairs and 
fasten the flag to a flag pole. An announcement in English, French, and 
Chinese instructs the stadium audience to rise for the national anthem 
of the PRC. One of the soldiers throws the flag into an artificial stream of 
wind, while a 224-member choir of ethnic minority singers performs the 
March of the Volunteers (Yiyongjun jinxingqu 义勇军进行曲). As the flag rises, 
the camera shows the saluting soldiers, the (Chinese) stadium audience, 
and the CCP Politburo members on the honour dais. Once the anthem 
concludes, fireworks colour the sky above the stadium red and yellow, 
while the audience below applauds enthusiastically.
This scene was part of a concerted effort by the PRC’s authorities to 
showcase what the Chinese nation should stand for at the start of the 
21st century. Under the leadership of the CCP, networked spectacles 
like the Beijing Olympics provided various actors with an opportunity 
to design these festivities in ways that would inject new vigour into 
conceptual categories like ‘the nation’ while simultaneously revising past 
policy strategies and the basis of the party’s legitimacy to rule China. 
China’s networked spectacles promised to provide a staging ground for 
such reassessments and a way to communicate the party’s mission to 
audiences both at home and abroad.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the organisational practices that 
shaped China’s networked spectacles under the Hu-Wen administration 
were not governed top down by a single actor, even if they often drew 
from hierarchical network structures that had served Chinese authorities 
well in the past. These practices allowed for delegation, cooperation, 
and negotiation, creating diverse semiotic resources and discursive 
statements. That said, the authorities had a specific vision for these 
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spectacles, and their programming activities within the event networks 
were geared towards relaying this vision through fairly clear discursive 
statements. 
These discourses may have been created by state and party actors 
whose potential influence on Chinese society is substantial, but I 
hesitate to call the discourses that these actors generated ‘hegemonic’, 
in the sense that they became dominant. It is hard to say how common 
or widely accepted such discourses really were. What is more, for a 
discourse to be hegemonic actors would have to create statements that 
serve the status quo, relay entrenched meanings, and reinforce common-
sense assumptions. However, as I show in subsequent chapters, the 
authorities frequently designed their messages to shift the status quo, alter 
existing meanings, and recalibrate previously accepted knowledge. Terms 
like ‘hegemonic’ vs ‘counter-hegemonic’ do not adequately capture these 
communicative moves. 
In what follows, I will then instead refer to these communication 
practices as official discourse, that is the collection of statements 
designed and communicated by actors associated with authoritative 
political organisations such as, in the Chinese case, the party or the state. 
Official discourse is ideological, in the sense that it infuses networks 
with the ideals of political organisations. This can happen indirectly and 
subtly, and it may not always involve strategic considerations on the part 
of the actors who are involved. Like everyone else, official actors also draw 
from available communicative resources, some of which may not comply 
with the received wisdom of what official ideology should entail. In that 
sense, not all official discourse is necessarily propaganda (i.e. statements 
by actors explicitly meant to communicate the position of their political 
organisation), though moments like the flag-raising ceremony described 
above illustrate that propaganda played an important role during China’s 
networked spectacles. More often than not, official discourse was less 
straightforward, frequently inconsistent or contradictory, but always 
highly creative in how it assembled familiar symbols and tropes into 
meanings.
Before turning in the next chapters to the many ways in which official 
actors recalibrated the PRC’s official discourses during networked 
spectacles, for instance by designing nationalist discourses or defining 
what a ‘harmonious society’ should look like, this chapter lays the 
groundwork for understanding this ideological labour. I will walk readers 
through three core spectacles of the Hu-Wen era: the Beijing Olympics 
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opening ceremony (2008), the PRC’s 60th anniversary parade (2009), and 
the official Chinese exhibits at the Shanghai Expo (2010). I will discuss 
each of these events in turn, focusing in particular on how the spectacles 
were staged, what communicative resources they drew from to compile 
their messages, and what background knowledge they attempted to 
activate through their use of specific symbols. The chapter concludes 
with various cultural activities that flanked the events in the run-up and 
aftermath. As I will show, the networked spectacles followed a general 
narrative that can best be summarised under the official propaganda term 
‘great revival’ (weida fuxing 伟大复兴), which has played an increasingly 
important role in Chinese political discourse since roughly 1999 (Zhang 
2013).
4.1	 The	Beijing	Olympics	opening	ceremony
If we accept that Olympic Games are political events, then their opening 
ceremonies serve as their primary political statement. The Beijing 
Olympics opening ceremony (CCTV 2008) was indeed such a statement, 
but not necessarily of the kind that observers outside China had expected 
at the time. Many foreign commentators had thought the event would 
be steeped in the tropes and symbols of Chinese communism, and that 
it would unapologetically celebrate CCP politics. As it turned out, the 
opening ceremony took a rather different approach, and it is telling that, 
for instance, journalists reporting for Germany’s main state TV channel, 
the ARD, were then surprised that the event had not, as one broadcaster 
put it, been ‘a propaganda show’ (ARD 2008). 
It is possible that the lack of traditional CCP imagery and references 
to political figures such as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping caused some 
observers to miss the subtler political messages that the organisers staged 
in Bejing’s National Stadium. Under the arguably masterful direction of 
Chinese film-maker Zhang Yimou, this spectacle managed to tap into 
both the positive imagination of the international community and the 
perceived cultural heritages of Chinese viewers to define what ‘China’ 
might stand for at the start of the 21st century (see also Gries et al. 2010: 
214).
The key focus throughout the opening ceremony was on China as 
a unified nation with a longstanding history of technical and cultural 
achievements. As Zhang Yimou and his team unfolded a 147-metre long 
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scroll in the centre of the stadium, they simultaneously unfolded a vision 
of China that stretched from the invention of gunpowder to the foundation 
of the first printing press, from the Han Dynasty’s regional trade along 
what would later become known as the Silk Roads to the Ming Dynasty’s 
nautical expeditions, from terracotta warriors to landscape painting, and 
from traditional Chinese instruments to modern concert pianists. 
History, or rather historiography, has long served Chinese leaders as a 
justification for present-day politics (Mittag 2009, Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 
& Schneider 2009): not only do references to past glories instil a sense 
of pride in domestic audiences, they also place the current leadership in 
the context of a long line of successes. The opening ceremony utilised 
such a linear, modernist blueprint to guide viewers through historical 
achievements that culminated, ultimately, in the first Chinese manned 
spaceflight.
This linear narrative carried an array of tropes that romanticised 
Chinese history and culture, and the organisers used extravagant visuals 
to arrange what the parameters of Chinese ‘civilisation’ should be today. 
This included colourful flowing dresses of Tang Dynasty ladies, powerful 
ancient drum performances, dream-like fairy creatures flying through 
the stadium, and elegant martial arts routines. These set pieces cleverly 
evoked patterns of meaning for both domestic and foreign audiences, 
providing a nostalgic foil of national splendour at home and arguably 
tapping into orientalist fantasies abroad. 
At the same time, the organisers had embedded the glamorous 
Chinese performances in international values such as peace and respect 
for the environment that promised to make the ceremony intelligible for 
foreign observers and give the spectacle a non-threatening tone. The 
performances ambitiously fused Chinese folklore and modern values, 
telling a story of national success and harmony through the language of 
the international mass event.
I will not narrate the entire performance here. Full versions as well 
as highlight reels are available through major online video streaming 
platforms such as Youtube, and Barmé (2008) has provided a step-
by-step account of the ceremony. I am interested here in the specific 
communication strategies that the organisers used to present their 
vision of China in the world. The director’s team had set out to ‘brand’ 
the very identity of the Chinese nation, and a crucial component of this 
effort was the way the organisers relied on child actors to tell the story of 
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contemporary China, a strategy that has long played an important role in 
CCP propaganda efforts (see Donald 1999: 97).
An example of this is the flag-raising ceremony that I described 
at the start of this chapter (Figure 4.1). In it, China’s ethnic groups are 
represented by 56 children, who harmoniously hold hands as they carry 
the national flag across the stadium floor. The message of ethnic unity is 
not new: the CCP has for decades evoked imagery that shows minority 
groups united around one of the nation’s most revered symbols, the 
flag. In this case, this familiar imagery has been recast in a way that 
suggests innocence, an issue I will examine in more detail in chapter 5: 
the statement about national unity was relayed through cute children 
holding hands. 
Figure 4.1: The Beijing Olympics Flag-Raising Ceremony. Images assembled from screenshots of online 
footage.
These 56 ethnic groups were united in their effort to carry the flag, but 
also by the little Han-Chinese girl with her pigtails singing the Ode to the 
Motherland as the other children — reportedly themselves Han Chinese 
(Spence 2008b), but wearing the traditional attire of specific minority 
groups — marched across the stadium floor. In her red dress and singing 
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a revolutionary song, the girl represented both the (Han) Chinese people 
as well as their communist vanguard. For all intents and purposes, she 
became the Chinese nation, collapsing state, party, and people into a 
single symbol. Her role in the ceremony was pivotal, and she would later 
reappear at another crucial moment, imbuing the event with a recurring 
theme of youthful innocence that reflected official narratives of national 
rejuvenation. 
The use of children continued throughout the entire ceremony, 
ensuring that the momentum of cuteness was never entirely lost: in one 
of the concluding sequences, which was titled ‘Starlight’ (xingguang 星
光), internationally renowned pianist Lang Lang was accompanied on 
the grand piano by a five-year-old girl. Dancers around them formed the 
shape of a white dove. Later in the sequence, as the dancers arranged their 
bodies to construct a miniature model of the Bird’s Nest Stadium, the girl 
in the red dress made her second appearance: suspended on wires, she 
sailed across the stadium, waving at the audience as she was seemingly 
carried into the sky by a Chinese kite. 
In the subsequent sequence, ‘Nature’ (ziran 自然), a group of 
children dressed up as elementary school students took a mock lesson 
in environmental protection while 2,008 martial artists performed Taiji 
movements around them. Towards the end of the sequence, the children 
used crayons to colour in a traditional Chinese landscape. As the painting 
rose to the sky, featuring a large smiley face in place of the sun, the 
children cheered and waved. 
Finally, as the performative part of the opening ceremony drew to a 
close, popular singers Liu Huan and Sarah Brightman performed the 
event’s theme song You and Me (Wo he ni 我和你) from the top of an 
artificial globe. Below them on the stadium floor, 2,008 actors opened up 
umbrellas that displayed the happy faces of children from all around the 
world. As the performance concluded, fireworks reportedly formed 2,008 
smiley faces in the skies above the stadium.
While this use of children is certainly not new in political 
communication, the organisers here chose to deploy this visual trope to 
create specific meanings. The trope coincides with distinctly modernist 
discourses: the children can be viewed as representing China’s future, and 
it is telling that they played a role in sequences that dealt with modernist and 
contemporary issues such as nationalism, economic development, urban 
construction, international relations, and environmental protection 
— themes that I will analyse in more detail in the next chapters. In 
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contrast, no children appeared during the four sequences that showcased 
the cultural achievements of pre-modern China (i.e. the invention of 
gunpowder, paper, the written script, and the compass). We do not see 
any children playing ancient Chinese instruments or performing martial 
arts either. This is an interesting way to frame modernity, not just as a 
linear journey forward through time, but one of ‘rejuvenation’ (fuxing 复
兴).
There is another dimension to the use of this trope throughout the 
opening ceremony, and this dimension connects to a more general shift 
in CCP ideology under the leadership of Hu Jintao. The laughing children 
holding hands provide semiotic resources for reimagining modern China 
as place of harmony. The idea of a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui 和
谐社会) was first introduced to official CCP discourse in 2004, during a 
plenary session of the party’s central committee (see China Daily 2010), 
and together with the ‘scientific development outlook’ (kexue fazhan guan 
科学发展观) it subsequently became one of the two core ideological 
concepts of the Hu era. Both concepts were later written into the PRC 
constitution, and they remained programmatic throughout Hu’s tenure 
as General Secretary of the party (for discussions see Chan 2009, Geis & 
Holt 2009, Hong 2010, and the contributions in Zhao & Lim 2010). 
In chapter 6, I will discuss in more detail how different actors created 
concrete meanings for this concept. Here, it suffices to stress a particular 
strategy through which the opening ceremony organisers made that 
concept a salient part of the event’s political discourse. Throughout 
the opening ceremony, the performances suggested that harmony was 
a continuous theme throughout Chinese culture, and that it is indeed 
central to China’s past, present, and future. One sequence was explicitly 
dedicated to creating this sense of continuity: the segment ‘Script’ (wenzi 
文字) showed the evolution of the Chinese character for harmony (he 和) 
from its pre-modern to its contemporary form.  
This set-up allowed the organisers to bridge the kind of awkward 
inconsistencies that Harvey (1996) has criticised in mass events: instead 
of creating tensions between, on the one hand, a linear, modernist 
narrative of progressive change and, on the other hand, a conservative 
narrative of immutable national culture, the segment construed a pure 
ideal of harmony that remained at the centre of this imagined Chinese 
civilisation, even as its instantiation took on new forms throughout the 
ages, adapting to changing circumstances. The press guide to the event 
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suggests this interpretation in its own explanation of the performance 
(BOCOG 2018a: 33, emphasis and errors in the original):
This is modern type of Chinese character ‘He’. All three words 
represent not only the evolution process of Chinese characters, but 
also Confucius’ idea of humanism, that is, ‘Harmony is Precious’.
Before such a backdrop, actors who invoked the concept of ‘harmony’, 
for instance the opening ceremony organisers or the Hu-Wen 
administration, then presented themselves as having merely dipped into 
a continuous civilisational river to pull out existing concepts, rather than 
having invented and calibrated such concept as part of their discursive 
work. Through such communicative choices, the actors involved in 
constructing political discourses to some extent naturalise the concepts 
they use and legitimate their meanings through appeals to a supposedly 
shared tradition. Similar communication patterns were also on display 
at the networked spectacles that the authorities staged the year after the 
Olympic Games: the 60th Anniversary of the PRC, in 2009.
4.2	 The	PRC	anniversary	parade
The Beijing Olympics opening ceremony was about branding the 
Chinese nation, laying out a continuous historical narrative for China, 
and framing the present (and future) through cute children. It was about 
Figure 4.2: The Evolution of the Character ‘He’ in the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony ‘Script’ sequence. 
Images assembled from screenshots of online footage.
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the rejuvenated Chinese nation. These efforts continued a year later, at 
the PRC’s elaborate 60th anniversary celebration, though arguably with 
a more domestic audience in mind. On 1 October 2009, at 10:00 am, 
the PRC launched a massive televised parade along Beijing’s Chang’an 
Avenue. Nearly 10,000 soldiers and 100,000 civilians would march across 
Tiananmen Square, past thousands of carefully vetted volunteers and 
invited guests. Picking up where the Olympic narratives had left off, the 
event told stories of national unity, harmony, and CCP leadership. 
My colleague Hwang Yih-jye and I have analysed the anniversary parade 
in detail (Hwang & Schneider 2011), and I will limit my present discussion 
to a description of the proceedings and a study of the core communicative 
strategies that informed the parade. I will return in the next chapters to 
some of the themes that Hwang and I traced in our earlier study. My goal 
here is to show how the anniversary celebrations drew on the iconography 
of China’s revolutionary past, reproducing several rituals that have come 
to form part of the CCP’s repertoire of symbolic interactions, but how the 
event organisers also juxtaposed revolution-era iconography with new 
elements, in the process often subtly adding meanings and discursive 
resources to the established canon of communist signs.
The celebrations began with three generations of Chinese leaders 
(Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping) walking the red carpet and taking 
their place on the podium above the famous Gate of Heavenly Peace. 
Together with other members of the CCP’s leadership, specifically the 
members of the party’s highest organ, the Politburo Standing Committee, 
they then observed the flag-raising ceremony opposite the Gate, in front 
of the Martyrs’ Memorial on Tiananmen Square. Following this ritual, 
PRC President and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao proceeded to inspect 
the troops (see Xinhua 2009d): riding along Chang’an Avenue, China’s 
top leader passed formation after formation of People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) soldiers. During this ride, he engaged the troops in a ritualistic 
exchange of slogans from the back of a ‘Red Flag’ limousine — a tradition 
familiar from the previous 13 PLA military parades that the PRC had 
witnessed since its founding (see Hung 2007, Sun 2001, and Ye & Barmé 
2009). The famous exchange has China’s commander-in-chief address the 
soldiers with ‘hello comrades’ (tongzhimen hao 同志们好), and they reply 
‘hello chief ’ (shouzhang hao 首长好) in carefully rehearsed unison. This 
line is then followed by a second exchange: ‘comrades, you have worked 
hard’ (tongzhimen xinku le 同志们辛苦了), asserts the commander-in-
chief, to which the soldiers respond ‘we serve the people’ (wei renmin fuwu 
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为人民服务), an emblematic phrase, dating back to Mao, that captures 
the party’s self-perception and one of its core legitimating arguments 
(Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3: The Ritual of Troop Inspection during the PRC’s 60th Anniversary. Figure adapted from 
screenshots of online footage.
After Hu Jintao completed his version of this exchange, repeating the 
famous phrases ten times, he returned to the balcony at the Gate of 
Heavenly Peace to give an eight-minute speech that highlighted recent 
economic achievements, national unity, and the importance of CCP 
rule. Hu’s speech was then followed by the military parade itself, with 
14 square formations of soldiers and 30 blocks of top-of-the-line military 
equipment traversing the square (China Daily 2009), in each case saluting 
the leaders on the podium in carefully choreographed synchronicity. This 
display of martial prowess was succeeded by a civilian pageant, which 
had been prepared by the same director as the Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony: Zhang Yimou. The civilian component of the parade included 











across the square, framed by famous propaganda slogans. It then showed 
major achievements in PRC history, covering political, economic, social, 
and technological themes. Following this sequence of highlights, the 
parade featured floats for each of the PRC’s provinces or administrative 
regions, and it concluded with displays of ethnic unity and transnational 
harmony. 
Much like the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, the PRC anniversary 
parade presented a linear narrative of history that moved from a distant 
but glorious ancient period through more recent phases of turmoil and 
humiliation on to a modern present that is marked by renewed glory. 
The use of symbols was particularly relevant to this endeavour, especially 
since the pre-modern era was represented only indirectly, through 
cultural references. Hu Jintao’s speech pointed towards this non-distinct 
past by praising China for ‘5,000 years of history’, a number that will 
have been familiar to audiences as the official CCP’s position on how far 
back the origins of the nation should be located. The speech linked this 
mythological past to the idea of rejuvenation that had already played such 
an important role in the Olympics opening ceremony discourse the year 
before, with Hu extolling ‘the Chinese nation’s bright prospect on the 
road to revival’. 
More generally, the parade discourses were at their core modernist, 
concerning themselves only with the pre-modern past in the form of 
symbols that suggested a vague, glorious past. References to modernity 
were much more specific, and symbolic numbers again played an 
important role in this regard. The soldiers who carried the PRC flag 
during the flag-raising ceremony took precisely 169 steps up to the 
flagpole, one for each year since the start of the First Opium War in 1840, 
reminding audiences of the year that the party leadership considers to be 
the start of a ‘century of humiliation’ at the hands of foreign powers. The 
idea of national humiliation provides an important foil for contemporary 
Chinese nationalism (Gries 2004: ch.3, Wang 2012), and more specifically 
for the revival narratives of recent leadership generations (Callahan 2010: 
ch.2): it was the CCP, so the rationale goes, that overcame this lost century 
and set the country on its path towards well-deserved glory. 
The 60 years of PRC history were then also frequently referred to, e.g. 
through a 60-gun salute during the flag-raising ceremony, the 60 floats of 
the civilian pageant, the 60,000 white doves that were released into the sky 
at the end of the event, but also the licence plate numbers of the limousines 
used during the troop inspection, which read V-01949 and V-02009 (see 
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Xinhua 2009f ). The event further evoked China’s revolutionary past 
through the PLA orchestra that played famous revolutionary songs, but 
of course also through the location itself: the Gate of Heavenly Peace had 
provided Mao with the stage for announcing the foundation of the PRC 
in 1949, and his portrait still adorns the monument and overlooks the 
famous site (for a history of the square and its iconography see Wu 2005). 
The event further pointed towards this founding mythology through the 
choice of attire that master-of-ceremony Hu Jintao wore for the occasion: 
whereas the other CCP cadres wore western suits, Hu was dressed in a 
‘Mao suit’, or rather a ‘Sun Yat-sen suit’, as the attire is known in Chinese. 
The suit served as a reminder of modern China’s Republican heritage, 
placing the current leadership into a timeline that extended beyond the 
famous founding date of the PRC and that connected Sun’s revolution, 
Mao’s revolution, and the present administration within the overarching 
theme of China’s road to revival.
To fill this overarching narrative with meaning, the event organisers 
used a number of communicative mechanics that served to frame the 
proceedings. Aside from building important symbols into the parade, for 
instance as part of specific floats and formations, the director’s team also 
had the parade pass before a backdrop of volunteers in the square who 
would flip colourful flashcards, creating a large ‘human screen’ that could 
display relevant slogans as the formations moved past (Figure 4.4). For 
domestic audiences, these slogans and the activities on the square were 
then further framed by the CCTV commentators, who disambiguated 
the event and provided the intended interpretation. Through these 
interlocking mechanisms, the organisers stacked various semiotic markers 
to shape the political discourse of the parade. For instance, the segment 
that showcased Mao’s portrait was presented as the ‘creation of heaven 
and earth’ (the official title of that segment, relayed to audiences through 
CCTV), and its relevance became enmeshed with the general background 
slogan that ‘socialism is good’ (presented by the volunteers in the square). 
The Deng era, in turn, would become ‘the story of spring’ (segment title), 
linked to the background statement ‘emancipate the mind’. 
Importantly, the more recent periods under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
were presented as a future-oriented transition into the 21st century, with 
Jiang’s formation (titled ‘walking into a new era’) accompanied by the 
background slogans ‘striding into the next century’ and ‘proceed with the 
times’. Such discursive statements may seem vacuous, but they generate 
the frame through which the organisers then made sense of the Hu 
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Jintao period, which coincided with flashcard displays of the ‘scientific 
development’ concept, and which carried the somewhat awkward title 
‘carry forward the cause, and charge ahead into the future’. In this way, 
the organisers of the anniversary festivities attempted to make the most 
recent leadership generations and their rule over China intelligible to 
audiences as a new historical stage in a linear progression through time, 
and as a crucial step towards national revival. 
Figure 4.4: Crucial Slogans Framing the PRC’s 60th Anniversary Parade on Tiananmen Square. Figure 
adapted from screenshots of online footage.
This period would then be filled with new meanings, which I return 
to in the next chapter. The idea of revival was deeply woven into this 
ideological work. Much of the remaining parade was arranged to imbue 
the present with a sense of rejuvenation and, much like during the Beijing 
Olympics opening ceremony, director Zhang Yimou used the trope of 
children to bring together various meaning-making moments and create 
an overarching sense of unity and future-oriented drive (see also Xinhua 
2009c). This was particularly evident towards the end of the event. The 
last floats included an arrangement of ‘young pioneers’ who performed 
on drums and, finally, a formation of children carrying balloons. During 
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this final formation, which was arranged around a flower basket and the 
slogan ‘long live the motherland’, the volunteers in the square displayed 
characters that read ‘tomorrow will be even more glorious’ while a choir 
of children sang ‘we are the future of communism’. The parade concluded 
with the children releasing their balloons into the air and running towards 
the Gate of Heavenly Peace, where they waved their colourful wreaths at 
the leaders in the stands, who waved back benevolently. 
This display of paternalistic leadership may seem quaint, but it is 
part of a wider effort that aims to define such leadership before diverse 
audiences, in various contexts. At the height of the Hu-Wen period, 
the CCP was re-imagining itself as a kind of ‘Volkspartei’, a political 
organisation that claimed to represent broad interests across the 
political spectrum and work for a shared common good. It was using the 
communicative resources at its disposal to set the ideological parameters 
for its legitimacy. Framed as ‘service to the people’, the CCP reaffirmed 
its role as a benevolent parental figure for ‘the people’, and it tied its 
mandate to rule China to modernist developmental achievements and the 
promise of an even better future. The parade served as the staging ground 
for a particular vision of this future, presented vaguely during the event as 
bright and glorious, but defined in more detail during the Shanghai Expo 
a year later, and heavily evoked during the Xi Jinping period through the 
focus on the ‘China Dream’.
4.3	 China’s	crown	jewel
At the World Exposition 2010, the hosts enshrined official discourses in a 
number of state-organised or state-commissioned buildings and exhibits, 
generally following the script of ‘national rejuvenation’ that had already 
governed the meaning-making efforts at the Beijing Olympics and PRC 
anniversary. The most prominent of the expo’s edifices was the iconic 
China National Pavilion (Zhongguo guan 中国馆, see Figure  4.5), also 
known as the ‘Oriental Crown’ (Dongfang zhi guan 东方之冠), which was 
flanked by the smaller pavilions of the Special Administrative Regions 
Hong Kong and Macau. The China Pavilion itself was home to a large, 
three-part exhibition on ‘Chinese Wisdom in Urban Development’ (城
市发展中的中华智慧, summarised in Chinese in Shiboju 2010), and its 
foundations housed 31 Chinese regional and provincial exhibits (some of 
which are presented in Oriental Morning Post 2010: 248-303).  
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Figure 4.5: China’s National Pavilion and its Replicas. All images © F. Schneider 2010, except top left 
(adapted from George Lu 2010 / Flickr / CC2.0). https://www.flickr.com/photos/gzlu/4991646142
I return to the main exhibition below, but first the architecture of the 
edifice deserves attention, since it is already such a spectacular example 
of political communication in its own right. Commentators frequently 
focus on the prominent position of the building and its towering shape 
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(see also my discussion in the previous chapter), but I am here more 
interested in the symbolic features that the creators embedded in the 
edifice and the communicative and design choices they made to tell a 
story through architecture (presented in the design studio’s official guide 
to the pavilion, SCAT 2010).
Thematically, the architectural design follows similar parameters to 
those that also informed the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, that 
is a strong emphasis on harmony and civilisation. The designers present 
their plans as bringing into unity ‘the cosmos and humankind’ (tianren 
heyi 天人合一; SCAT 2010: 30), and they tie their endeavours to a similarly 
linear narrative of the past to the one that also informed China’s networked 
spectacles in 2008 and 2009, describing the China Pavilion as combining 
‘traditional structures and contemporary deductions’ (传统构架，现代
演绎; SCAT 2010: 41). The project’s meaning is anchored to pre-modern 
concepts such as ‘heaven’ (tian 天) and ‘harmony’ (he 和), as well as to 
selected cultural artefacts from the past. The beams of the building, for 
instance, use a pre-modern construction technique known as dougong 
(dougong 斗拱) brackets, a system of interlocking wooden supports that 
would tie beams and roofs together in the imperial architecture of, for 
instance, the Tang and Song dynasties, and famously visible in the Ming-
era edifices that form the Forbidden City in Beijing. 
The inverted pyramid-like structure of the China Pavilion is also 
meant to resemble the coronal caps (guanmao 冠帽) of dynastic rulers, 
and as a whole it emulates the shape of an ancient ritual vessel (ding 
鼎). The architectural team further referred to the lunisolar calendar 
with its 24 solar terms, which were engraved into the pavilion’s facade 
in traditional seal script. The characters now adorn the building’s base 
and the endpoints of its beams. Through these strategies, the designers 
have woven elements that they considered part of a Chinese civilisational 
legacy into the construction, using either pre-modern components 
like the ritual vessel or the coronation cap as metaphorical models 
for the structure (hence the term ‘Oriental Crown’), or literally using 
contemporary versions of pre-modern architectural practices in their 
project.
The building serves as a contemporary symbol of Chinese civilisation, 
and it interprets this civilisation as being primarily about harmony. The 
discourse of harmony for instance reappears in the various technologies 
that the architectural team brought to bear in order to ensure an 
energy-efficient design: rooftop gardens, natural air conditioning 
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and plumbing, and environmentally friendly construction materials 
all imply a harmonious relationship between human culture and the 
natural environment. Symbolically, the concept of harmony also informs 
the colour choice for the building. The building uses seven hues of 
red, which the designers reportedly selected in collaboration with the 
China Academy of Art, after an extensive colour analysis of traditional 
monuments like the Forbidden City (ibid.: 76). The four shades used in 
the roof design are stacked across the structure to ensure that the colour 
‘gradually becomes lighter towards the ground, which increases the 
sense of hierarchy and space’ (并由上到下通过渐变的手法由深到浅，
以增加整体 “中国红” 的层次感，空间感) (ibid.: 45). As a whole, these 
hues then form the colour ‘China Red’ (中国之红), and to the designers 
they embody the Confucian phrase he er bu tong (和而不同), which they 
translate into ‘harmony in diversity’. 
I will return to this phrase and its many meanings in chapter 6, since 
it is at the centre of official efforts to conceptualise what a ‘harmonious 
society’ should be. Importantly, the architects embedded their efforts 
within wider communication practices that imagine Chinese civilisation 
as a continuous linear narrative of national revival, and they enshrined in 
their construction two concepts that were crucial to such imaginations 
during China’s networked spectacles under the Hu-Wen administration’s 
leadership: civilisation and harmony. These themes were then also woven 
into the exhibition inside the building.
4.4	 A	tour	of	the	China	Pavilion
The China Pavilion was designed as an impressive discursive statement 
about contemporary China and its role in the world, and during 
the Shanghai Expo it housed an exhibition that further developed, 
showcased, and explained the themes of the event. This exhibition was 
called ‘Chinese Wisdom in Urban Development’ (城市发展中的中华
智慧), and it transposed the discourses familiar from the Olympics and 
the 60th PRC Anniversary to the genre of the world fair (for an official 
introduction to the exhibition see Shiboju 2010). 
Ascending the towering China Pavilion via its escalator system, 
visitors would enter the exhibition at the top floor of the building. There, 
visitors were guided first through the core exhibition ‘The Footprints’ 
(in Chinese called ‘Eastern Footprints’, Dongfang zuji 东方足迹), which 
Staging China’s Revival 125
included one of two specially produced feature films. The pavilion cycled 
through screenings of The Road to our Beautiful Life (in Chinese: ‘process’ 
or ‘journey of experience’; Licheng 历程), directed by Fan Yingwei (范英
伟), and Harmonious China (Hexie Zhongguo 和谐中国), directed by Zheng 
Dasheng (郑大圣). Each film was arranged across three connected 
screens, allowing the directors to juxtapose different visual elements 
and present interlocking parts of their films across the front half of 
the 700-seat auditorium. The films were meant to showcase ‘the story 
of spring’ (chuntian de gushi 春天的故事), marking the beginning of the 
pavilion’s tour through contemporary China’s urban development and, 
by extension, also metaphorically symbolising the country’s start on a 
journey of national revival. 
The film The Road to our Beautiful Life presented a highly stylised story of 
four generations experiencing the rise to prominence of contemporary, 
urban China. Starting in a pristine rural past, a son leaves his father’s 
ancestral lands to build the New China. He joins a wave of young people 
who rush across the countryside and gather at a cliff, gazing into the 
distance at the city that is their destination. The film then presents 
a number of set pieces, each portraying heroic construction and 
developmental efforts, and ultimately showing the achievements that 
these efforts have led to: impressive fictional cityscapes and real-world 
edifices like the Bird’s Nest Stadium in Beijing. 
During this period of construction, the young man meets his future 
wife, and the two have a son. The next part of the film follows the boy 
growing up: as he runs along a street of adults celebrating what is 
probably the Spring Festival, time ‘flies by’ in the form of years, projected 
as overlays onto the screen. The boy enters a revolving door, and as it 
turns more numbers fly by. In the cinema, the screens to the left and 
right of the main action show various achievements throughout China’s 
reform-and-opening-up period. The boy emerges a young man, only to be 
stopped in his tracks by an event that has become a watershed moment in 
contemporary Chinese historiography: the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
in Sichuan Province. The young man volunteers to join the relief effort, 
and at the site of the disaster he meets his future wife, whom he saves 
from the rubble. They, too, have a son. 
The short film concludes with the grandfather visiting his family in 
Shanghai, travelling on a tourist bus along the Bund in amazement as 
CCTV headlines pass by in time, again highlighting numerous important 
achievements of the past years. In the end, the grandfather holds his 
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newly-born great-grandson in his arms to bombastic music, with his 
son’s and grandson’s families each watching him joyously from across the 
two flanking screens. The camera then cuts to a digital image of a highly 
developed Shanghai skyline, informing readers that ‘30 years China’ (30 
nian Zhongguo 30年中国) has created 300,000 new cities and 300 million 
new urban citizens. Finally, the point-of-view camera flies through a 
canyon in a utopian green landscape, arriving at a science-fictional city of 
glass high-rises that sits atop a gigantic waterfall. A caption reads:
In the future, we will return to the green, we will return to nature. 
Our life in the city will become more glorious.
未来，我们会回到绿色，回到自然。我们的城市生活会更美
好。
The second feature film, Harmonious China, provided a less bombastic 
vision of modern China, but despite the different filmic and narrative 
choices, it connected with similar themes (see also Hubbert 2017: 53-56 
for an analysis). Following an opening scene in which landscape paintings 
morph into contemporary Chinese skylines, the film presents its narrative 
in three segments, each starting with a famous Confucius quotation that 
is presented on-screen in Chinese characters, accompanied by English 
translations (see Shiboju 2010: 28-31; the translations and any language 
errors are taken from the original):
While standing by a river, the Confucius said, ‘What passes away 
is, perhaps, like [t]his. Day and night it never lets up.’
子在川上曰 逝者如斯夫不舍昼夜
The Confucius said, ‘The gentleman agrees with others without 
being an echo.’
子曰 君子和而不同
The Confucius said, ‘Follow my heart’s desire without overstepping 
the line.’
子曰 从心所欲而不逾矩
The first segment of the film is built around a Chinese living-room scene 
that is presented on the centre screen, and that changes over time as 
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images of everyday life throughout the years pass by on the screens on the 
left and right: sepia-coloured photographs from the 80s and 90s showing 
people taking boat rides and buying the first mobile phones, colour 
images of university graduations, and so forth. The second segment is 
also constructed around the passage of time, but in this case showing 
everyday scenes throughout a day in China. Starting at 07:30 am, the 
film shows people practising Taiji in the morning, a boy marvelling at a 
window cleaner around noon, a couple getting married in the afternoon, 
and a Chinese opera performance at night, concluding with a street 
cleaner sweeping the streets in a night-time park at 11:30 pm. The third 
segment then rounds out these stories about time. It shows an hour glass 
and a counter that spins forward through the years, while the images on 
screen provide a glimpse into China’s future. City images are overlaid 
with animations of plants and butterflies, and the iconography ultimately 
returns to its trope of the landscape painting that started the film, now 
showing an animated painting of a futuristic, green city as birds fly by. 
The entire film is underscored with classic Chinese instrumentation.
These roughly eight-minute-long films set the tone for the rest of the 
exhibition. They introduced visitors to the central concerns of the exhibit 
— harmony, civilisation, a linear passage of time, a glorious future — 
and then released them into the first segment of the exhibition proper, 
which was called ‘Reminiscence’. In Chinese, the exhibition carried the 
poetic title ‘glancing back at time’ (Suiyue huimou 岁月回眸), interestingly 
eschewing more common Chinese phrases for ‘looking back’ (e.g. huigu 
回顾) and opting instead for a flowery phrase taken from Tang poetry: 
Bai Juyi’s famous ‘Song of Eternal Regrett’ has the concubine Yang 
Guifei ‘glancing back’ at Emperor Xuanzhong, setting in motion a tragic 
love story that will have been familiar to many Chinese visitors from 
their high-school textbooks. The exhibits themselves were not directly 
related to poetry or literature, but they combined trinkets from the past 
decades: much like the sequence in the film Harmonious China, the exhibits 
showcased Chinese living rooms and how they had changed over the 
course of the previous four decades (Figure 4.6). 
The historical retrospective continued in the subsequent section, 
‘River of Wisdom’ (Zhihui de changhe 智慧的长河), which contained an 
ingenious animated version of the scroll ‘Along the River During the 
Qingming Festival’ (Qingming shanghe tu 清明上河图), a famous painting 
that depicts the bustling life in a Song-era city generally believed to be 
the Northern Song capital Kaifeng. The section also featured a series 
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of historical artefacts (the ‘Crystals of Civilisation’, or in Chinese 
‘civilisational heritage’, wenming chuancheng 文明传承). Most prominent 
among these was a piece from the Terracotta Army, the ‘Bronze Chariot 
Number One’ (Yi hao tong chema 一号铜车马), which was presented as the 
core ‘National Treasure’ (Guo zhi guibao 国之瑰宝) of the pavilion.
These historical exhibits were followed by a modernist section titled 
‘Land of Hope’, which showcased a field of bio-engineered ‘super-green 
rice’, examples of rural and urban tourist sites, and an animated image of 
an apartment building in which various families went about their affairs 
‘under the same roof ’ (tongyi wuyan xia 同一屋檐下). These displays of 
contemporary achievements rounded out the exhibit on the upper floor 
of the pavilion, and visitors were then guided along a walkway to the 
second set of installations, passing 98 children’s paintings (Figure 4.7) 
that had reportedly been selected from 5,000 entries into a nation-wide 
painting competition called ‘imagining a new life — future cities and life 
through my eyes’ (畅想新生活 — 我心目中的未来城市和生活; Shiboju 
2010: 118). 
Arriving on the next floor down, visitors would enter an exhibition 
that was modelled on theme-park rides, with carriages transporting 
Figure 4.6: Three Decades of Chinese Living Rooms. The China Pavilion’s ‘Reminiscence’ Exhibition Area. 
Images © F. Schneider 2010.
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passengers along rails through a stylised world of architectural design 
practices. The exhibit, called ‘The Dialogue’ (in Chinese: Xunmi zhi lü 寻
觅之旅, ‘journey of discovery’), connected ancient Chinese designs and 
practices to contemporary construction projects. Visitors were introduced 
to pre-modern bricklaying and roofing techniques, to classic window 
and door designs, and to engineering practices in bridge-building and 
traffic management. These elements were then presented as antecedents 
of high-profile construction projects like the Donghai Bridge outside 
Shanghai or national plans to construct an interlinking highway network.
Leaving the themed ride, visitors would then descend to the final 
level of the China Pavilion’s exhibition space, entering five rooms that 
each displayed an element of the authorities’ approach to sustainable 
‘scientific development’. This included a ‘Warning from Nature’ (Ziran 
jingshi 自然警示) in the form of an installation that dynamically projected 
Figure 4.7: Children’s Paintings ‘Imagining a New Life’, Displayed in the China Pavilion during the 
Shanghai Expo. Images © F. Schneider 2010.
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global environmental statistics onto a wall (CO2 emissions, rising sea 
levels, changing temperatures, and so on). It also included a ‘Proper 
Exploration’ of environmental issues (qun zhi you dao 取之有道, a term 
adapted from a Ming-era Daoist text), which consisted of a hall displaying 
innovations in green energy production, such as wind power, solar power, 
algae-based biofuels, and smart energy networks. A subsequent section 
then demonstrated ‘Measured Consumption’ (yong zhi you jie 用之有
节, again a quotation from a classic work, the Song-era text called Zizhi 
Tongjian), demonstrating technologies and practices for reducing carbon 
emissions, avoiding plastic waste, and improving recycling practices. An 
installation about the reforestation of China’s countryside, called ‘Return 
to Simplicity’ (fanpu guizhen 返璞归真, an idiom dating back to Warring 
States texts), completed the presentation of environmental issues. At the 
centre of the display floor lay, in a circular room, the concluding segment 
of the exhibition, called ‘Fountain of Illumination’ (ganwu zhi quan 感
悟之泉): a garden of lotus flowers, surrounded by walls of cascading 
water that morphed into various symbols and phrases. Visitors thus left 
the pavilion in front of a backdrop of expo slogans and China Pavilion 
exhibition titles, formed by water, and underscored with the sounds of 
classic Chinese instruments.
Across its three floors, the feature exhibition of the China Pavilion 
presented a multi-layered story of national revival. This story was told 
through multiple media, and it combined a complex series of tropes and 
symbols to imply a continuous movement forward for the Chinese nation 
— a movement that ultimately led to hypermodern utopian cityscapes 
in some non-distinct green future. All the while, this bright future was 
anchored in the past through recourse to selected symbols of ancient 
wisdom, providing a contemporary take on the idea of ‘making the past 
serve the present’ (gu wei jin yong 古为今用), a famous Mao quotation, but 
also a sentiment that has shaped roughly a century of Chinese discussions 
on how to create a native version of modernity (see Dirlik 2011b).
4.5	 Framing	China’s	networked	spectacles
I have so far provided a tour through the official elements of the three 
major networked spectacles that the Hu-Wen administration organised 
during its tenure. During each of these events, the party, state, and 
private actors collaborated to organise an official narrative about China’s 
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role in the world. To this end, they cleverly arranged ritual interactions 
and deployed available discursive resources across various media types 
to make their official statements intelligible to diverse audiences, both at 
home and abroad. However, such activities do not exist in isolation; they 
are not confined to the events alone, but they require communicative 
work in the run-up, to prepare the ground for the actual spectacle (see 
Dayan & Katz 1994), and sustained efforts after the events, to keep the 
discourse alive through continuous ritual interactions.
The authorities made excellent use of the discursive opportunity that 
networked spectacles provide: through their influence in Chinese news 
media, and their ability to infuse cultural production networks with 
values and incentives, they created a barrage of related reporting that set 
the stage for the actual events. Internationally, the Chinese authorities 
deployed official news outlets to create symbolic capital abroad and 
signal to potential foreign partners that the PRC was open for business 
and tourism, for instance in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics (Preuss 
& Alfs 2011). Domestically, Xinhua News Agency inundated audiences 
with event-related information, for instance about the Shanghai Expo, 
on which the agency ran more than 2,600 news items in the year before 
the event, as a query for ‘Shanghai shibo hui’ (上海世博会) on the 
news aggregator Factiva reveals. For the national anniversary the year 
before, Xinhua had released more than 800 items on the term ‘national 
anniversary’ (guoqing 国庆), and the year before that, it produced nearly 
11,000 Chinese-language news items about the Beijing Olympics (Beijing 
Aoyunhui 北京奥运会). This reporting of course also focused on sports 
and lifestyle issues, but it was frequently nationalistic. As Han (2010) has 
shown for the Olympic torch relay in 2008, Chinese news media generally 
flanked the controversies with reports that provided a nationalist frame 
for China’s Olympic ambitions.
Aside from this flood of official news reports in the run-up to China’s 
networked spectacles, the authorities also used public space to prime 
audiences for the relevance of these events. Some of these activities 
were arguably banal, such as putting up Haibo statues across Shanghai 
in preparation for the expo, but recall again the subtle impact that such 
banal flagging can have on community sentiments like nationalism. 
Figure 4.8 shows a flower pot that was used in public spaces in Shanghai 
in 2010, and which resembled the expo’s China Pavilion, itself a national 
symbol (see above).  
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Figure 4.8: China Pavilion Flower Pot, Shanghai 2010. Image © F. Schneider 2010.
The 60th anniversary was similarly preceded by extensive propaganda 
campaigns, often infusing public discourse with specific event-related 
markers and themes. In the Beijing metro, the public service monitors 
showed messages that citizens had purportedly sent in to voice their 
congratulations, such as the one I have reproduced in Figure 4.9, and 
which roughly translates as:
Black-and-white, colour, LCD;
Hand fan, electric fan, air-condition;
Land line, pager, mobile phone;
Warm food and clothing, comparatively well-off living standards, 
harmony!
The common people’s lives change, the country develops with big 
strides;
A golden age coincides with the Chinese nation’s birthday, the 
motherland strides forward with head held high! 
I am in no position to assess whether such comments truly came from 
ordinary citizens. It is at least conceivable that they had been designed by 
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propaganda workers, considering how closely such comments mirrored 
both official language and propaganda themes, e.g. the metaphor of 
the country steadily ‘striding forward’ through time. Then again, such 
phrases are so well-known that it is at least conceivable that citizens 
would use them in messages intended to get public air time. Whoever 
the producers of these messages may have been, their relentless efforts 
ensured that public spaces across China were inundated with discursive 
statements that presented the officially approved themes of China’s 
networked spectacles. 
The themes of the anniversary were further developed in a range of 
official cultural productions that my colleague Hwang Yih-jye and I have 
analysed in our study of how official actors narrated stories of national 
rejuvenation at the time (Schneider & Hwang 2014a). This included 
a blockbuster movie production that retold the story of The Founding of 
the Republic (Jianguo daye 建国大业), placing the early Mao years into the 
Figure 4.9: Beijing Metro Display of Citizens’ Congratulatory Text Messages during the PRC’s 60th 
Anniversary. Image © F. Schneider 2009.
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context of national celebrations 60 years later. While the film itself was 
arguably convoluted, stringing together a series of committee meetings 
and political speeches, it was nevertheless designed for mass appeal: the 
film was laced with cameos of famous stars, prompting cinema-goers 
to see if they could spot their favourite actors among the multitude of 
Chinese celebrities. This strategy seems to have paid off at the box-office, 
where the film ranked as the third most popular film in 2009, reportedly 
raking in 420 million RMB (Douban 2009), which at the time was 
equivalent to 42 million Euros. It will not have hurt the financial returns 
that party members were required to watch the film, that the censors 
blocked foreign blockbusters from screening at the same time, and that 
state organisations bussed their employees to collective screenings. 
Another cultural product that laid the ideological groundwork for 
the anniversary celebrations was a CCTV documentary series about 
China’s modern history. In six episodes, the TV production covered the 
humiliations that the nation had suffered at the hands of foreign powers, 
starting with the Opium Wars, and then narrated the story of China’s 
revival, walking viewers through the achievements under the guidance 
of consecutive CCP leadership generations. The same subject matter 
was further developed in a special multi-media opera, titled Road to 
Revival, which was staged at the Beijing Opera House in 2009. Combining 
tropes from revolutionary opera with contemporary musical and theatre 
elements, the show provided a highlight reel of important moments in 
official CCP historiography, focusing strongly on emotive imagery and 
music, and disambiguating the stylised performances by having two 
narrators explain each scene through recourse to official language.
Chinese cultural governance thus extended across different media 
types to generate an official discourse outside the immediate anniversary 
festivities themselves, and this was also the case a year later, when a 
plethora of media reports signalled to audiences what themes and 
symbols would matter during the Shanghai Expo. Chinese public spaces 
were again saturated with propaganda posters, statues, and public service 
announcements, and all state media outlets flanked the world fair with 
updates and reports.
Throughout all three events, official discourses were frequently 
self-referential; the PRC anniversary parade included two floats that 
celebrated the Beijing Olympics, and the float symbolising Shanghai 
already featured a miniature model of the China Pavilion. At the Shanghai 
Expo itself, Olympic symbolism was part of the official Chinese expo 
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exhibitions, for instance in the many references to the iconic national 
stadium in Beijing. Indeed, the edifices erected for China’s networked 
spectacles played an important role in permanently enshrining the 
legacies of these events in public spaces. By constructing iconic buildings 
such as Beijing’s National Stadium (Guojia tiyuchang 国家体育场) and 
the National Aquatics Centre (Guojia youyong zhongxin 国家游泳中心), 
respectively nicknamed the ‘Bird’s Nest’ (Niaochao 鸟巢) and the ‘Water 
Cube’ (Shuilifang 水立方), the city government of Beijing provided spaces 
that could easily be used in follow-up events, framed by the symbolism 
of national success. For instance, to ensure that the momentum of the 
Beijing Games was not lost, the Chinese state called for a campaign to 
keep the spirit of the Olympics alive. Under the direction of the Beijing 
Olympic City Development Association (BODA; 北京奥运城市发展
促进会), the authorities continued to organise sporting and cultural 
events, academic conferences, as well as exhibitions related to the Beijing 
Olympics in the year following the original sporting event (BODA 2010: 
32). A particularly recursive example was a gala concert that the Beijing 
Symphony Orchestra organised on 6 August 2009 at the Olympic Green, 
to mark the first anniversary of the Beijing Olympics. The event featured a 
host of stars performing a total of 22 songs, ranging from Chinese sports 
anthems to nationalist songs such as Rejoicing China (Huanle Zhongguo 欢
乐中国), the Ode to the Motherland, and the patriotic song Nation (Guojia 国
家), performed by Jackie Chan (see also chapter 5).
Much like the Shanghai Expo’s China Pavilion, which now serves as an 
art museum, Beijing’s Olympic stadiums have become national symbols 
in their own right, ready to be appropriated and disseminated by state 
and non-state actors alike. Both the National Stadium and the National 
Aquatics Centre serve as tourist attractions, mainly for domestic travel 
groups. Despite relatively steep ticket prices at the time (50 RMB for the 
Bird’s Nest, 30 RMB for the Water Cube), the Bird’s Nest Stadium alone 
saw 20,000 to 30,000 visitors per day in the first year after the Games, 
generating roughly 300 million RMB in revenues (Li 2009). What is 
remarkable is that the two buildings had fairly little to offer the respective 
visitors. In the Water Cube, tourist groups filed through the corridors of 
the building and across the stands of the different aquatic sites. In the 
Bird’s Nest, a large screen played promotion videos while visitors tested 
what it felt like to sit in the ranks, or to touch the impressive steel beams 
that form the outer shell of the complex. During my own visit in 2009, 
both sites were filled with busy chatter and the flashlights of cameras, 
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but they offered no cultural activities or exhibits. In essence, they had 
become memorials: reminders of the nation’s achievements in 2008.
The main activity that both sites offered the tourist visitors was 
shopping. The Bird’s Nest featured a large gift shop that sold a broad 
range of souvenirs, such as documentaries of the original Games, 
Karaoke DVDs with the Chinese songs featured during the event, mascots 
in different sizes, and miniature Bird’s Nest stadiums in gold, silver, and 
as plush toys. Similarly, in the entrance hall of the Water Cube, various 
vendors sold trademarked Water Cube accessories (Yin 2009): swim suits, 
key chains, jewellery, and even bottles of special Water Cube water that 
had allegedly been shipped in from glaciers in northern Canada (Figure 
4.9). The national symbols have become brands in their own right and 
function as part of the replicable series of signs that are so characteristic 
of nationalist narratives (Anderson 2006: 185). The Olympic sites have 
not only been turned into places of remembrance, they have been 
transformed into logos, endlessly reproduced and proliferated through 
the logic of the market. While this process has been facilitated by the 
state, it is not under complete state control. The state has created spaces 
for the consumption of national symbols, and has switched private 
entrepreneurs into the distribution network of national meanings, but in 
the end it is the tourist consumers who fuel this industry of nationalism. 
Hooked by the state-organised networked spectacles, citizens now go on 
pilgrimage to state-constructed sites to purchase the building-blocks of 
their national identity, a dynamic that arguably also drives ‘Red Tourism’ 
in China more generally (see Zhao & Timothy 2015).
Figure 4.10: Marketing the Symbols of the Nation: Water Cube Water, sold at the Beijing National Aquatics 
Centre in 2009. Image © F. Schneider 2009.
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This illustrates an important strategy of official propaganda at networked 
spectacles: to establish a repertoire of recognisable symbols that can then 
be dropped into new contexts to signal national belonging and legitimate 
the leadership of the CCP. The three spectacles I have discussed here 
contained elements that promised to serve official actors as long-lasting 
discursive resources for future propaganda efforts.
4.6	 Conclusion
As the discussions above already suggest, official Chinese efforts to stage 
networked spectacles were marked by a certain continuity, with specific 
symbols and themes reappearing across all three cases. Discourses about 
the nation, harmony, civilisation, or sustainable development played a 
role throughout, and the next chapters will take a closer look at the specific 
meanings that actors constructed around such themes. Importantly, 
these themes did not exist in isolation; they were connected through an 
overarching narrative about China’s ‘road to revival’ (fuxing zhi lu 复兴之
路), which played a role in CCP propaganda efforts beyond the spectacles 
themselves. Through their concerted efforts, the authorities ensured that 
the grounds for this narrative had been properly prepared in the run-up 
to the events, for instance through cultural products that preceded and 
flanked the spectacles, and they made sure that the legacy of that narrative 
would remain visible once the events had concluded. Buildings like the 
China Pavilion in Shanghai or the Bird’s Nest Stadium and Water Cube 
in Beijing serve as reminders of China’s success in staging networked 
spectacles, ensuring that these moments of national rejuvenation remain 
ever-present parts of the urban infrastructure, frozen in time.
What, then, were the precise statements that actors made, regarding 
the official themes and concepts that characterised the road-to-revival 
story? As it turns out, discursive parameters that the authorities provided 
through their cultural governance efforts allowed for highly creative 
ideological work that frequently shifted meanings and recalibrated 
core concepts, and these activities can tell us much about changing 
understandings of China’s politics at the beginning of the 21st century.

5 Designing Chinese Nationalism
The camera circles around a construction site. Steel girders are lowered 
onto a base. Sparks fly as the pieces are welded together. Off-screen, a 
male voice explains:
The Bird’s Nest, the Water Cube, and the other Olympic sites not 
only feature unique designs, but also Olympic architecture of world-
class technological prowess. In terms of materials, technologies, 
construction, and many other related elements, they embody the 
Chinese people’s ability to put into practice their dream of blazing 




An animation shows the steel frame of Beijing’s National Stadium taking 
shape step by step, then the camera switches to shots of construction 
crews welding steel into place, transporting materials, measuring the 
site, and assembling the girders. The voice continues:
The Bird’s Nest steel structure is unparalleled in the world. Before 
the Bird’s Nest, no one in China had ever produced such high-
strength rolled steel. To ensure that the construction of the Bird’s 
Nest went smoothly, the project’s scientific staff had to tackle three 
key technological challenges before the new type of rolled steel 
could be manufactured. It not only had to exceed unprecedented 
thickness and size, it also needed to possess the desirable anti-
seismic qualities, temperature resistance, welding properties, and 
so on. China’s own innovative rolled steel was hard as nails as it 
propped up the Bird’s Nest. The exterior steel structure of the Bird’s 
Nest required 42,000 tons of rolled steel. The whole construction, 
including the concrete and the screw threads, required 110,000 
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tons of steel. Using not a single kilogramme of foreign steel, the 










The narrative goes on to illustrate the engineering feats required to build 
the National Aquatics Centre, then the camera returns to a studio where 
the female host of the architectural programme, Wu Xiaoli (吴小莉), 
concludes:
The Olympics have seen a century come and go, and they are still 
going strong. For a city, for a nation, the Olympic Games are about 
more than who hosts the contests or who wins the gold medals. 
More importantly, they are about showing that particular city’s 
cultural essence and national culture. No matter whether it is the 
Bird’s Nest, the Water Cube, or some other Olympic building, 
they are monuments of Olympic history, and they are the greatest 
examples of modern construction in the new city of Beijing, and 
they will inevitably have a profound influence on the future lives of 







This scene is part of a TV documentary on famous buildings in China’s 
capital, co-produced by several Cantonese cultural enterprises and 
Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV; the documentary became part of the officially 
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endorsed line of Olympics souvenirs available at the Olympic event sites 
that I discussed in the previous chapter. The programme, titled New 
Beijing (Liu & Wong 2007: time code 24:21), illustrates how officially 
approved cultural products made sense of mass event infrastructures, 
using the lens of nationalism. The documentary explicitly attempts to 
inspire pride in the Bird’s Nest stadium and other architectural marvels in 
Beijing, presenting these buildings as symbols of national achievement. 
In a similar vein, the architects of the Shanghai Expo’s China Pavilion 
justified their fusion of selectively curated pre-modern concepts and 
state-of-the art engineering as quintessentially ‘Chinese’. The designers 
describe the building as encapsulating the ‘Chinese spirit’ (Zhongguo 
jingshen 中国精神; SCAT 2010: 16 & 41) and the idea of a c̒ontemporary 
spirit with Chinese characteristics’ (Zhongguo tese, shidai jingshen 中国特
色，时代精神; ibid: 16).
Statements and symbols of the Chinese nation were ubiquitous 
during China’s networked spectacles. I have already discussed how the 
authorities provided a framework of semiotic resources during these 
important events, and how they tried to ensure that these resources 
were stacked and staged in ways that created an overarching official 
narrative of national revival. These activities, which involved state and 
non-state actors alike, produced a multitude of discursive statements 
that frequently reworked the ideological parameters the CCP had set for 
these events, and this was also true for the many meanings that actors 
constructed about the nation, and the strategies they deployed to invite 
an emotional investment in the idea of national belonging.
China’s networked spectacles are, at their core, nationalist events. In 
this, they closely follow the general pattern of such spectacles around 
the world, and of mass events throughout modern history. Adopting 
the same strong focus on nation-states as principle actors in political 
affairs, the Chinese authorities built their own events strongly around 
ideas related to the Chinese nation, its unity under the leadership of the 
CCP, and its place in a Westphalian international society of sovereign 
nations. This emphasis on the Chinese nation-state stretched across 
the event discourses, even extending to the meaning-making processes 
surrounding the physical event infrastructure itself, particularly the 
iconic buildings in Beijing and Shanghai mentioned earlier.
China’s networked spectacles were full of statements that signalled 
belonging to the Chinese nation, and official actors frequently used 
the opportunity to produce nationalist discourse to redefine what the 
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Chinese nation should stand for at the outset of the 21st century. This 
chapter examines some of this creative ideological work. It first briefly 
sketches how scholarship has traditionally made sense of nationalism 
and media, before discussing how various official Chinese actors have 
been constructing a repertoire of discursive resources in the service of 
the imagined community that is the nation. Next, I discuss how symbolic 
resources are deployed to personify the nation and cast it in the role of a 
family member. This also includes a closer look at activities that frame the 
nation and its state as benevolent. Next, I examine discursive strategies 
that seemingly remove state actors from the process of constructing the 
nation, and I explore in more detail how such actors invite emotional 
investment in the imagined community they have drawn up. Finally, I 
show how actors reimagined the nation’s past during China’s networked 
spectacles, and I conclude with a discussion of how official discursive 
practices at these spectacles were geared towards creating opportunities 
for participants to partake ritually in the experience of belonging to the 
imagined community of the nation.
5.1	 Mediating	the	Chinese	nation
Nations and their driving ideology, nationalism, are intimately tied to 
networked communication and interaction. Nations are what Benedict 
Anderson (2006) has famously called ‘imagined communities’: groups 
of people whose members do not all know each other, but who believe 
they share certain commonalities, such as a collective language, history, 
race, or set of values and institutions. These presumed commonalities 
provide the foundation for members’ sense of provenance and shared 
destiny. Historically, it has been elites (Gellner 1983/2006 & 1997) such 
as intellectuals, artists, politicians, bureaucrats, and merchants who 
utilised existing discursive tropes (Shapiro 2004, Smith 1993 & 1998) to 
mobilise large masses of people in the service of building the nation-state 
(Breuilly 1993), that is: a set of modern political institutions that draws 
its raison d’être from the idea that its subjects are a united and sovereign 
group, inhabiting a collective homeland that requires autonomous, 
representative government (for discussions of this history see the 
contributions in Breuilly 2013).
This is not to say that nationalism is a wholly elite-based ideology, 
designed strategically by agents in the service of the nation-state to 
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legitimate their political agenda, although such activities certainly make 
up an important part of nationalism. As nation-state institutions become 
the norm for governing large numbers of people, and as official actors 
and the subjects of the nation-state interact over time, nationalist ideas 
gradually enter the realm of common-sense background knowledge, 
becoming seemingly trivial (Billig 2009), but actually forming a powerful 
framework for understanding the world. Media have traditionally played 
an important role in this process, allowing state actors to circulate the 
markers of national association widely. This has involved modern mass-
media technologies, such as print and broadcasting, which have provided 
elite actors with the ability to communicate in vernacular language, using 
shared symbols to reach a national audience (Anderson 2006). It has also 
included the ability of state actors to take charge of semiotic resources 
associated with the nation: by assuring that national coins, stamps, 
and flags circulate through national networks, by constructing statues 
and monuments, and by naming streets and squares after prominent 
members of the nation, state actors have infused public space with ‘banal’ 
symbols and turned ‘background space into homeland space’ (Billig 
2009: 43). Any actors wanting to take action on issues related to these 
national frameworks of understanding will have to position themselves 
vis-à-vis the parameters that nationalism provides, whether to evoke and 
reinforce these parameters or challenge and change them. Over time, 
across diverse and numerous chains of ritual interactions, actors thus 
shape what the components of nationalism mean, creating a fluid yet 
bounded set of concepts and representations that inform the politics of 
their nation-state. 
In the Chinese case, attempts to establish a framework of national 
meanings that could become the foundations of a modern nation-state 
date back to the late Qing Dynasty, and they paved the way for the nation-
building efforts of the Nationalist Party as well as the Communist Party 
during the Republican period (for discussions of nationalism in these 
historical contexts see Duara 1997, Mitter 2004, and Zarrow 2005). The 
legacies of these attempts to construct a unified Chinese nation have 
informed the politics of the PRC to this day (see Dirlik 2011a and Hughes 
2006), as well as politics in various other Chinese territories, such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Chinese diaspora around the world. This has made 
Chinese nationalism a discursive domain of continuous contestation, 
and to this day the idea of ‘Chineseness’ is subject to very different 
interpretations. These range from attempts to critically assess cultural 
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and linguistic traditions in the service of a cosmopolitan pan-Chinese 
community to projects that define China along culturally essentialist and 
frequently racial lines (see Dirlik 2011a; Leibold 2010 has discussed Han 
chauvinism).
In the PRC, the ruling CCP has forcefully tried to take charge of 
nationalist discourses. In the post-Mao era, the leadership emphasised 
what Zhao Suisheng (2004) has called ‘pragmatic nationalism’, an 
avowedly non-aggressive form of nationalist discourse that was meant to 
place CCP ideology on a broad nationalist footing and generate popular 
support without alienating potential trade partners abroad. Through 
party and state media, as well as through school curricula, the leadership 
emphasised China as a multi-ethnic country that has sought to find its 
rightful place in the world, following the so-called century of humiliation 
(He 2007, Wang 2012). As Peter Gries (2004) has shown, this state-led 
nationalism has been reappropriated by bottom-up forces in China, 
leading to often xenophobic public movements that target perceived 
enemies of the nation, and that at times challenge the CCP’s leadership 
role when nationalists feel the authorities are mishandling matters 
of national importance (see Nyíri et al. 2010 for the case of the Beijing 
Olympics). 
Ongoing scholarly debates about nationalism in contemporary 
Chinese politics revolve around the unresolved question of whether and 
how popular nationalist sentiments, elite activities, and policy-making 
are connected. The answers range from claims that nationalism in no 
way informs CCP politics (Jie 2016) via arguments that the CCP and its 
‘smart state’ (Reilly 2012) consist of rational actors who skilfully manage 
and manipulate nationalist sentiments (Weiss 2014), to assessments that 
emphasise how bottom-up nationalism has come to inform and even 
drive Chinese policy-making (Gries et al. 2016).
In my own work (Schneider 2018), I have traced the discursive 
construction of the Chinese nation across various digital realms, arguing 
that Chinese nationalism is today filtered through digital technologies 
and reprogrammed through digital networks. Actors recursively construct 
the meaning of the Chinese nation through search engines, websites, 
online encyclopaedias, microblogs, and other digital media, and this 
involves the authorities with their substantial switching power in digital 
networks, but it also involves actors as diverse as software designers, 
website editors, bloggers, celebrities, and online commentators, all 
of whom engage in their own programming activities within the pre-
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designed technical affordances of digital media networks. In the end, 
this provides the stages on which actors perform their politics, and I 
consequently side with Gries and his colleagues (2016) when they argue 
that nationalism in today’s China is not easily managed by the authorities, 
despite considerable efforts, but that it powerfully informs what official 
actors can or cannot do.
While my present study of China’s networked spectacles does not 
explore the digital dimensions of such activities, it continues my earlier 
argument that, in China, diverse actors continuously shift the parameters 
of ideologies such as nationalism through their networked interactions 
(see also Schneider 2018: ch.2). As I will show in chapter 8, a good example 
of this is how various actors reappropriate the discursive resources that 
the state has flagged for use in nationalist representations. However, 
before exploring those activities, it is worth asking how official actors 
generate such a repertoire of nationalist signs in the first place, and how 
they try to ensure that the use of these signs aligns with their preferred 
politics.
5.2	 Designing	the	watch	signs	of	official	discourse
The Chinese authorities have long understood that the unity required 
to fuel a nation has to be communicated. Networked spectacles provide 
an ideal occasion for flagging the nation to diverse domestic audiences, 
and events like the Beijing Olympics, the 60th Anniversary, and the 
Shanghai Expo became important discursive moments for elite actors to 
try to evoke and spread recognisable signs of the nation in the service 
of their politics, or to design wholly new signs as part of their nation-
maintenance activities. This is a core task of the CCP’s propaganda 
system, the complex network of party and state institutions that is 
switched into all major media and mass communication activities in 
China (see Shambaugh 2007). Several important organisations sit at 
crucial nodes in that propaganda network, specifically two committees 
that make programmatic choices, and two agencies that implement 
CCP propaganda and provide feedback on its effectiveness. The two 
committees are the Central Leading Group for Propaganda (中央宣传
思想领导小组), which coordinates ideological work across the network, 
and the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilisation 
(中央精神文明建设指导委员会), which is the main steering committee 
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for designing CCP ideology. The two agencies that implement the party’s 
propaganda directives are the Central Propaganda Department (中央宣
传部), charged with the practical propaganda efforts as well as media 
control and censorship, and the Central Policy Research Office (中央政策
研究室), which among other things protocols all major CCP congresses, 
drafts party decrees and speeches, and is responsible for designing major 
ideological concepts like ‘scientific development’ or the ‘China Dream’. 
There is significant overlap and continuity between these 
organisations, especially on the personnel side: for instance, Li 
Changchun simultaneously served as the head of the leading group for 
propaganda and the spiritual civilisation commission, Liu Yunshan 
became his successor as the head of the leading group for propaganda 
after a decade of running the propaganda department, and at the time 
of writing Wang Huning, the man believed to be responsible for many 
of the party’s ideological innovations since the Jiang Zemin period (see 
Hu 2013), is serving simultaneously as the director of the policy research 
office and chairman of the spiritual civilisation commission.
The cadres who staff these central party committees and agencies 
design the general direction of CCP ideology, decide what semiotic 
resources should be used for promoting that direction, and establish what 
acceptable, correct discourse on political topics should look like. This 
includes approving the set of phrases and slogans that form the backbone 
of official propaganda texts, known in Chinese as tifa (提法). This official 
CCP rhetoric is likely to seem stilted and arcane to outside observers but, 
as Gang (2012) has argued, it serves as a set of recurring ‘buzzwords’ or 
‘watch words’ that flag official ideological positions. Examples include 
phrases like ‘harmony’ or ‘scientific development’, which have powerfully 
been deployed by CCP actors in their efforts to programme networks and 
set the parameters for making and implementing policy (see Ohlberg 
2015 for additional interesting tifa examples and Brady 2008: 100-101 for 
a discussion). 
I would argue that much like these ‘watch words’, Chinese political 
discourse also contains what might be called ‘watch signs’, that is 
symbols that serve as convenient shorthand for ideological concepts or 
statements. Examples include the trope of dancing minorities that is so 
frequently deployed in official propaganda to signal ethnic unity (see 
Landsberger 2016b), or the socialist-realist hero gaze that illustrates 
steadfast dedication to the socialist road (see Landsberger 2016a and 
2016d for examples from different time periods). Such visual tropes unite 
Designing Chinese Nationalism 147
a plethora of background assumptions in convenient signposts, and 
these signposts can be used much like the linguistic tropes of Chinese 
tifa to shine a light on important waypoints in the CCP’s ideological work. 
Discourses about the nation are particularly rich contexts for 
exploring the use of such ‘watch signs’, especially considering how 
strongly the construction of imagined communities relies on actors 
establishing a recognisable set of community markers. Take the example 
of how the CCP has used occasions like natural disasters to promote a set 
of visual tropes that signal national unity under the party’s leadership. 
My colleague Hwang Yih-jye and I have analysed such tropes in our study 
of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake (Schneider & Hwang 2014b). We found 
that the discourse was saturated with both linguistic and visual cues 
that pointed towards a small set of ideological meanings, most notably 
the ideas that the Chinese people were united through the catastrophe, 
that a vibrant Chinese civil society stood ready to cushion the blow of 
the tragedy, and that the party and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
were successfully spearheading the relief efforts, demonstrating that 
the leadership remained close to the needs of the masses. The party 
leveraged specific phrases to embody this representation of their efforts, 
for instance ‘in unity, there is strength’ (wan zhong yi xin 万众一心) and 
ʻputting people first’ (yi ren wei ben 以人为 本), and it provided visual cues 
in its own propaganda to evoke these sentiments. This included frequent 
images of relief workers carrying victims on stretchers across rubble, as 
well as people joining hands, or hands reaching out across rubble. These 
tropes circulated throughout the various disaster representations, for 
instance through the news, but they were also adopted in many cultural 
products that were not part of official propaganda. For instance the 
blockbuster disaster movie Aftershock, directed by Feng Xiaogang and 
released in 2010, utilised the same iconography and made many of the 
same discursive statements about the nation and the challenges it faces. 
It deployed the readily available semiotic resources familiar from official 
discourse to create rich emotional tapestries for making sense of the 
nation’s progress, using iconic natural disasters as its lens. 
Figure 5.1 shows examples of these visual callouts from three different 
cultural products, two of them part of the networked spectacles I am 
analysing here: the 2010 film Aftershock, the musical production Road 
to Revival that was staged for the 60th anniversary of the PRC, and the 
feature film The Road to our Beautiful Life that was part of the Shanghai 
Expo’s China Pavilion. Disaster tropes such as hands reaching out (left) or 
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relief workers carrying victims across rubble (right) were indeed deployed 
all throughout China’s networked spectacles. At the expo, the state-
owned People’s Insurance Company of China decided to build into its 
pavilion floor various miniature models of famous floods, landslides, and 
earthquakes that had taken place in China. The Chinese Red Cross Society 
showed footage of disasters around the world, including slow-motion 
scenes from the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts, underscored with 
sentimental music. The official theme pavilion ‘City Being’ contained a 
feature film that showed scenes from famous squares around the world, 
and China was represented in this segment by Wenchuan Square in the 
earthquake-stricken region. Similar emotional triggers were also part of 
the anniversary parade and the cultural products that accompanied it. As 
a whole, these references to the disaster inspired associations with the 
imagined community of the nation while at the same time legitimating 
the authorities’ developmental agenda (see Schneider & Hwang 2014b for 
a longer discussion).  
A particularly common discursive move was to portray relief efforts 
as a kind of war, and anyone involved in these efforts as a ‘combatant’ 
(zhanshi 战士). Whether linguistically, visually, or acoustically, disaster 
discourses during these events connected the input space of the natural 
calamity with the input space of military engagement; a strategy that has 
also, in the past, been applied to other ostensible national challenges, 
such as the ‘battle’ against communal diseases. Stefan Lansberger 
(2016c), for instance, has covered the 2003 ‘people’s war’ against SARS 
in his propaganda poster collection, and Zhang Xiaoling (2006) has 
analysed the news coverage that accompanied the outbreak in China. 
Militarist symbolism is not new in Chinese political discourses, or in 
discourses more generally. Creating analogies with wars adds an alarmist, 
existentialist dimension to the issue at hand, and it demands that the 
community come together as one in such a time of need. A particularly 
evocative example of how the official disaster discourse during China’s 
networked spectacles tried to activate this martial input space was the 
Road to Revival musical, which featured a scene specifically about the 
Sichuan earthquake. In this scene, male relief workers in uniforms 
stood united as they extracted a young girl in a red dress from imaginary 
rubble. While the scene was accompanied by a sentimental song and 
the atmosphere was generally more muted than that of other scenes, the 
visual tropes recalled the militarist and highly gendered discourse that 
official media had been communicating. 
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The use of disaster tropes highlights how the authorities have used their 
staged spectacles as occasions for infusing wider networks of cultural 
production with symbols that evoke the imagined community of the 
nation and that lend themselves to constructing narratives of suffering 
and heroism. The ways these symbols are juxtaposed as part of a militarist 
input space to public meaning-making efforts allows actors to securitise 
calamities like floods and earthquakes, suggesting that these events are 
national crises that require on the one hand extraordinary solidarity on 
the part of citizens and on the other hand exceptional degrees of state 
interventions. Using China’s networked spectacles as a vehicle, the 
authorities implied that these efforts could only succeed if the nation 
remained united under the leadership of the ruling party.
It is worth noting that throughout China’s networked spectacles 
much of the communicative effort to construct an official narrative 
around the nation was geared towards hiding the fact that such efforts 
Figure 5.1: Disaster Tropes Across Three Cultural Products: the film Aftershock (top), the musical Road to 
Revival (middle), and the China Pavilion feature film The Road to our Beautiful Life (bottom). Images 
assembled from screenshots of online footage.
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were taking place at all. In many staged attempts to represent the nation, 
official actors strategically downplayed their own role in creating such 
representations. Take the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, which 
repeatedly obscured the fact that state and party actors, together with 
their commercial partners, were actively redefining knowledge about the 
Chinese nation. This was in part achieved through intense pathos, an 
issue I return to later. It was also achieved through the visual sleights-of-
hand that the director’s team employed and through the language that 
framed the event for domestic viewers. 
Visually, the performances were tightly planned and organised 
to ensure that viewers would not notice the transitions between the 
elaborate arrangements of people and props. As one of the organisers 
told me, and as journalists from Taiwan also reported (see chapter 8), 
the director’s team faced the task of moving thousands of actors on to 
and off the stage, and this task was made more challenging by the fact 
that the team was aiming to create organic transitions that would not 
interrupt viewer immersion. This may seem like an understandable 
practical concern, but it has conceptual implications: to create a ‘natural’ 
feeling for a performance is itself an artistic choice, informed by a 
particular understanding of performative arts. Realist and postmodern 
strands of theatre, for instance, might intentionally allow viewers to 
witness transitions to shatter the illusion of natural immersion and draw 
attention to the performance as an artifice. This is the famous Brechtian 
estrangement effect (‘Verfremdungseffekt’), which aims to push viewers 
to distance themselves from the event and its narrative (the seminal 
treatment of Brecht is arguably Jameson 1998). 
For the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony the designers opted for a 
naturalising approach that tried to keep the illusion of the performance 
intact, and the broadcaster CCTV extended this rationale to its telecasting. 
When the two commentators described what audiences were witnessing 
on stage, they avoided any explicit reference to the fact that it was a team 
of performers who were arranging and enacting various interpretations 
of cultural artefacts. Instead, the commentators described how these 
cultural artefacts simply ‘emerged’ (chengxian 呈现) before the viewers’ 
eyes. Central performers such as the pianist Lang Lang ‘become the 
focus of our gaze’ (成为我们瞩目的焦点). The tranquil scene of Taiji 
performances ‘appears’ (chuxian 出现). This neutralising language 
entirely removes the organisers from the event and, by extension, 
suggests that the subtle rearrangement of national symbols and the shifts 
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in meanings are natural. This practice was also on display at the Shanghai 
Expo’s China Pavilion, which opted not to place Chinese leaders at the 
centre of its narrative but instead suggested that the pavilion represented 
the imagined community of common Chinese people, for instance by 
displaying stereotypical Chinese living rooms, or by designing its feature 
films around the stories of seemingly ‘normal’ Chinese.
5.3	 The	nation	as	a	person
The earthquake scene from the 2009 musical production Road to Revival 
illustrates how the watch signs of Chinese official discourse circulate 
during networked spectacles like the 60th anniversary of the PRC, but 
it also showcases a particular communication strategy for making 
statements about the nation: the use of ‘synecdoche’. A synecdoche is a 
rhetorical device that suggests a part should stand for the whole, or vice 
versa. The relief workers are extracting not just a young girl, but a girl in 
a red dress that stands for the entire nation. Such personification was 
widespread during China’s networked spectacles, where both the nation 
and the nation-state were regularly represented as people.
This is visible in the ways Chinese news media reported the national 
anniversary. Take mainstream newspaper front pages on 1 October 2009, 
the day of the event, as examples of how various papers took the officially 
approved national symbols and contextualised them within stories of the 
nation-state as a person. The Czech blogger Gabor (2009) has captured a 
selection of these front pages on his website, and I have reproduced this 
image here, to illustrate a number of discursive practices that generally 
characterised this reporting (Figure 5.2).  
A number of commonalities immediately catch the eye: the front 
pages overwhelmingly use the colours red and yellow, and they reproduce 
national symbols like the PRC flag, the Gate of Heavenly Peace, and the 
official logo of the event (a red number 60, with a partial representation 
of the national emblem at its centre, itself a stylised facsimile of the 
Gate of Heavenly Peace). Attempts to put this symbolism to use to 
anthropomorphise the nation play a major role in the reporting: numerous 
newspaper front pages personified the nation-state for their readers by, 
for instance, wishing the PRC a ‘happy birthday’ (shengri kuaile 生日快乐 
or huadan 华诞). Some opt to address the nation-state directly, with one 
newspaper using the formal honorific pronoun for ‘you’ (nin 您). The 
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Figure 5.2: Selected Chinese Newspaper Front Pages on the Day of the PRC’s 60th Anniversary (reproduced 
from Gabor 2009). 
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news discourse further uses language related to the age of living things, 
e.g. opting for the character that counts years of age (sui 岁) rather than 
years in a calendar (nian 年) to discuss how ‘old’ the PRC is, or describing 
how the PRC has ‘grown up’ or ‘matured’ (chengzhang 成长). 
These are all important discursive moves, since they suggest that 
nation-states deserve to be treated like people. In the Chinese context, 
the metaphor is more powerful yet, with the media workers at major 
Chinese newspapers frequently connecting such personifications with 
statements about China as the ‘ancestral land’ (zuguo 祖国), a term 
that can be translated into ‘fatherland’ or ‘motherland’, depending on 
the context, and that is indeed subject to substantial gender politics in 
Chinese political discourse. For instance, popular TV drama series about 
famous dynastic rulers frequently connect these men to paternalistic 
discourses in which benevolent rulers act as strict yet kind father figures 
to their subjects (for an example see my own discussion of the series The 
Great Han Emperor Wu; Schneider 2012: ch.2). In other contexts, cultural 
products such as the multi-media opera Road to Revival contain segments 
that use women to represent the nation, e.g. when the nation is ‘raped’ by 
foreign invasion or becomes the ‘victim’ of natural disaster, as discussed 
earlier. 
Nationalist discourses and symbolism are thus closely entwined 
with gender discourses in modern China, and they connect with and 
reproduce representations of masculinity and femininity that are by no 
means innocent. It is usually the nation (the community of people) that 
is represented as a nurturing woman in need of protection, and it is in 
turn the nation-state (the ruler over that national community) that is 
represented as a strong fatherly figure; these interrelated interpretations 
generate a sexist context in which paternalistic, authoritarian policies 
become more plausible and more easily justifiable (for a discussion of 
how political discourses rely on father and mother figures more generally 
see Lackoff & Johnson 1987/2003).
Even where the discourse is not explicitly gendered, the move to 
present the nation-state as a family member provides an important input 
space for meaning-construction about the nation. This input space is 
readily available across nationalist discourses in China more generally, 
which are rife with metaphors of family relations. For instance, one of 
the nationalist songs that accompanied China’s networked spectacles 
was Jackie Chan’s performance of Country, a song that played with the 
fact that the Chinese word for ‘country’ or ‘nation-state’ (guojia 国家) 
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is a combination of the characters for ‘state’ (guo 国, also sometimes 
translated as ‘country’) and for ‘home’ (jia 家, also translated as ‘family’). 
It features lyrics such as ‘only if the country is strong will our home be 
prosperous’ (有了强的国，才有富的家), and ‘this state is my state, this 
home is my home, I love my state, I love my home, I love my... country’ (国
是我的国，家是我的家，我爱我的国，我爱我的家，我爱我.........
国家). Through such a fusion of concepts, first of ‘state’ and ‘country’ 
(from guo 国 to guojia 国家) and then of ‘country’ and ‘family’ (from guojia 
国家 to jia 家), the song conflates modern political institutions and more 
perennial elements of the human lifeworld, in this case family relations.
This longstanding discourse of the nation-state as a home, and 
potentially as a family member, lends itself to further discursive 
activities, for instance when actors take the personified nation to imply 
specific meanings about the PRC and its role in world politics. Organisers 
of international events like the Olympics and world fair were heavily 
involved in such activities, which were often highly complex. The actors 
had to anticipate potentially different perceptions of nationalism among 
diverse audiences. The events needed to appeal to Chinese viewers in the 
PRC and in other Chinese-speaking regions, covering a broad spectrum 
of ideological positions and complex identity practices associated with 
ideas of ‘Chineseness’; they also needed to appeal to foreign observers, 
again covering a broad range of positions vis-à-vis China: the nationalist 
symbolism needed to be acceptable to audiences without much knowledge 
of the PRC, but also to audiences highly critical of Chinese nationalism 
and, potentially, also to audiences who might find nationalist themes 
offensive in principle. 
The Bejing Olympics opening ceremony is an excellent example of 
how organisers tried to cope with this dilemma, and how they creatively 
reframed the meaning of the Chinese nation. Recall the girl in the red 
dress singing the revolutionary song Ode to the Motherland. The organisers 
reportedly went to great lengths in casting this specific child to play the 
role, and they went as far as having her lip-sync the song, which was sung 
by a different girl entirely. Much has been made of the perceived duplicity 
and ‘fakeness’ of this performance (e.g. Branigan 2008), but such 
discussions say more about the critics’ understanding of authenticity 
and their appeals to orientalist tropes about a deceitful ‘East’ than about 
discursive practices in China. More significant in the present context is 
the way the organisers intentionally tried to imbue the scene with a sense 
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of ‘cuteness’, and the fact that this then had different implications for 
domestic and foreign consumption of nationalist symbolism. 
In each case, the girl functions as a synecdoche, in this case a person 
standing in for the Chinese nation. For domestic viewers, the ‘in-group’ 
of national discourses, the cute girl implies that the nation is an object 
worthy of love: ‘cute’, ke’ai (可爱) in Chinese, literally translates into 
‘loveable’. For foreign viewers, the girl puts the nationalist symbolism of 
this segment into a different frame: the potency of state symbols such as 
the PRC flag, the soldiers, and the anthem are meant to become diluted, 
while the innocent cuteness of the child-actor is placed centre-stage. 
Emphasising a cute girl potentially counteracts prejudices that the PRC 
might be a threat, and it instead turns China into a benign nation — an 
idea that connects with narratives of peace and harmony (see also chapter 
6).
The song that the girl sings is also relevant in this context. For domestic 
audiences, it serves as a reference to China’s revolutionary past, a time 
now steeped in nostalgia. And yet it is not the original Ode to the Motherland. 
The song has been edited for the occasion, emphasising national pride 
while at the same time de-emphasising China’s revolutionary past. 
The original ode was composed by Wang Shen (王莘) in 1950, and it 
consists of seven verses. It contains phrases such as ‘those who dare to 
cross us, we shall call for their deaths!’ (谁敢侵犯我们就叫他死亡) and 
‘our leader Mao Zedong guides the way forward’ (我们领袖毛泽东指引
着前进的方向). Not only have these verses been omitted here, the event 
organisers also changed a line in the first verse. The original wording 
was ‘the heroic people have stood up!’ (英雄的人民站起来了). For the 
Olympics, this has been replaced by a line from a later verse: ‘we love peace, 
we love the homeland’ (我们爱和平，我们爱家乡). It would be hard to 
argue that the organisers made this change for diplomatic reasons, since 
only a Chinese-speaking audience would be able to know the meaning. I 
find it more plausible that it is the domestic audience that here receives a 
lesson in what it means to love the homeland today. Revolutionary zeal is 
replaced by the ideal of harmonious coexistence. This is a general trend 
throughout China’s networked spectacles under Hu Jintao’s rule, and I 
will show additional examples in chapter 6. Importantly, the organisers 
have used the opening ceremony’s flag-raising ceremony to signal 
national unity and investment into an imaginary homeland while at the 
same time reprogramming the nationalist discourse and revisiting what 
investment in a homeland should ultimately mean. 
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The organisers have achieved no mean feat: they have turned 
nationalism (aiguo zhuyi 爱国主义) into what I would call cute 
nationalism (ke’ai guo zhuyi 可爱国主义), a seemingly inoffensive 
symbolic representation of the nation that suggests benevolence and 
innocence, and that lends itself to being filled with meanings and 
emotional attachments from a broad range of audiences. It is the 
quintessential reinvention of nationalism for a networked society: a free-
floating signifier, open to innocuous interpretations and yet recognisable 
as a trope that can be redeployed during new interactions to elicit a vague 
sense of unity, fill those interactions with meanings, and justify specific 
policy stances.
5.4	 Reimagining	China’s	past
The way that actors reworked the meaning of the Chinese nation during 
China’s networked spectacles was not limited solely to branding the 
nation and its state as benevolent, amicable family members and benign 
entities in international affairs. These representations were accompanied 
by concerted efforts across different media to recalibrate the Chinese 
nation’s historiography. As Guibernau (2004: 134) has pointed out, 
creating a sense of belonging requires the construction of a shared past. 
To the CCP, it is inordinately important to provide a ‘correct’ reading of 
this past, and consecutive leaderships have continued the longstanding 
tradition (Mittag 2009) of conceptualising the relevance of Chinese 
history within the context of their own political agenda (see also Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik & Schneider 2009). The networked spectacles of the Hu 
period are particularly interesting in this regard. They provided spaces 
for actors to, on the one hand, use very subtle communicative strategies 
to reinterpret modern history while, on the other hand, allowing often 
radical departures from previous interpretations.
One such example is visible in the propaganda blockbuster film The 
Founding of the Republic (Han & Huang 2009), released on the occasion of 
the 60th anniversary of the PRC, which heavily revamped the meaning of 
founding figure Mao Zedong and his political ideology. In one scene (at 
time code 01:38:47), after the PLA has secured Beijing, Mao finds himself 
without his cigarettes and without a way to procure new ones. Walking 
through the old streets of the city and then sitting down with his allies for 
a meeting, he vents his frustration.
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Mao Zedong: Not a shop is open in two blocks. Comrade Chengjun, 
you’re the county committee secretary, this can’t go on.
Chengjun: After entering the city, rumour had it that the capitalists 
and merchants were all exploiters and that we should punish them. 
They’re so scared, no one is open for business.
Zhu De: This is no small matter. We’re the best in the world at 
revolutions, but we’ve got nothing on them when it comes to 
economics.
Mao Zedong: Can’t even get smokes without the merchants let 









This short scene is an example of the ideological work that takes place 
within official political discourse. The propaganda film reinvented what 
founder Mao Zedong should stand for. Indeed, my translation above 
follows the Chinese original as much as possible, but the official English 
subtitles even have Mao explicitly stating ‘we need the capitalists back’ (my 
emphasis). 
The film is profoundly anachronistic, but that is in many ways beside 
the point: as an official cultural product, it interprets the PRC’s past in the 
present, suggesting a particular understanding of contemporary affairs 
and justifying the politics of the day. The film goes on to reframe the 
relationship between Mao Zedong and his historical antagonist Chiang 
Kai-shek, suggesting a grudging respect between the two men as well as 
close similarities in their general approach to politics. In that sense, the 
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film also framed political activities across the Taiwan Straits, laying the 
ideological groundwork for potentially warmer, more respectful cross-
straits relations that were developing between the Hu-Wen administration 
on the mainland and Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan at that time.
 In The Founding of the Republic, Mao is reimagined to the point that he 
ends up effectively endorsing the reform era’s embrace of capitalism. 
Indeed, it remained a major puzzle for the creators of official cultural 
products throughout China’s networked spectacles how they could retain 
the nationalist relevance of the PRC’s founding figure and of the early 
revolutionary periods of the country’s modern history, while at the same 
time legitimating the present leadership’s de facto rejection of Maoist 
politics in favour of an overwhelmingly capitalist, urban, and often 
neoliberal modernity. Official actors generally addressed this problem 
in one of two ways: either by downplaying, and at times deleting, the 
relevance of the Mao era, or by reinterpreting that era in the context of 
reform-era developments.
The practice of removing Mao from the PRC’s history was, for instance, 
on display during the Olympics opening ceremony, which eschewed any 
explicit references to Mao and his legacy, choosing instead to relegate 
revolutionary themes to the short flag-raising ceremony, and then only in 
the obscured form of the heavily edited and sanitised revolutionary song 
I have discussed above. In its representation of historical achievements, 
the event otherwise skipped the Mao years, instead showcasing only pre-
modern and contemporary themes. 
In contrast to this, the 60th anniversary parade drew more explicitly 
from Mao-era symbolism, but it also subtly de-emphasised the Mao era, 
instead showcasing primarily themes of the reform era and the Hu-Wen 
period. Hwang and I (2009) have calculated how much time the organisers 
of the parade allotted to different topics during the two-and-a-half 
hour march, and even if we include all floats that related in some form 
to the founding of the PRC under Mao Zedong, Mao-themed elements 
accounted for only about a fifth of the event. This stands in stark contrast 
to the proportion of Mao’s actual rule over mainland China: by 2009, he 
had ruled for nearly half of the PRC’s 60-year history. The parade referred 
to Mao only selectively, turning the chairman into a nostalgia trigger 
rather than a signifier of specific ideological statements. Indeed, Mao-
era catastrophes like the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) were ignored during the parade.
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A similarly ambiguous relationship with the first three decades of PRC 
history was on display in a number of places throughout the Shanghai 
Expo’s China Pavilion. For instance, the curators of the ‘Reminiscence’ 
section, which showed how PRC living rooms had changed throughout 
the decades, opted to start their displays only in 1978, the year that Deng 
Xiaoping’s administration launched its policy of reforms and opening 
up. While the installation that was meant to represent a 1978 living room 
contained various paraphernalia that evoked the Mao era through their 
iconography, such as kitchy propaganda postcards, vintage marriage 
certificates framed by socialist realist representations of revolutionaries, 
and family pictures of people in Sun Yat-sen suits, there is curiously no 
single picture of Mao Zedong himself. The revolutionary backdrop is 
downplayed, and the emphasis is placed on the seemingly unstoppable 
march towards increased prosperity, arguably captured most powerfully 
in how the home appliances changed from one installation to the next 
(see also Wallis & Balsamo 2016: 42): radios, TVs, and refrigerators 
became updated, and they were joined by desktop computers, laptops, 
and other digital gadgets as time progressed. 
In a similar vein, the official guidebook to the pavilion almost entirely 
omits the Mao era from its representations of PRC history: a timeline that 
is meant to depict the ‘Memory of China’s Urbanisation’ (中国城市化记
忆) starts with the year 1949, the year that Mao founded the PRC, stating 
(Shiboju 2010: 14):
The founding of New China placed China in a new starting position 
for modernisation and urbanisation. From the agrarian reform, the 
rebuilding of the infrastructure that had been destroyed by war, 
and other reconstruction plans began the construction project of 




The next entry in the time line is then the year 1978, and the accompanying 
text features only a single short sentence on the late 1970s before shifting 
the focus to the 1980s (ibid.):
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At the close of the 1970s, China faced a stable international political 
environment, allowing China to develop its external environment 
by implementing the reform and opening up policies. By the 
mid-1980s, the reforms that had started in the countryside had 
led to a high-tide of development for township enterprises and 
small towns, and the opening-up policy further accelerated the 





After setting the stage in these terms, the guidebook then proceeds to 
list 19 major achievements over the subsequent three decades, including 
the years when CCTV first aired its New Year’s Gala (1983), when the first 
email was sent from China (1987), when the first supermarket opened 
(1994), and when the PRC hosted its two recent networked spectacles: 
the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and now the Shanghai Expo in 2010. I have 
reproduced this time-line in Figure 5.3 below. 
A very similar rationale to this timeline is visible in the highly stylised 
feature film The Road to our Beautiful Life, which reproduces similar 
timelines to those on display in the subsequent exhibit as well as in the 
guidebook; the film omits any negative connotations with the past, only 
hinting at the revolutionary period as the origin of national success, and 
otherwise reducing ‘China’ to a 30-year story of modern development. 
This is explicit in the shot that shows Shanghai’s highly developed skyline, 
accompanied by the phrase ‘30 years China’. 
It is noteworthy that the film nevertheless uses the iconography of 
the Mao years to make this point: the characters are the kind of socialist 
realist figures familiar from martyrs’ memorials and other revolutionary 
representations; they are not characters in their own right, but instead 
serve as templates for the Chinese people as a whole. Visually, these 
figures are framed in ways that evoke much earlier CCP propaganda. 
The movie is filmed in highly saturated colours, making the images 
look like Mao-era propaganda posters. The camera dynamics contribute 
to this impression through low-angle hero shots and slow-motion 
camera movements, reproducing the perspectives of such posters and 
signalling the iconography as worthy of special attention. These visuals 
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are further accompanied by a pathos-laden music score that resembles 
revolution-era music and operas. Filtered through the lens of these 
recognisable tropes, the director and his team reinvent China as a land 
of iconic worker-heroes who, over the past three decades, have been busy 
building a green, hypermodern utopia. This enterprise seems to embody 
a non-distinct revolutionary heritage, but at the same time it endorses 
a capitalist modernity that has little to do with the agenda of the PRC’s 
founding cadres.
The Mao era is not the only part of Chinese history that receives 
a make-over in China’s networked spectacles. Pre-modern history 
is integrated into Chinese nationalist discourse as an important, 
immutable antecedent of contemporary success. During the Olympics 
opening ceremony (see also Barmé 2009) and throughout the official 
Chinese Shanghai Expo exhibits, but also in the road-to-revival cultural 
Year Chinese English
1979 第一条电视商业广告播出 First TV commercial aired
1980 第一家个体工商户出现 First private business licensed
1981 第一条地铁正式开通 First subway opened
1982 新中国第一次参加世博会 P.R.C. participated in the World 
Expo for the first time
1983 中央电视台举办首届春节联欢晚会 First CCTV New Year’s Gala held
1984 居民身份证诞生 First Resident ID card issued
1985 第一张人民币信用卡出现 First RMB credit card issued
1987 第一封电子邮件发出 First e-mail sent
1988 第一条高速公路建成通车 First expressway opened to traffic
1990 首家证券交易所开业 First stock exchange opened
1992 第一个电影节开幕 First film festival opened
1993 粮票制度取消 Food coupon system abandoned
1994 第一家超市出现 First supermarket opened
1995 开始实施每周40小时工作制 ‘40-hour work week’ introduced
1996 第一家网吧出现 First Internet cafe opened
2002 第一个博客网站开通 First blog website launched
2007 第一列动车组火车正式运行 First CRH train went into 
operation
2008 第29届夏李奥运会在北京举办 29th Summer Olympic Games held 
in Beijing
2010 中国2010年上海世博会举办 World Expo 2010 held in Shanghai
  记忆还将继续 There are more to expect…
Figure 5.3: Timeline of China’s National Achievements, as presented by the Shanghai Expo Guidebook 
(Shiboju 2010). 
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products that accompanied the 60th anniversary celebrations (Schneider 
& Hwang 2014b), the discourse fused a series of historical developments, 
recognisable symbols, and famous figures, creating a sense of a unified 
national heritage and placing today’s China in a direct line of succession 
with this imagined past. Considering how strongly CCP ideology 
previously criticised the pre-modern era as a backwards feudalist society, 
it is indeed remarkable how unapologetically contemporary actors place 
this feudal past in the service of their political projects at the start of the 
21st century.
Throughout the networked spectacles that the Hu-Wen administration 
hosted, the pre-modern past was leveraged to legitimate contemporary 
practices. As discussed in chapter 4, the architectural design team behind 
the Shanghai Expo’s China Pavilion, for instance, justified many of its 
engineering choices by drawing from pre-modern concepts, artefacts, 
iconographies, and text passages to link contemporary practices to 
carefully selected precursors. The same practice was also on display 
in the pavilion’s main exhibition halls, where official actors presented 
contemporary China in civilisational terms, drawing a linear path 
through history in order to make sense of the past. In this view, history 
starts in the pre-imperial times of famous sages like Confucius, whom 
I will return to in the next chapter. Chinese civilisation then continues 
onwards, to the first unification of the territories that would form what 
later became known as China. 
Recall the display of the ‘National Treasure’, the bronze horse and 
chariot figurine from the Qin period. The choice of displaying a piece 
of the Terracotta Army so centrally is telling. The artefact is a reference 
to the conquest of the first emperor, Qinshihuang (秦始皇), who united 
the disparate kingdoms of the region to form the first dynasty. The Qin 
was a short-lived and notoriously brutal period in dynastic history that 
was reviled by many later commentators (for discussions see Fairbank & 
Goldman 2006: 54-57 and Gernet 1972/2002), but it has frequently served 
modern politicians and intellectuals as a foil for rationalising autocratic 
politics in the service of national glory. The Qin emperor has been praised 
by Republican and PRC historians alike, and Mao himself reportedly 
thought highly of the first emperor’s achievements, particularly his anti-
intellectualist purge of scholars (Lieberthal 2003: 71). Accounts from the 
early 21st century then also frequently frame Qinshihuang as a hardened 
realist who ultimately did right by the nation. Examples include the 2002 
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martial arts epic Hero, directed by Zhang Yimou, and the 2001 television 
drama series Qin Shi Huang (Sina 2006). 
 In the China Pavilion, the Qin dynasty provided the backdrop before 
which the nation’s civilisation unfolded. The Bronze Chariot Number One 
is the first and largest of the ‘civilisational crystals’ presented from pre-
modern times. The artefacts cover ‘eight core groups of cultural artefacts’ 
(一八组文物为核心) that ‘serve as inspiration for today’ (表现...对今
天的启示; Shiboju 2010: 76): metal casting, silk production, porcelain 
wares, paper printing, urban economy and life, traditional medicine, 
architecture, and artefacts associated with trade along the Silk Roads and 
maritime trade routes. Each of these categories serves the curators as a 
lens through which to explain contemporary developments and make 
claims about the Chinese nation, but the last category is particularly 
interesting; it exemplifies the practice of constructing a linear, modernist 
narrative out of selected pre-modern artefacts, but it also connects with 
performances that showcased the Silk Roads and Maritime Silk Roads 
during the Olympics opening ceremony two years before, effectively 
creating a context for national policy (Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4: Images of the Silk Roads (left) and Maritime Silk Roads (right) during the Beijing Olympics 
Opening Ceremony. Images assembled from screenshots of online footage.
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In the China Pavilion, the topic is represented by a silver sacrificial vessel 
from the Han (206 BC - 220 AD) and a glass vessel from the Northern Yan 
(409 - 436 AD), each of which is meant to illustrate the bilateral transfer of 
crafting techniques between the Chinese and Roman worlds at the time. 
The guidebook to the exhibit places these artefacts into contemporary 
perspective for visitors (Shiboju 2010: 83):
The Maritime Silk Road is a passage for transport, trade, and 
cultural exchange between ancient China and foreign countries. 
The Maritime Silk Road initially formed during the Qin and Han 
period, was further developed during the Wei, Jin, and North-
South Dynasties, flourished during the Song and Tang period, 
and transformed during the Ming and Qing periods. The star 
constellations may have turned, but the ‘Northern Dipper’ after 
which today’s Northern Dipper Satellite Navigation System is 
named, is still the same constellation that was used by the compass 
that opened up the maritime trade routes, letting humanity’s 






Such depictions of Chinese maritime trade already foreshadow later 
projects like the Belt and Road Initiative under Xi Jinping’s leadership, 
which also imagine contemporary trade and development in the region 
as a logical, linear extension of pre-modern practices. Note, here, how 
the quotation also connects its national historiographic discourse to the 
idea of scientific progress, and by extension to globalisation (indirectly 
referring to, and misrepresenting, McLuhan’s famous ‘global village’ 
idea). The compass, as one of the major pre-modern Chinese inventions, 
is presented as the natural precursor to the highly advanced satellite 
system that the PRC was developing during the first two decades of the 
21st century, implying continuous progress through time and a sense that 
this progress is owed to Chinese ingenuity.
This modernist fusion of nationalist and scientific discourses was 
ubiquitous across China’s networked spectacles, and it is arguably 
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a major part of the CCP’s ideology today. In the China Pavilion, the 
exhibition marched visitors past the artistic and scientific achievements 
of numerous dynasties before arriving in modern times, where it provided 
only a very brief and generally rosy impression of the PRC’s revolutionary 
past before quickly ushering the audience towards the main focus of the 
presentations: a contemporary period of revival and a glorious science-
fictional future where Chinese inventiveness and scientific prowess 
promise to solve the nation’s problems. 
It might be tempting to dismiss this narrative as reductionist, or 
as anachronistic, but this would again miss an important point of 
China’s networked spectacles, and of political communication in the 
PRC more generally. The carefully selected elements from the past lend 
themselves to a reshuffling of meanings in the present, and they provide 
the resources for making a number of discursive moves that ultimately 
pave the way to specific policy choices, for instance those related to 
the ‘harmonious society’ concept (see chapter 6). Importantly, these 
pointers towards pre-modern history rely on recognisable components, 
and they require a certain ‘buy-in’, on the part of audiences, to the idea 
of the nation. Reimagining the nation’s past is not merely a cognitive, 
communicative activity; it relies heavily on emotional investment and 
social interaction.
5.5	 Ritual	entrainment	and	the	governance	of	emotion
How, then, do the symbols and narratives of the nation become objects of 
emotional investment? In practice, this happens through two interrelated 
processes: continuous mass-media priming and chains of ritual 
interactions. In Foucauldian terms, the first process might be considered 
‘discursive’ and the second ‘social’, and both of these dimensions were in 
evidence during China’s networked spectacles.
Ideologies like nationalism require a certain willingness to accept the 
broad parameters of the ideational framework as common sense, and it 
is in this context that the programming activities of actors with privileged 
access to mass communication networks are important. Switched 
into the networks at powerful, authoritative nodes like mass media 
corporations or state information agencies, media workers translate 
their understanding of ideological imperatives into an assemblage of 
recognisable signs, layering these components in different modes and 
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imbuing them with cues for emotional reaction. As such processes unfold 
over extended periods of time, flanked by media usage in classrooms 
and homes, public spaces and work places, the array of emotionally 
charged symbols enters into the background of everyday interactions, 
but it nevertheless leaves those who have continuously interacted with 
those symbols ‘primed’ to understand their emotional force in moments 
when these symbols become the focus of heightened attention (see also 
Althaus & Coe 2011, Iyengar et al. 1982, Krosnick & Kinder 1990, and the 
contributions in Molden 2014).
Recall the flag-raising ceremony during the Olympics opening 
ceremony. One of the most striking aspects of this sequence was its 
emotional force. Even an unsentimental viewer would be hard pressed 
to dismiss the pathos of the proceedings. This pathos is manufactured 
(see Carroll 1998) to tap the ‘structures of feeling’ (Callahan 2010: 19) 
that underlie national identity construction. In this particular case, the 
emotional effect of the sound and images has been carefully engineered to 
evoke nationalist sentiments. Throughout this four-minute performance, 
TV audiences have been shown Chinese flags for roughly two minutes, 
and they have been exposed to the colour red for over three. The symbolic 
colour is as much a sign of the nation as are the melodramatic music, the 
lyrics, the CCTV announcement, the children in ethnic attire, the flag, the 
soldiers, the Chinese leaders on the dais, the flag-waving and cheering 
Chinese audience, and the little girl in the red dress I discussed earlier. 
The TV editors’ montage ensures that all of these elements come together 
‘naturally’, in what Alexander has referred to as a coherent fusion (2006: 
29). This barrage of symbols ensures that the significance of the moment 
does not go unnoticed, while the redundancy in meanings ensures that 
the message is relayed unambiguously (see Barthes 1977): the Chinese 
nation is proudly hosting this international event.
Stacking various signifiers helps to ‘programme’ the meaning of 
the ritual, but it does not fully account for the emotional impact itself. 
That impact relies on audiences of different orders of the spectatorship 
process recognising specific symbols and the emotional weight assigned 
to them during the ritual. The proceedings are designed to address the 
expectations of Chinese viewers, or at least what the organisers believed 
those expectations to be. These viewers, in turn, had been primed for years 
to regard this moment as a significant national occasion. As discussed 
in chapter 2, commentaries and news reports in the national media had 
continuously built up to this event, and China’s leaders had repeatedly 
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framed this moment as a national achievement. This is precisely what 
Dayan & Katz (1992: 17) have in mind when they describe such events as 
powerful interruptions to daily life, that is as formal rituals that deserve 
special attention (hence the name opening ceremony).
While the presentation of national symbols during an interruption of 
profane normality lends them an air of the sacred, the symbols themselves 
work precisely because of their profane normality. The audience has not 
only been primed for several years to expect this event, it has also been 
primed for decades to recognise the national symbols through which 
the event makes itself intelligible. This is the kind of normalisation of 
national symbols that Billig (2009: 38) discusses when he writes of 
‘flagging’ activities, and that I have discussed in chapter 2. Saturating 
public life with symbols of the nation moves them to the background 
of everyday life while also keeping them ever present: flags hang from 
government buildings, students sing national hymns in school, TV news 
anchors announce national policies, the national emblem graces every 
social security card in the country, and each banknote features the face of 
the nation’s founder. Through this overexposure, citizens forget that they 
are continuously reminded of their nationhood. The reminders ‘hardly 
register in the flow of daily attention, as citizens rush past on their daily 
business’ (ibid.: 38). The effect is that these ‘forgotten reminders’ can 
be activated or ‘flagged’ as needed, providing instantaneous access to a 
pool of emotions that national ideology has associated with them over 
the years. 
While this construction of ‘banal nationalism’ is as much apparent 
in Chinese daily life as in China’s patriotic education campaigns (Zhao 
2004: 218-227), it is by no means a particularly Chinese phenomenon. All 
of the above mechanisms are used widely in other nation-states, whether 
in the Americas, Europe, East Asia, or elsewhere in the world, and they 
are visible throughout the history of the modern mass event. It is in fact 
the very normality that national symbols possess in a world of nation-
states, as well as the universal emotions they appeal to (feelings of home, 
belonging, safety, etc.), that allow the organisers of networked spectacles 
to effectively ‘fuse’ various performative elements into a compelling 
nationalist narrative. It is the reason foreign observers may feel similarly 
moved by a cute Chinese girl singing an ode to her motherland to the 
domestic audience. The symbolic language of the spectacle is familiar. 
It is understood inter-nationally because the world of nation-states has 
created ‘assumptions about what a nation is: as such it is a theory of 
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communication, as well as a theory about the world being “naturally” 
divided into such communities’ (Billig 2009: 63). 
The flag-raising moment of the Olympics indeed promised that all 
humankind would come together as ‘One World’ with ‘One Dream’ – 
only this dream was not about sports or a collective humanism. It was 
about the audience’s collective sense of modern nation-ness. This, then, 
is one of the opening ceremony’s main accomplishments: that it is able 
to cleverly draw from nationalist primes and invite such understanding 
while addressing both Chinese and foreign audiences.
The cultural artefacts that represent nation-ness become emotionally 
charged through the mechanisms of ritual interaction. As I discussed 
in chapter 1, people assemble ‘culture’ or ‘society’ through their open-
ended social and communicative interactions with each other and the 
objects of their social worlds. These interactions form ‘rituals’ when they 
prompt actors to focus their attention and their emotions, and in such 
moments the actors produce ‘a momentarily shared reality, which thereby 
generates solidarity and symbols of group membership’ (Collins 2003: 
612). An important component of such a ritual is what Collins refers to 
as ‘entrainment’, using a metaphor from biology that normally describes 
how, for instance, cicadas match their bodily rhythms to environmental 
cues. In human ritual interactions, the participants also match each 
other’s bodily cues and activities, mirroring each other’s behaviours and 
responding to social rhythms, and the more complete this process of 
synchronisation is, so Collins argues, the more emotionally satisfying 
and powerful it becomes. Examples include groups of people shouting, 
cheering, or moving in unison, for instance during sports events.
Networked spectacles are noteworthy sites of ritual entrainment; 
they are designed to elicit collective responses such as cheering and 
applause, often prompting participants to launch into such expressions 
‘spontaneously’, but actually cueing these emotional moments through 
carefully designed event dynamics. The Olympics opening ceremony 
contained numerous such moments during which audiences were 
prompted to react with expressions of collective awe, for instance 
during the fireworks, the synchronous performances of large numbers 
of actors, or the rare moments of planned interruption, such as when 
the men manipulating the complex movable typeface during the scene 
‘Script’ emerged from their hiding places to provide a rare peek behind 
the scenes of this complex performative arrangement. Similarly, the 
China Pavilion’s feature films during the Shanghai Expo used filmic 
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elements like camera angles, musical scores, and editing dynamics to 
build entrainment and lead viewers to important moments of national 
identification within the films, for instance the moment when The Road 
to our Beautiful Life pauses its depiction of break-neck development and 
urbanisation to immerse viewers in a slow-motion assemblage of visual 
disaster tropes that construct a singular moment of national unity, in 
this case the Sichuan earthquake. When I attended a screening of this 
feature film in July 2010, the audience was indeed transfixed by the visual 
and acoustic spectacle, and the emotional tensions in the theatre were 
palpable, with several audience members around me bursting into tears 
at the depiction of national solidarity.
Not all ritual interactions need to be this monumental. Entrainment 
also occurs in everyday situations (see Goffman 1967), such as the kind 
of non-interactions that take place between the patrons of a café (see 
Woldoff et al. 2013) as they seemingly ignore each other and go about 
their business, reading the paper, drinking their coffee, or working on 
their laptops. Nevertheless, those present in the café still contribute to 
the general atmosphere through their minute social signals, creating 
emotional attachments and interpersonal meanings. Of course, places 
like cafés are also designed to yield certain effects (Waxman 2006), and 
they play important roles in social and economic orders (Davidson & 
Rafailidis 2011), even if patrons and staff are not necessarily aware of 
these dimensions of their casual interactions. Similarly, some of the most 
interesting interactions during China’s networked spectacles were small-
scale, for instance the everyday encounters between volunteer workers 
and event visitors which the state was relying on to present a positive 
image to foreigners and encourage self-discipline among its citizens 
(Chong 2011). In fact, I would argue that the lengthy interactions involved 
in recruiting, training, and testing volunteers during these events already 
served as an important opportunity for everyday entrainment and, 
ultimately, initiation into communal sentiments (see Zhuang & Girginov 
2012 on volunteer selection during the Beijing Olympics). Such activities 
are no less important for the construction of emotions and nationalist 
discourse than the planned tear-jerker moments in mass communication 
products like feature films, core exhibits, or official telecasts. Much like 
I have described attempts to manage the cultural parameters in which 
politics unfold as cultural governance, we may think of such efforts to 
regulate the emotional textures of communal understanding as emotional 
governance.
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The daily activities at the Shanghai Expo territory are a case in point: 
the organisers staged daily mock national days for different participating 
countries, and they hosted parades and musical performances throughout 
the day. These activities served as reminders that the main actors at the 
event were nation-states, but they also invited visitors to participate as 
official actors symbolically staged the event’s ‘internationalness’. A 
particularly playful example was the ‘expo passport’ (Figure 5.5). Visitors 
could purchase this facsimile of an actual passport and then pretend to 
‘travel’ to different countries by visiting national pavilions and gathering 
‘visa’ stamps. In such instances, the movement across the territory, the 
activity of standing in line, or the sudden ‘stampedes’ caused by stamp-
hungry passport holders as they struggled to be first in line at some 
pavilion, all revolved round the tangible object of the passport, allowing 
visitors to project their experiences and emotions onto this symbol of 
nationness. Incidentally, this symbol would later sell at exorbitant prices 
on e-commerce sites, as visitors with ‘complete’ stamp collections sold 
their expo passports at prices equivalent to those of a new iPhone (CNN 
2010). Such sales of event paraphernalia provide a reminder of how 
nationalism is also intricately linked to capitalist consumption patterns.
Figure 5.5: The Expo Passport. Playing World Citizen at the Shanghai Expo 2010. Image © F. Schneider 
2019.
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In that sense, investment in the idea of being a member of a nation was 
not merely communicated to visitors through the expo exhibits or the 
accompanying mass media messages, it was actively practised by the 
visitors themselves, who were invited to enact the activities of citizens 
travelling through this imaginary, miniature world. It is precisely such 
ritual interactions that make the kinds of ‘watch signs’ I have discussed 
above more than just cognitive devices that connect to existing maps 
of background knowledge. They become elements in chains of ritual 
interaction as actors deploy or handle them within their meaning-making 
efforts. As Collins (2004) puts it, the actors ‘charge’ these artefacts with 
emotional energy, imbuing ideological concepts with personal feelings 
through interaction, and this ultimately creates the ‘pathos formulae’ 
that Müller & Kappas (2011) have explored. 
For tropes such as those that constitute national narratives, this entails 
the long-term usage I have discussed earlier. The practice of ‘playing’ 
citizen with an expo passport gains meaning because of the continuous 
exposure to the idea that humans should be nationals, encapsulated 
powerfully in the objects of actual passports and visa stamps. Priming and 
ritual interactions work together. The PRC anniversary parade illustrates 
this, showing how a ritual ‘on the ground’ is communicated through 
mass communication technology to relay a series of recognisable primes 
for the imagined community while at the same time encouraging ritual 
entrainment, albeit at a distance. When Hu Jintao travelled past the troops 
to engage in staged dialogue, the exchange provided an opportunity for 
the broadcaster CCTV to stage the segment as a rhythmic pattern of 
35-second narrative units, each cycling through the same camera angles 
and shot lengths. The march of the troops across Tiananmen Square 
was similarly designed as a cycle of recurring visual patterns. Such 
repetition invites ‘parasocial’ engagement (Giles 2002), that is a sense 
of interaction with people and situations that are only known indirectly, 
at a distance, through mass communication technologies (for examples 
and discussions see Boyle & Magnusson 2007, Frederick et al. 2012, 
Madison & Porter 2015, 2016, and Schiappa et al. 2007). TV viewers do 
not personally know Hu Jintao, and they are unlikely to know the soldiers 
or the spectators depicted on screen. Yet, through the sense of collective 
ritual, carefully designed by the event organisers and the media workers 
at the national broadcaster CCTV, they are invited to imagine themselves 
as affiliates of these fellow citizens, and consequently as part of the 
nation, which is itself a parasocial entity. 
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5.6	 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how elite actors, especially the 
authorities, design and circulate recognisable symbols of the nation, 
how they narrate the nation’s history, and how they tweak the meanings 
that surround the nation and its state. Throughout China’s networked 
spectacles, this entailed a marked shift in Chinese historiography, and 
a reinterpretation of what the Chinese nation should stand for. Through 
substantial ideological work, official actors imagined the nation as a 
benevolent family member, presenting ‘China’ to audiences at home and 
abroad as ‘lovable’ (ke’ai 可爱). They also systematically broke with the 
PRC’s revolutionary past and contextualised the nation within the past 30 
years of reform efforts, and especially within the ideological parameters 
that the Hu-Wen administration had been laying out at the start of the 
21st century.
These discursive activities also had an important social dimension, 
as actors invited audiences to participate actively in the circulation and 
consumption of national symbols that had long served as ‘primes’ for 
communal feelings. The organisers created opportunities for ritual 
interactions, encouraging participants to associate cultural artefacts and 
symbolic representations with their own sense of nation-ness, through 
continuous use. Such emotional governance activities made the artefacts 
of the nation available as depositories and carriers of the kinds of feelings 
that drive association with imagined communities like nations: social 
affirmation, security, certainty, and competence (see also my discussion 
in Schneider 2018: ch.2). These emotional ‘charges’ (Collins 2003) then 
become available to actors to be utilised in the name of national unity, 
and to pave the way for specific policy initiatives, such as the Hu-Wen 
administration’s attempt to design a ‘harmonious society’.
6  The Making of a 
Harmonious Utopia
In early 2011, journalists and China commentators were reeling from 
whiplash as Chinese authorities seemed to be sending mixed signals 
about the party’s assessment of pre-modern culture. Early in the year, 
Beijing’s National Museum of China had erected an almost 10-metre-
tall statue of the sage Confucius at its northern gate. Considering how 
concepts and ideas associated with Confucianism had been gaining 
popularity throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and considering how the 
Hu-Wen administration had been evoking this particular heritage of 
Chinese philosophy over the preceding years (Chan 2009), many were 
speculating about the symbolic relevance of this statue (e.g. Coonan 
2011). Situated on Chang’an Avenue, just half a kilometre from the Gate 
of Heavenly Peace, the statue left some with the impression that the CCP 
had ‘resurrected Confucius and practically put Mao and Confucius side 
by side’, as Pei Minxin put it; considering Mao’s distaste for the sage and 
his philosophy, Pei concluded that ‘Mao must be turning in his grave’ 
(cited in Chen 2011). 
Not even four months later, the monumental statue disappeared 
overnight. Assertions by officials that it had merely been moved, and that 
this had been planned all along, left many Chinese citizens and foreign 
observers unconvinced (see China Digital Times 2011), especially since 
the statue had been removed in such a clandestine way. Speculation 
abounded, with some wondering whether leftist cadres had successfully 
agitated against this symbol of an ideology they had long perceived as 
feudalist and backward (see Jacobs 2011). Others wondered whether the 
party had been swayed by disgruntled descendants of Confucius, who 
had viewed this official endorsement of the sage as disingenuous and 
disrespectful, especially since the CCP had never formally apologised 
for the persecution of all things related to Confucius during the Cultural 
Revolution (see Reuters 2011). Whatever the reasons, the statue had 
become a political issue, closely tied to controversies over the direction 
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that national culture in general and the CCP’s political orientation more 
specifically should take. As Dirlik (2011b: 2) put it at the time, Confucius 
powerfully served as ‘a symbol of national cultural identity’ that was the 
object of ‘both cultural political manipulation and popular desire’.
The curious incident of the Confucius statue came in the wake of the 
networked spectacles that this book analyses, and of the many attempts 
to recalibrate official discourses by drawing from the rich traditions of 
Chinese history (see also China Story 2012). In this chapter, I turn to these 
activities and I explore how various actors referred to classic Chinese 
concepts and statements to fill the core official concepts of the Hu-Wen era 
with meaning: the ideas of a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui 和谐社会) 
and of ‘scientific development’ (keji fazhan 科技发展). I start with a brief 
discussion of China’s so-called ‘Confucian Revival’ at the start of the 21st 
century, and of the political discourses that accompanied this renewed 
interest in pre-modern philosophy as part of a wider push to invigorate 
‘national studies’, or guoxue (国学), and anchor modernity in Chinese 
tradition. I then explore how China’s networked spectacles evoked the 
idea of ‘harmony’ in both domestic and foreign affairs contexts, and 
how various actors used resources from the past to make sense of the 
concept. This will also include a discussion of official attempts to frame 
the PRC’s foreign policy in terms of harmony and peace. Next, I discuss 
the way in which the CCP uses the concept of harmony to legitimate 
its modernist developmental politics, and I conclude by examining the 
kind of neoliberal hypermodernity that these conceptual activities have 
frequently come to justify.
6.1	 Modernity	and	the	‘Confucian	revival’
In contemporary China, the interest in pre-modern Chinese culture 
and philosophy is intimately linked to the modernity projects of various 
elites. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, constructing the 
modern imagined community of the nation requires a sense of national 
tradition. This is very much in evidence in China, where consecutive 
generations of Chinese modernists have tried to understand the complex 
and fragmented dynastic and pre-imperial past from the perspective of 
the relatively recent invention of China as a modern nation-state. 
Arif Dirlik (2011c) has shown how these endeavours roughly fall 
into one of two schools of thought. The first is a culturally conservative 
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programme aimed at creating Chinese national identity through 
activities that could also be called acts of ‘collective remembering’, that 
is knowledge-making practices that treat the past as a unified narrative 
in the service of a group and that do not lightly suffer ambiguities about 
the past (see Wertsch 2002 for a discussion). Such modern practices of 
collective remembering tend to follow nativist trajectories that seek to 
reify history as national history, and in China this has included attempts 
to elevate certain elements of the past to the status of national essence 
(guocui 国粹) or national soul (guohun 国魂), two terms that date back to 
early modernists at the close of the Qing Dynasty (Dirlik 2011c: 7). At the 
time, the contemporaries borrowed this terminology from neighbouring 
Japan, a nation-state they perceived as a template for how to become a 
modern power without abandoning traditions. In contrast to this, liberal 
cosmopolitan modernists tried to critically interrogate China’s past, 
questioning the value of traditions, and drawing from foreign scholarly 
traditions to do so (ibid.: 6). This paradigm famously informed the May 
Fourth’s New Culture Movement (see Mitter 2004), but it has remained 
an important fixture in scholarly and popular understandings of China’s 
past to this day. 
The continuous interplay between these two paradigms in China 
highlights some of the contradictions involved in becoming modern, 
and they speak to the complex question of how to situate ‘local’ forms of 
knowledge within the now near-global knowledge practices of modernity 
(see also Gluck 2011). In Dirlik’s view (2011c: 4), they illustrate a general 
modern quest for ‘ethno-epistemologies’ that actors invoke ‘to establish 
claims to alternative modernities (but only rarely to alternatives to 
modernity).’ He goes on to argue that such attempts to define knowledge 
and identity through national traditions ‘point not to the past but, taking 
a detour through the past, to an alternative future’; this, as will become 
clear below, is very much the case for how the Hu-Wen administration 
and various other actors in China leveraged traditions in the service of 
their own ethno-epistemologies.
The debates that Dirlik outlines informed a renewed interest in 
China’s past in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and it is before this 
backdrop that the PRC experienced a surge in ‘national studies’ (guoxue 
国学) that has lasted to this day, and that still produces both powerful 
nativist and cosmopolitan iterations (for discussions see Chen 2011, Gan 
2009, Liu 2011, Tong 2011, and Xie 2011). This interest, while not originally 
state-induced, became a convenient foundation for the authorities’ own 
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attempts to place their state-led nationalism on a broad, popular footing 
(see also Zhao 2004). Indeed, one of the reasons it was viable for the CCP 
to launch its patriotic education campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s was 
that traditional culture was again in vogue in China, especially among 
cultural conservatives (Makeham 2011). 
The ‘national studies craze’ (see Chen 2011, Xie 2011) has led to 
a barrage of self-help books and popular cultural products in China, 
including TV programmes like CCTV’s Lecture Room (Baijia jiangtan 百家讲
坛), which has provided pop celebrities like Yu Dan (于丹) with a platform 
for their feel-good messages (see Makeham 2011: 14). These cultural 
products are part of a profitable industry, but they also serve actors as 
vehicles for their political discourses. Yu Dan, for instance, spells out the 
lessons of her engagement with the Confucian classics in an interview 
with Osnos (2014): 
We must rely on a strict system to resolve problems. As citizens, 
our duty is not necessarily to be perfect moral persons. Our duty is 
to be law-abiding citizens.
Yu Dan’s arguments illustrate how the renewed interest in pre-modern 
philosophy, particularly in its nativist instantiations, is frequently fuelled 
by the wish to ‘civilise’ Chinese subjects, reinvent them as ‘citizens’, and 
encourage the kind of self-discipline that advocates perceive as crucial 
for creating stable social relations across the nation. These discourses are 
then frequently culturally conservative and politically neo-authoritarian 
(see Sauntman 1992, Van Dongen 2009, and Minzer 2018 on Chinese 
neo-authoritarianism more generally). A prominent example of this is 
Zhao Tingyang’s (2005, 2006) work, which mines pre-dynastic history for 
insights into the perceived golden age of the Western Zhou Kingdom (ca. 
1040 to 771 BC). The Zhou kings had often served the philosophers of 
China’s axial age (ca. 722 to 221 BC) as a source of anecdotes, reflections, 
and lessons on how to rule, and Zhao Tingyang mobilises this tradition 
to outline how these rulers venerated ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia 天下), 
and how their ‘heavenly mandate’ (tianming 天命) rested on an ideology 
that connected the cosmos, the world, the rulers, and their subjects 
through relations of respect and duty. For Zhao, it is a moral imperative 
to learn from this precedent and transitively apply its rationale (or, rather, 
Zhao’s interpretation of that rationale) to the flawed social relations of 
our contemporary ‘bad world’ (see Zhao 2009), so as to govern society 
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through an emphasis on order (for critiques see Barabantseva 2012 and 
Callahan 2008). 
Such arguments about governance and self-governance, grounded in 
pre-modern thought, became particularly popular during the Hu-Wen 
administration. It is hard to say in which direction the causalities ran, 
but the official endorsement of ‘harmony’ (he 和) arguably signalled that 
ideological engagement with traditional philosophical concepts was 
acceptable to the authorities. Political scientists ranging from liberal 
constructivists (e.g. Qin 2009) to hardened realists (e.g. Yan & Xu 2009) 
consequently took up the challenge of trying to explain the PRC’s role in 
world politics in terms of pre-modern thought, often constructing their 
own versions of established political theories like constructivism or neo-
realism, but now with Chinese characteristics (for discussions see Hui 
2012 and my own work in Schneider 2014a). While these practices have 
run the gamut of traditional Chinese philosophies, from Daoism through 
Legalism to Moism, the most commonly evoked sources are arguably the 
Confucian classics, at least in nativist versions of ‘national studies’ that 
celebrate a ‘Confucian revival’ (ruxue fuxing 儒家复兴). As Dirlik writes 
(2011b: 2): 
At its narrowest, contemporary scholars of guoxue (and their 
popular constituencies) identify it with ruxue, or what is usually 
described somewhat misleadingly as ‘Confucianism,’ and 
Confucius with the spirit of the nation.
‘Confucianism’ (ruxue 儒学) indeed encompasses a whole array of ideas 
and practices, some philosophical, others religious, which are all tied 
in complicated ways to pre-modern antecedents and their modern 
reinterpretations (see Billioud & Thoraval 2014). It is then best not 
to understand Confucianism as a unified, coherent set of principles, 
even if it is frequently portrayed as such by advocates, but rather as a 
discursive field, a network in which diverse actors create emergent and 
often idiosyncratic meanings in the service of their respective political 
projects, using Confucian concepts as their building-blocks. 
This has arguably been true throughout history: the writings that are 
today considered Confucian classics were written and rewritten after 
the period in which Confucius himself lived (the Spring-and-Autumn 
period, chunqiu 春秋, ca. 722-481 BC), and connections between the 
actual man’s thoughts and later interpretations of the classic works that 
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became attributed to him are frequently tenuous. Like so many classic 
texts in Chinese philosophy, the famous Confucian texts were compiled 
after the sage’s death by his disciples, and these texts were then rewritten 
(and sometimes outright forged) during subsequent periods, for instance 
during the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD). Later ‘Neo-Confucian’ 
scholars, most notably of the Song Dynasty period (960 to 1279 BC), 
significantly expanded the Confucian framework, and the early 20th 
century saw yet another round of reassessments that would become part 
of ‘Modern Neo-Confucianism’ (xiandai xin ruxue 现代新儒学). 
More recent interpretations have selectively drawn elements from 
these precursors to make sense of life and sociality in a rapidly changing 
China, often augmenting or contrasting their efforts with European, 
Korean, and Japanese philosophical currents, or with the works of 
Chinese philosophers outside the mainland (see Berthrong 1998/2018 
and Rošker 2016). The result has been a rich collection of discourses 
under the overarching banner of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ 
(dangdai xin ruxue 当代新儒学), which fits only awkwardly into essentialist 
understandings of the sage and his legacy (for helpful discussions see the 
contributions in Hammond & Richey 2015 and Hon & Stapleton 2017, as 
well as Osno’s insightful 2014 journalistic account). 
The conceptual frameworks of Confucian thought provide 
contemporaries with resources for their own political agendas. This 
has included criticising the institutions of global modernity, especially 
those that rely on egalitarian mass participation, and instead promoting 
governance by experts who are awarded their position based on 
meritocratic selection mechanisms, and whose mandate is to create 
stability and welfare for all. An example of such ‘political Confucianism’ 
is the work of Jiang Qing (2005), but arguably also of Daniel A. Bell (2007, 
2008), whose assessment of contemporary Chinese meritocracy (Bell 
2015) has been the subject of heated debate (see Bell et al. 2015 for an 
extended discussion, Nathan 2015 for a critique, and Bell 2015b for the 
response). 
The PRC’s authorities have been largely opportunistic in their embrace 
of ‘Confucian’ initiatives. The state has for instance opted to name a 
major part of its public diplomacy efforts after the sage: the Confucius 
Institutes (Kongzi xueyuan 孔子学院, see D’Hooghe 2015: ch.4). The 
authorities also seem to have initially supported a private initiative to 
establish a ‘Confucius Peace Prize’ in 2010 as an alternative to the Nobel 
Peace Prize, which had been awarded to dissident Liu Xiaobo that year. 
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The PRC’s Ministry of Culture later withdrew its support, prompting 
the organisers to move their activities to Hong Kong (BBC 2011). From 
there, they have since awarded the prize to controversial figures such as 
Vladimir Putin, Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, and Hun Sen, and these 
activities have arguably created no small amount of embarrassment for 
the PRC’s central authorities and their attempts to present China as a 
responsible stakeholder in international society. 
Political initiatives related to Confucius show how complicated the 
networked processes are through which actors try to generate meanings 
around China’s philosophical traditions. Such initiatives also demonstrate 
how discourses about Confucian tradition do not necessarily align with 
the CCP’s attempts to appropriate pre-modern Chinese concepts (see 
Dotson 2011). This is visible in the way that official actors interpreted the 
Hu-Wen administration’s emphasis on the nominally Confucian concept 
of ‘harmony’.
6.2	 Harmonising	all	under	heaven
During the Hu-Wen administration, and especially after 2004, official 
ideology revolved strongly around the idea of a harmonious society (see 
Chan 2009, China Story 2012, Trevaskes 2012), and actors confronted 
with the challenge of positioning their activities within official discourse 
frequently returned to this concept to legitimate themselves and their 
actions, whether to secure funding, promote certain policies, or intervene 
in public discourse. This meant that a multitude of actors engaged in 
meaning-making processes that involved the concept of harmony (Zheng 
& Tok 2007), and many official actors ultimately planned policy initiatives 
based on their understanding of this idea (for an overview and assessment 
see the contributions in Zhao & Lim 2009). This frequently entailed 
turning to pre-modern sources for inspiration on how to understand 
what a contemporary Chinese ‘harmonious society’ might stand for. 
As I have discussed earlier, these understandings were frequently 
based on highly idiosyncratic interpretations of China’s past, especially 
its Confucian heritage, but be that as it may, the networked spectacles 
of the Hu-Wen period clearly anchored their use of the term harmony 
in pre-modern classics, using in particular quotations from the famous 
Confucian Analects (论语). For instance, the Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony relied on quotations from this work in the segment that 
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showcased Chinese typesetting, and that was built around a movable 
typeset that produced the various iterations of the character for harmony 
I discussed in chapter 4. In order to ensure that the Chinese character 
he (和) was indeed associated with Confucian interpretations, the 
demonstration was accompanied by a recital of two central quotations 
from the Analects.
Is it not a pleasure to have friends come from afar? 
有朋自远方来，不亦乐乎 (Analects 1.1)
Within the four seas, all are his [the sage’s] brothers.
四海之內，皆兄弟也 (Analects 12.5)
It is worth noting that, in the original, the first quotation is part of a 
statement on sagely learning, and the second quotation is part of a 
discussion about propriety. Here, these text passages are decontextualised 
to become part of a contemporary, cosmopolitan narrative anchored in 
pre-modern times. The programme for the opening ceremony makes this 
clear (BOCOG 2008b: ‘Written Character’):
With the passing of seasons and years, the Chinese people have 
gone in pursuit of the eternal Harmony [sic].
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, ‘harmony’ became part of 
the linear trajectory of history that organisers of China’s networked 
spectacles constructed for these occasions. It became a transitive concept 
that applied across time, even as it took different forms along the way. 
In addition, however, the concept was also used transitively to cover 
numerous social domains and different kinds of relations, following the 
rationale associated with the idea of ‘all under heaven’ that I discussed 
earlier. 
During the Beijing Olympics, the opening ceremony organisers applied 
the concept to a range of spheres which were stacked from large (the 
world) to small (the individual). This included the natural environment, 
which was cast into eco-friendly terms for instance by projecting images 
of forests and waterfalls, as well as by prominently using the colour green 
in the ‘Nature’ segment. The relationship between humans and nature 
was then implied to be ‘harmonious’, which was symbolically captured in 
the same segment by young children colouring in a landscape painting of 
nature while learning about environmentalism in a mock classroom. The 
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visitor’s guide made this connection explicit (BOCOG 2008b: ‘Nature’, 
translation in the original): 
We live with the Heaven and the Earth; nature and mankind [sic] 
are in harmony.
天地与我并生，万物与我为一。
The original Chinese passage is a quotation from the Daoist classic 
Zhuangzi (2.9), and the translators have taken some liberties with the 
original, for instance by including the word ‘harmony’, which is not in the 
original. Another translation might read: heaven, earth, and I came into 
being together; all things and I are one. However, the guide’s translation 
choice emphasises the eco-friendly message that the organisers have 
programmed into this segment: that humanity and nature should exit in 
harmony.
During the opening ceremony, the concept further came to have a 
societal dimension. On the one hand, this included discursive statements 
about how humanity should strive for world peace, an issue I return to 
below to show how the harmonious society discourse connected with 
official attempts to cast Chinese foreign policy as inherently peaceful. On 
the other hand, the idea of harmony came to imply unity, and especially 
national or ethnic unity within China. This message was communicated 
through staged performances such as the children in ethnic attire carrying 
the national flag, or minorities that ‘dance joyously to greet all athletes’ 
(BOCOG 2008a: 45). More subtly, the opening ceremony suggested that 
harmony might mean social harmony, or even social stability, and this 
was implied by the large numbers of actors moving in perfect unison for 
example during the Fou drum performance and the Confucian recital, 
or as part of the movable typeset that was ingeniously controlled by 
individual human performers hiding beneath the stage. In one instance, 
1,000 performers literally recreated the very fabric of a miniature model 
of the Olympic stadium with their bodies (Figure 6.1).  
While these performances may not have been universally understood 
as examples of harmony, in some cases even informing anxieties about 
China (Gries et al. 2010, see also chapter 8), the organisers demonstrably 
tried to connect the masses of people on stage to harmony discourses. 
The CCTV commentary, for instance, clarified for domestic audiences 
that the miniature ‘Bird’s Nest’, formed by human bodies, was indeed 
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a metaphor for constructing a united, national, harmonious society 
(minute 61):
The people dressed in green have set up a green Bird’s Nest for us, 
bathed in starlight, and in a flash this green Bird’s Nest becomes 
glittering and translucent, and delicately beautiful. On the picture 
scroll, scenes from all around present-day China unfold before 
our eyes, transmitting the abundant confidence of contemporary 
society in setting up a harmonious scene in which the people live 





Finally, harmony extended to self-cultivation practices and individual 
responsibilities, represented for instance by the Taiji performances and 
the children studying how to personally protect the environment. While 
relatively muted during the opening ceremony, the neoliberal implications 
of this dimension of the discourse would later return more forcefully 
during other events, especially in the Shanghai Expo’s hypermodernist 
discourses (see below). 
Connected through the tropes of Confucian heritage, the organisers 
of the opening ceremony brought these elements together as a whole that 
lent itself to creative, ideological work. The Olympic opening ceremony 
Figure 6.1: Constructing a Stable Stadium and a Stable Society. Images assembled from screenshots of online 
footage.
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conceptualised harmony as an ideology that extends from the much 
evoked ‘One World’ all the way to the individual.
Interestingly, the performances followed a script that seems to have 
taken its cues from the arguments of contemporary Chinese philosopher 
Zhao Tingyang (2005: 89-90 & 107) that I have discussed above: that all 
realms of social interaction should be viewed as transitively governed by 
the same conservative principles. It is hard to say whether the ceremony 
organisers were influenced by Zhao directly, or whether each party 
arrived independently at similar interpretations, possibly informed by 
the push that the Hu-Wen administration had been making in this very 
direction as it rediscovered Confucian tradition for its own governing 
purposes. The result is nevertheless a comprehensive reimagining of how 
a perceived Confucian political category like he (和) might connect with 
contemporary governance in the PRC, and how such a term might come 
to mean harmony at home while at the same time implying a harmonious 
(read: peaceful) agenda abroad.
6.3	 From	peaceful	rise	to	peaceful	development
Under Hu’s leadership, the state had generally been refocusing its 
foreign policy directives for some time, abandoning an earlier focus on 
the ill-phrased ‘peaceful rise’ concept (see Suettinger 2004 and Glaser 
& Medeiros 2007), which had arguably evoked too many orientalist 
‘yellow scare’ associations of China resembling a waking dragon or rising 
leviathan. At the time of the administration’s three flagship spectacles 
(Olympics, anniversary, expo), the central authorities had been well 
on their way towards a more benevolent-sounding discourse of mutual 
peace and prosperity, and at that point the recognisable tropes on ‘peace’ 
and ‘harmony’ (he 和) blended neatly with earlier policy directives such 
as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These five principles date 
back to 1954 (see Panda 2014 for a discussion), and they encompass the 
following (Xinhua 2015):
1. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
2. mutual non-aggression, 
3. non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. [somewhat tautologically] peaceful coexistence.
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The Olympics opening ceremony of 2008 already suggested that ‘harmony’ 
should stand for world peace, and that the PRC would generally strive 
to achieve such peace, due to the presumably innate cultural heritage of 
Confucianism. The commitment to peace was built into the performances 
through symbols such as white doves, foreigners performing alongside 
Chinese actors, images of foreign children, and ultimately the large globe 
used during the final segment of the ceremony (Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: Symbols of Global Peace at the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony. Images assembled from 
screenshots of online footage.
During that segment, the singers Sarah Brightman and Liu Huan stood 
atop the globe, holding hands, and singing in Chinese and English:
Come together,










The event connected a cosmopolitan discourse on world unity and peace 
to the idea of China as an inherently harmonious nation-state, and it 
did so in no uncertain terms, for both domestic and foreign audiences. 
Examples of this are the official materials and commentaries that 
accompanied the event. The English-language media guide for foreign 
journalists explained the concluding elements of the ‘Writing’ segment, 
with its display of peach blossoms, as ‘romantic and enjoyable, adequately 
demonstrating the sweet wish of peace-loving Chinese people’ (BOCOG 
2008a: 33), and the Chinese-language CCTV commentary at that moment 
in the proceedings (minute 38) concluded that the multitude of blossoms
...instantly transports people into a spring-flower-filled, 
harmonious peach blossom garden paradise that expresses the 
Chinese people’s heartfelt, glorious desire for peace. 
让人们瞬间置身于满园春色和谐的桃花仙境表达中国人热爱
和平的美好心愿。
Such statements about harmony as peace informed China’s networked 
spectacles in general, but arguably the most provocative example of how 
official actors deployed the concept to creatively shift political discourse 
was the 60th anniversary military parade. During that event, the military 
equipment was reframed as part of the contemporary agenda for peaceful 
development. Hu Jintao set the stage for this understanding with his 
speech, which mentioned ‘harmony’ three times and ‘peace’ eight 
times. The national broadcaster CCTV then expanded on the theme by 
framing the military parade for domestic audiences and systematically 
de-emphasised the potential for violence that the armed forces might 
represent. Instead, the anchors cast the troops and weaponry as tools 
for peace. This was no small feat, considering that the state was rolling 
weapons of mass destruction across Tiananmen Square (Figure 6.3).  
To sell the PLA as a force for peace, the announcers deployed an 
arsenal of flowery phrases and euphemistic metaphors, interlinked with 
‘watch words’ that flagged the PRC’s policy stance. Take the example of 
the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary security division tasked, 
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among other things, with quelling any potential domestic unrest by 
force (see Cheung 1996 for an introduction). CCTV (2009: time stamp 
0:58:40) explained that PAP’s duties were to ‘uphold national security 
and social stability, and guarantee that the people can live and work in 
peace and contentment’ (维护了国家安全和社会稳定，保障人民安居
乐业). The station’s anchor then went on to make the case that:
The officers and men of the armed police use their limitless loyalty 
and selfless respect for the party and the people to make society 
harmonious and the people happy by propping up a peaceful sky.
武警官兵用对党，对人民的无限忠诚和无私奉献，为社会和
谐，人民幸福撑起一片安宁的天空。 
Harmony here becomes coterminous with social stability (shehui 
wending 社会稳定), and it comes to serve as an indirect justification 
for the frequently harsh law-and-order agenda of the Chinese state (see 
Trevaskes 2012 for a discussion). During later segments, as the parade 
moved on to heavier military equipment, the announcers shifted this 
focus on ‘harmony’ from a domestic context to the international stage, 
Figure 6.3: A High-Tech Force for Peace and Harmony. Images assembled from screenshots of online footage.
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for instance commenting on the PLA navy’s formations by reminding 
viewers of the navy’s involvement in United Nations peacekeeping 
missions (CCTV 2009: time stamp 1:14:00):
A formation of navy vessels joined several dozen countries from 
all five continents to carry out escort missions in Somalian waters 
in the Gulf of Aden, showing the world a positive image as our 
country took on the responsibilities of a Great Power, making 
an important contribution to constructing harmonious seas and 




This claim to Great Power status was a common feature of the parade’s 
discourse, as was the commitment to a multipolar world order based on 
national sovereignty. A particularly intriguing statement that drew these 
elements together accompanied the display of the PLA’s nuclear weapons 
(CCTV 2009, time stamp 1:22:44):
China has always pursued a policy that rejects a first strike with 
nuclear weapons, insisting on a nuclear self-defence strategy 
and not entering into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 
China is a responsible Great Power that will certainly contribute its 




CCTV thus followed the same arguments as other official media outlets, 
which framed the event in terms of peaceful development and responsible 
Great Power behaviour. For English-speaking audiences, outlets like 
the China Daily (2009) or Xinhua News (2009e) made this case, with 
Xinhua (2009b) quoting the military parade’s director Fang Fenghui to 
disambiguated the display of weapons in the following way: 
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Fang said the formation of the phalanxes shows the ongoing 
transformation of the PLA from a labour-intensive force to a 
technology-intensive one and its ability to carry out diverse 
military missions. He said the military parade will ‘showcase PLA’s 
firm determination to safeguard national security and interests 
and maintain world peace.’
Through the official media, state actors thus attempted to calibrate the 
military discourse in terms of technological advances within the military, 
treating the display of weapons as a necessary reflection of the changing 
role the armed forces played in a multipolar world. In this sense, the 
military parade generated an opportunity for domestic viewers to 
identify with the imagined community of the nation and feel pride for its 
achievements while at the same time framing that identification process 
through the lens of harmony and peace. Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
the military display was not about military might, despite arguments 
in the foreign press to the contrary (e.g. Dyer & Anderlini 2009). It was 
about national unity and a moral imperative to promote peace, designed 
by the Hu-Wen administration as part of its ideological work to define 
the meaning of a harmonious society at home and of a harmonious world 
abroad.
6.4	 Reinterpreting	the	classics
The discussion so far has already illustrated the high degree of creativity 
required to reprogramme discourses during China’s networked 
spectacles and fit pre-modern concepts like ‘harmony’ into modernist 
frameworks for making sense of China. The fact that the PRC’s cultural 
governance approach actively sought to involve diverse actors in these 
processes (see chapter 3) then also meant that this creative work was 
open to reinterpretation by actors with often differing agendas and 
assumptions. Some elements of the discourse neatly slotted into the 
kinds of ‘nativist’ ethno-epistemologies discussed above; others created 
meanings that aligned with cosmopolitan ideas about the Chinese past 
and present. Take the case of the China Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo, 
which so powerfully served as an official symbol of national glory, while 
at the same time providing a site for complex semiotic assemblages. 
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As discussed in chapter 4, the architectural team contextualised 
its engineering practices by deploying cultural references, and this 
included citing (in Chinese) classic sources on matters of harmony. In 
their architectural guide the design team prominently referred to the 
Confucian Analects that also served the designers of the Beijing Olympics 
opening ceremony as a resource for their meaning-making activities. In 
one instance, the architectural guide features a painting of Confucius 
along with a quotation that contains two foundational phrases of the 
Confucian intellectual tradition, and that appear frequently within the 
Hu-Wen administration’s harmony discourse: he wei gui (和为贵) and he 
er bu tong (和而不同). The original quotation in the guide reads (SCAT 
2010: 16):
孔子曰：礼之用，和为贵。君子和而不同，小人同而不和。
I will return to the English meaning in a moment, since translating 
these phrases is by no means straightforward. Interestingly, the 
architectural guide itself provides only the Chinese original, spelled out 
in the traditional rendering from right to left, top to bottom, without 
punctuation marks, but rendered in the simplified character script 
introduced on the mainland in the 1950s and 1960s (see Figure 6.4). 
This is a somewhat idiosyncratic choice that on the one hand signals 
a commitment to historical authenticity (by reproducing the reading 
direction of ancient scrolls) while on the other hand making the text 
legible to Chinese audiences who may not be familiar with the traditional 
character script of the original. The quotation is presented as part of the 
picture portraying the sage, printed on what looks like aged paper, again 
suggesting a sense of historicity and serving the creators of the guide to 
legitimate their interpretation of Chinese antiquity. This is in and of itself 
a fascinating choice, seeing that the image of the sage has become an 
object of contemporary political debates, especially in the wake of official 
attempts to ‘standardise’ the portrait of Confucius, which in turn is an 
interesting twist, considering how much of the Confucian tradition was 
concerned with ‘rectifying’ names and concepts (see Steinkraus 1980, 
Tabor 2014). 
What, then, can the use of these classic quotations tell us about 
meaning-making during the design and construction of the China 
Pavilion? Deciphering the intended meanings behind such use of classic 
quotations is made more difficult by the fact that classic Chinese is 
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an extremely minimalist and ambiguous language; a fact that to some 
extent enables precisely the creative translation and blending activities 
that Chinese actors engage in when they cite classic sources. There are 
indeed numerous ways to translate quotations from such early materials, 
whether into contemporary Chinese or foreign languages. A classic 
translation into English comes from James Legge (1861) and, applied to 
the text passages that the guidebook contains, the English version would 
here read:
Figure 6.4: Confucian Quotations on Harmony in the Service of Architectural Design (SCAT 2010: 16). 
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The Master [Kong] said: In practising the rules of propriety, a 
natural ease is to be prized. The superior man is affable, but not 
adulatory; the mean man is adulatory, but not affable.
Legge’s somewhat archaic and frequently literal translations are of course 
also a product of their time: James Legge was a Christian Missionary and 
Oxford University professor during the Victorian period (see Girardot 
2001), and his language choices to some extent reflect this context. Here, 
Legge’s translation draws attention to the fact that the text in the Analects 
was concerned with sagely conduct, and specifically with the question 
of how to behave in accordance with the principles embodied by pre-
modern rituals (li 礼). 
It is unlikely that the architectural guide has this reading in mind. The 
editors have juxtaposed two disparate text fragments from the original 
source (Analects 1:12 & 13:23), implying firstly that these two segments 
are connected, secondly that both lines were spoken by ‘Master Kong’, 
even though the first sentence is actually attributed to a different person, 
the Confucian disciple Master You (Youzi 有子). This already suggests that 
the creators of the architectural guide were not concerned with issues of 
actual historicity or text-immanent coherence, but rather with the core 
commonality between these text fragments: the character he (和). This 
is also implied by the guide itself, which interprets the China Pavilion as 
an embodiment of hexie (和谐), i.e. ‘harmony’ (SCAT 2010: 30). It seems 
plausible that the editors understood the quotation in that context. A 
more likely translation of the quotation might then be the following, 
which I have here based on translations that the official broadcaster 
China Radio International prefers when citing Confucian classics (CRI 
2011 & 2014):
Confucius said: In practising the rights, harmony is precious. The 
superior person aims at harmony but not at uniformity. The mean 
person aims at uniformity but not at harmony.
Intriguingly, the architectural guide presents these quotations from the 
Analects in juxtaposition with the classic Daoist quotations I mentioned 
earlier. Again, the authors combine text fragments from two different 
contexts, in this case quotations from different books, each again dealing 
with the idea of he (和). These sources are the Dao De Jing (道德经, section 
42.2) and the Zhuangzi (outer chapter, ‘The Way of Heaven’, 13.2). As 
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was the case with the Confucian quotations, the passages are presented 
alongside a picture of a sage (presumably Master Lao) on faded paper. 
The original reads: 
老子曰：万物负阴而抱阳，冲气以为和。与人和者，谓之人
乐。与天和者，谓之天乐。
There are again numerous possible translations. For three different 
authoritative English versions of the first passage see Dao De Jing (n/d), 
and for a translation of the second passage see Legge (1881). I would here 
suggest the following: 
Master Lao said: All things carry the principle Yin and encompass 
the principle Yang; the principle Qi brings them into harmony. 
To be in harmony with others is called human happiness; to be in 
harmony with heaven is called heavenly happiness. 
The editors here channel two separate classic sources, by separate 
philosophers, into a single voice: that of the probably fictitious Daoist 
sage Laozi, whose role in compiling the famous Dao De Jing remained 
contested throughout history (for discussions see Fairbank & Goldman 
2006: 53, Gernet 1972/2002: 93-94, and, in Dutch, Ter Haar 2009: 50). 
Together with the misattributed Confucius quotations, the architectural 
guide then produces a rather apocryphal understanding of China’s past, 
but this may be beside the point: the designers and architects here 
imagine what the building means, using discursive resources that the 
party and state had highlighted as relevant at the time (see also Penny 
2012). While the results may be anachronistic, they allow the actors 
to frame and legitimate their contemporary strategies of sustainable 
development, and ultimately to appeal to the state agents who needed to 
select this project plan and approve its funding. To this end, the design 
strategy positions the project as a meaningful undertaking by ‘flagging’ 
popular pre-modern concepts. 
The selective mobilisation of pre-modern statements about ‘harmony’ 
also provides the architects with a foundation for then demonstrating their 
eco-conscious (and technologically-minded) prowess. This includes the 
use of environmentally-friendly materials and energy-saving techniques 
like a natural ventilation system, solar panels on the building’s roof, a 
system that harvests rainwater, and an energy management system that 
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features natural air cooling and energy-efficient plumbing (SCAT 2010: 
59), all of which are brought into context with the architectural guide’s 
conception of Confucian and Daoist harmonious living. The producers 
of this officially approved discourse on the China Pavilion demonstrate 
how parameters provided by the CCP’s leadership, such as the focus on 
‘harmony’, come to be reworked to create contemporary meanings and 
produce novel discourses, in this case about architecture and engineering. 
In the end, these attempts to evoke pre-modern sages has little to 
do with the classics. Recall the design choice to create a multi-layered 
colour scheme of red hues that would together form the building’s 
characteristic ‘China Red’ – a dynamic that the designers’ architectural 
guide explicitly describes as again embodying the famous Confucian 
phrase he er bu tong (和而不同), which the book translates into English as 
‘harmony in diversity’ (SCAT 2010: 45). The government, specifically the 
municipal Shiboju in Shanghai, has used a similar interpretation in its 
own official guide to the China Pavilion’s exhibits, which clarifies what 
the propaganda officials at that specific government agency wanted the 
classic phrase to mean in this context: ‘it implies a pluralistic, united, 
harmonious Chinese civilization’ (寓意了多远，统一，和谐的中国文
化; Shiboju 2010: 127).
The meaning of ‘harmony’ has here come a long way, from historical 
arguments that sage-like behaviour might mean that scholars should 
be agreeable without grovelling, to the contemporary political ideal 
of China as a society that despite its supposed hierarchical structure 
encourages diversity and pluralism. Effectively, a set of private and state 
actors have collaborated to generate political discourse, programming a 
networked spectacle with their particular cosmopolitan and multicultural 
interpretation of what ‘China’ should stand for. Using the China Pavilion 
as their site of discursive assemblage, and drawing from the approved 
symbolic resources available at the time, they have blended the input space 
of pre-modern Confucian meanings with architectural design elements 
to create an emergent liberal argument about the modern Chinese 
nation-state as a multicultural society. This illustrates the general degree 
of conceptual flexibility that characterises political discourses during 
China’s collaboratively produced networked spectacles.
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6.5	 The	logic	of	urban	modernity
The practices I have described so far consisted of attempts to draw from pre-
modern Chinese sources to fill the Hu-Wen administration’s ‘harmonious 
society’ concept with meaning and put it to work in the service of specific 
modern political projects. It is not my intention to suggest that this 
strategy only played a role in the context of China’s networked spectacles. 
Osnos (2014), for example, recounts how the Beijing Confucius Temple 
used CCP slogans to refer to China’s pre-modern past and legitimate 
its own spiritual agenda; he cites the temple’s justification for a staged 
performance that was meant to represent the ‘harmonious ideology and 
harmonious society of the ancient people, which will have a positive 
influence on the construction of modern harmonious society’. Others 
have applied the concept of harmony to social and economic matters, for 
instance Bell and Mo (2014), who have proposed a developmental metric 
that they explicitly conceptualise as an alternative to US-based Freedom 
House’s index of political and civic liberties in different countries. This 
measure, which the authors argue is a more holistic indicator of societal 
wellbeing than its American counterpart, carries the name ‘Harmony 
Index’. 
Such appropriation of the CCP’s watch words, and in this case of the 
party’s nominally Confucian lingo of harmony, is a frequent feature of 
Chinese political communication, and I provide additional examples of 
the ideological drift that this practice encourages in chapter 7. Here, it 
is worth stressing how the harmony framework connected with modern 
concerns about economic and social development, captured by the other 
crucial slogan of the Hu-Wen era: ‘scientific development’ (keji fazhan 科
学发展). The PRC’s 60th anniversary parade illustrates how official actors 
juxtaposed their scientific development agenda with the harmonious 
society idea. 
The parade itself was in many ways a stereotypical representation of 
modern development, anchored firmly in the modern concept of national 
sovereignty and replete with the recognisable symbols of modernity, 
such as planes, high-speed trains, cars, and any other human-made 
artefact with streamlined design that promises to propel its occupants 
forward (see Figure 6.6). Several floats were explicitly dedicated to such 
metaphors of progress, for instance the floats on industry and transport. 
Throughout the pageant, state-led industrial development functioned as 
an important anchor-point for this iconography. 
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Particularly blatant cases were the floats that depicted progress in 
China’s various provinces and municipalities, with Beijing, Jilin, Fujian, 
Sichuan, and Shaanxi each featuring aeroplanes or aerospace technology 
as part of their presentation, and prominently displaying high-speed 
trains. It is indeed hard to imagine a more perfect fusion of modernist 
and traditional concepts than the PRC’s bullet trains of ‘mark Harmony’ 
(hexie hao 和谐号). A particularly interesting example that brought 
economic development in line with the harmonious society agenda was 
the Tibet float, which showcased infrastructure projects like highway 
and tunnel constructions on a large screen, under the title ‘Harmonious 
Tibet’. On CCTV, the commentators clarified for domestic audiences that 
the float exemplified the ‘magical nature and developmental progress of 
a harmonious Tibet’ (神奇自然，发展进步的和谐西藏). 
In a similar way, CCTV clarified for viewers that urban development 
was a crucial part of the harmonious society agenda. One float, designated 
‘harmonious homeland’ (hexie jiayuan 和谐家园), showcased a model 
‘harmonious community’ (hexie shequ 和谐社区): an urban skyline under 
a rainbow with a prominently placed ‘service centre’ to attend to citizens’ 
administrative needs, a ‘district council’ for citizen participation, and 
featuring a phalanx of people in wheelchairs to symbolise the state’s 
care for the elderly and infirm. CCTV’s commentary stressed that the 
authorities had been tirelessly labouring to develop these harmonious 
communities, which constitute ‘the glorious homeland and safe harbour 
of the masses’ (人民群众的美好家园和稳性港湾).
This fusion of urban modernity with Confucian harmony continued 
a year later, at the Shanghai Expo, but now with more explicit references 
to pre-modern precedents as actors set out to programme the event’s 
discourses about economic sustainability and modern living. The feature 
films were an example of this, particularly the Confucian-themed film 
Harmonious China, which presented scenes of predominantly urban living 
under the banner of its three Confucius quotations, including the popular 
phrase he er bu tong (和而不同). Another example was the pavilion’s 
display of ancient artefacts. The guidebook to the China Pavilion’s core 
exhibition makes it clear that a set of these items were meant to illustrate 
the ‘urban economy and citizen’s life’ (城市经济与市民生活; Shiboju 
2010: 80). Describing urban development during the Song Dynasty, the 
guidebook concludes (ibid.):
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From ancient times to the present, the appearance of the city has 
undergone huge changes, but throughout the Chinese people’s 
wish for a harmonious life has not changed.
从古到今的城市面貌发生了巨大的变化，但中国人对和谐生
活的诉求始终没有改变。
In the pavilion, this connection between ancient wisdom and 
contemporary urbanisation was most powerfully presented in the form 
of the ingeniously animated Qingming Scroll. This 120-metre-wide 
installation reproduced the urban landscape of the original scroll, but 
embedded with looped narrative arcs for the multitude of activities that 
the original depicted. Animated citizens buy wine, ride carts, chase 
pigs, and pilot boats along the river, and these dynamics loop endlessly 
through a day-night cycle. As Chow (2012) points out, the design choice 
itself reflects a commitment to the kind of holistic perspective associated 
with Daoist thought. His description of the artwork (ibid.: 184) echoes 
the arguments about ritualistic entrainment, embodied participation, 
and emergent meanings I discussed earlier:
...for spectators, these dynamics are so intricate that the interaction 
between various impulses can only be perceived collectively. 
The final image projected to spectators is still full of energy, but 
it is definitely not the result of a single dominant impulse. The 
phenomenon again is comparable to the emergent motion of a 
flock of birds or a school of fish, in which each animate entity is 
simultaneously steering toward local members of the flock and 
away from overcrowding.
The exhibit designers made an intriguing choice to illustrate the expo’s 
theme ‘better city, better life’ by using such a high-tech version of a 
pre-modern artwork. Indeed, much of the artwork’s content is used to 
extrapolate a continuous tradition of harmonious urbanism that extends 
to the present. The deputy director of the Shanghai Expo, Zhou Hanmin, 
made this case in a speech that contextualised this exhibit (Zhou 2012):
What visitors appreciate in the animation painting is that so many 
people could get along with each other so harmoniously. The 
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harmony and peace depicted by the painting is the epitome of the 
5,500-year long Chinese civilisation.
Aside from suggesting that contemporary Chinese urbanism is a direct 
extension of ancient Chinese practices, and that it is consequently fuelled 
by a desire for harmony, the organisers also used the Song Dynasty, and 
specifically the famous Qingming Scroll, as a resource to make discursive 
statements about what they felt the nature of modern Chinese urbanism 
should be. It was in this context that the organisers redeploy the symbolic 
resources of antiquity to generate novel discourses that envisaged urban 
life as a function of the market economy. 
The guidebook to the exhibit, for instance, covers the original 
painting in four double-page spreads (Shiboju 2010: 48-55), in each case 
reproducing a section of the scroll and flanking it with annotations that 
explain various activities related to three topical areas: the city (cheng 
城), the market (shi 市), and the suburb (jiao 郊). In the ‘city’ section, 
the guidebook points out examples of money exchange and of early 
advertising, followed by two double-pages dedicated to ‘the market’, 
which highlight examples of commerce and trade, for example store 
signs and shipping activities. One explanation reads (ibid.: 50):
The Song era’s handicraft industry was already highly developed. 
Many workshops and manufactures appeared, along with an 
abundance of categories. [The industry’s] division of labour was 
deep and the scope was large. At the time, the 20,000 or more 





The use of phrases like ‘division of labour’, along with the repeated 
emphasis on commerce and trade, push a discourse of market-economic 
activity onto these representations. Before this backdrop, it is intriguing 
that the guidebook would choose a quotation from the notoriously 
obscure classic The Book of Changes (Yi Jing 易经, sections Qian 1.1 and Kun 
2.1) to usher in its discussion of the animated scroll (Shiboju 2010: 44); in 
this context, that quotation might be interpreted loosely as follows:
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Heaven is in constant motion. The superior person applies 
themselves ceaselessly;




What emerges from these exhibits and explanations is a capitalist 
discourse that associated virtuous behaviour with industrious, urban 
activity, and that justifies this understanding in pre-modern readings of 
philosophy and art, idiosyncratic as those readings may be.
6.6	 Sustaining	the	future	of	modernity
The revival of pre-modern concepts is then indeed not necessarily about 
the past, but rather about how to design the future, as Dirlik (2011c: 4) 
has also pointed out. Networked spectacles serve as exceptional spaces 
that allow various actors to play with ethno-epistemologies to extrapolate 
utopian visions of the future (see Jameson 2007), and in the case of the 
Shanghai expo this included official attempts to envisage a hypermodern 
techno-utopia. To paraphrase Dirlik, this was no alternative to modernity, 
but it was an alternative modernity. Hubbert (2017: 51) rightly points this 
out when she writes that the official Chinese expo narratives did not 
locate ‘tradition as antithetical to modernity’ but ‘instead wed cultural 
history and heritage to economic growth and technological advancement 
to offer tradition as a prescription for addressing modernity’s putative 
hazards’. 
For instance, many of the installations on the China Pavilion’s third 
exhibition floor, which promoted sustainable development, were steeped 
in optimism that scientific progress would solve the woes of the planet. 
These problems were presented as urgent, but ultimately as manageable 
through technology. This was a scientistic, solutionist approach to 
politics, one that was interested in fighting the symptoms of modernity 
but not their causes.
In that vein, the exhibits relied heavily on flowcharts and other visual 
representations that implied that society might be a machine that had to be 
fine-tuned for efficiency. Visitors could ‘calibrate’ some of these processes 
themselves, ‘by touching digital display screens’ and manipulating 
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‘parameters such as commuting distance and mode of commute to obtain 
a calculation of their daily carbon footprint’ (Wallis & Balsamo 2016: 43). 
An extreme example of the mechanistic understanding that the exhibits 
communicated is the process charts with which the guidebook explains 
the idea of a ‘smart energy network’, which in Chinese is called a ‘general 
capacity network’ (fan neng wang 泛能网). The flow chart (Shiboju 2010: 
104) has at its centre the ‘Energy Efficiency Controller’, which connects 
various energy production and storage processes through computer relays 
to three specific domains: housing, transport, and industry. The graphic 
lists the ‘biogas, wind, solar, nuclear, and clean coal’ energy sources, and 
it espouses a ‘synergistic optimization across supply and demand sides 
of various energy forms’. This is the Chinese-language explanation that 
accompanies the image:
The general capacity network is based on the technology of 
energy-efficient systems; it applies capacity and information 
coupling in the four sectors of energy production, storage, usage, 
and recycling, and it forms real-time synergies between energy 
inputs and outputs that cut across time and space; in this manner, 
it realises optimisation and capacity efficiency throughout the 
full life cycle of the system; its energy-efficient operating system 
balances all changes in the flow of energy supply and demand, 
exploits each step, and optimises time and space, and in this way 
maximises systematic energy efficiency; ultimately, its output is a 
kind of self-organising, high-level, systematic smart energy source 







It is telling how strongly this short text relies on words like ‘optimise’ 
and ‘efficient’; this is a view of systems that is borne out of mechanistic, 
industrial-age understandings of complexity. It extends Taylorist and 
Fordist visions of efficient control to the 21st century (see Smith 2016: 207 
and Vidal 2016), selling these ideas to the audiences as solutions rather 
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than problematising them as factors that potentially contributed to the 
issues these systems are now meant to solve. Note, for instance, how 
consumerism and industrial production are simply taken for granted as 
economic realities rather than being an object of critical discussion. The 
question is not how to rethink the nature of human energy consumption, 
but how to maintain past patterns of energy consumption under new 
conditions, so as to ensure economic growth through continuous 
consumption. 
Indeed, the pavilion and its exhibits presented a largely unquestioned, 
rationalist, and frequently neoliberal narrative of urbanised, industrialised 
modernity that fits neatly into the tradition of mass events like world 
expositions, with their modernist discourses, and it is telling that the 
official Shanghai Expo theme also reflected this focus, at least in the 
Chinese original. Whereas the organisers translated the event’s slogan 
into English as ‘better city, better life’, a more accurate translation of the 
Chinese slogan would be ‘cities: making life even better’ (城市，让生活
更美好). The logic encapsulated in the phrase was that, if only modern 
urbanisation continued, prosperity would follow naturally.
This modernist discourse was further married to the strong sense 
that when it came to leading a ‘low carbon’ life and achieving ‘measured 
consumption’, responsibility lay squarely with individual citizens. As the 
guidebook explains (Shiboju 2010: 109):
Let every single citizen take action. To start with ourselves, to 
start with the little things, start now, and to start with what is next 
to us, is to positively participate in energy conservation and the 
reduction of carbon emissions, and to make our own contribution 
to the country’s energy conservation and carbon emission targets. 
[Let us] together create a thriftier, cleaner, and more civilised 





In the guidebook, this explanation accompanies an illustration of the 
ideal low-carbon day (ibid.: 108), which provides readers with everyday 
solutions to environmental problems: taking showers instead of baths, 
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switching from cars to bicycles, taking the stairs rather than the lift, going 
to bed earlier to save electricity, etc. In the pavilion itself, this focus on 
individual action reappeared in calls to recycle waste and avoid harmful 
consumer products like plastic bags. 
My point here is not that these understandings of society and 
economics are fallacious, though it is worth pointing out that they have 
been criticised severely for only redressing and restating the foundational 
problems of modernity in modernist terms, rather than providing 
serious alternatives to modern modes of living, producing, consuming, 
and organising (see, for instance, Graeber 2011). My point is that the 
overarching discourse of harmony provided organisers at the Shanghai 
Expo with a framework for imagining Chinese modernity, and that among 
official actors in Shanghai this entailed tying narratives of industrial 
progress to a neoliberal discourse that placed individual responsibility at 
the core of sustainable development visions.
6.7	 Conclusion
Throughout China’s networked spectacles, pre-modern Chinese 
philosophy has served official actors as an important input space for 
making sense of modern society, politics, and economics. Extending 
the longstanding practices of reinterpreting ancient classics, the cadres, 
media workers, architects, designers, advertisers, and other actors 
involved in staging these large-scale spectacles filled the official slogans 
of the Hu-Wen era with meaning and deployed them as part of their own 
projects. What emerged from such activities was often a conservative, 
nativist discourse about the supposed timelessness of authoritarian, elitist 
governance practices in China, but it also included liberal, cosmopolitan 
statements about the value of pluralism, coated in the veneer of tradition 
to legitimate progressive arguments. In this, the discursive activities at 
China’s networked spectacles were not much different from the practices 
that have long driven the quests for meaning in Chinese ‘national studies’. 
 Such creative reinterpretations of antiquity in the service of modern 
political projects arguably played fast and loose with the source materials, 
which were hardly concerned with issues like multiculturalism, 
environmental protection, nuclear deterrence, neoliberal efficiency, or 
other similarly anachronistic topics. In that sense, these interpretations 
of Chinese antiquity departed noticeably from their historical templates. 
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At the same time, they also departed from the contemporary official 
discourses that the authorities were developing. Even among official 
actors, the ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ slogans 
offered conceptual building blocks to promote diverging agendas. 
The men and women who were designing Hu Jintao’s harmony 
discourse seem to have been favouring interpretations that emphasised 
order and hierarchy (see also Penny 2012), and this stream of ideological 
work integrated Confucian quotations into a neo-authoritarian vision 
of contemporary China. Other actors, for instance the designers and 
architects of the China Pavilion, skilfully referred to this network of 
meanings but did not simply echo the same interpretations. Through the 
language of official discourse, these actors assembled specific statements 
about the sort of ‘harmony’ that they thought the China Pavilion should 
stand for, in this case reframing potentially hierarchical understandings 
of harmony through the use of liberal ideas about diversity and sustainable 
development. 
The Shanghai authorities in charge of the expo and the China Pavilion’s 
exhibitions adopted a similar discourse to that of the pavilion designers 
in their public-relations materials, explaining China’s Confucian heritage 
to domestic audiences in terms such as unity and plurality, but also 
extending it to legitimate a neoliberal developmental agenda that sat 
uneasily next to the more egalitarian propaganda work of the central 
authorities. In this way, designers and local administrators participated 
in the contemporary reimagining of China, contributing to the ongoing 
discourse of what Chinese society might stand for in the 21st century. As 
the next chapter will show, the horizon of meanings became wider yet as 
the PRC’s cultural governance switched non-official actors into the social 
interactions that defined its networked spectacles.
7 Contested Nation Branding
Eric Cartman, the whimsical boy from the animated comedy series South 
Park, is having a nightmare. ‘No, no’, he screams in his sleep. In his dream, 
he is trapped in the Bird’s Nest Stadium in Beijing during the Olympic 
opening ceremony. The ominous voice of a TV anchor announces, 
‘Thousands of ancient Chinese drummers are drumming thousands of 
ancient Chinese drums, the precision of their movement made even more 
powerful by their vast numbers’. The drummers beat their drums while 
Cartman is tossing in his bed – in his mind, he is trying to find a way out 
of the maze of drums. ‘Too many of them!’, he gasps. Then he is being 
flung across the movable typeset that featured in the performance, finally 
finding himself surrounded by a sea of performers, closing in on him.
As he calls out ‘no, leave us alone’, his mother enters the room, 
checking whether her son is all right. Little Eric wakes from his nightmare, 
crying. ‘The Chinese are going to get us! There’s two billion of them and 
with their advances in technology and their growing economy they are 
going to bring down America’, he sobs. 
Few popular depictions of contemporary American anxieties about 
China are as prescient as this lovingly crafted satire by the South Park 
creators Terry Parker and Matt Stone (2008). Indeed, the short, one-
minute segment highlights the tremendous challenge that Chinese PR 
specialists face as they try to change international perceptions of the PRC 
during networked spectacles. In the case of the Beijing Olympics, the 
carefully crafted discourse on harmony unravelled in foreign contexts, 
where unity at times became reinterpreted as uniformity, fuelling 
longstanding Orientalist resentments and fears (see also Gries et al. 
2010).
This is not to say that China’s networked spectacles necessarily slotted 
into ‘China Threat’ perceptions among foreign audiences. For the Beijing 
Olympics d’Hooghe (2015: 253) finds:
The press generally reported favourably about China’s organisation 
of the Olympic Games and the press facilities, and hailed China’s 
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Olympic architecture and the opening and closing ceremonies. 
Furthermore, most visitors were impressed by the friendliness of 
the volunteers in Beijing and other Olympic cities.
My own screening of Dutch, German, English, and American foreign 
telecasts suggests something similar. For instance, German television 
aired brief interview segments with athletes leaving the stadium after the 
opening ceremony, and these participants enthusiastically praised the 
organisers and the impressive event (ARC 2008: 004, Beijing time 23:41):
Athlete 1: ‘It was crazy, totally spectacular, and you could enjoy 
almost every minute there, in that stadium, and, yeah. It was 
complete crazy for us.’
Coach: ‘That was of course a gigantic festival, or rather, it still is.’
Athlete 2: ‘I sort of still can’t really believe it, I think you’ll have to 
sort of reflect on this some more, and, uhm, in, uhm, retrospect 
examine that some more, but it was, it was sensational.’
Athlete 3: ‘When the fire got lit, well that was... I even had tears in 
my eyes. So that was really crazy.‘
Athlet 1: ‘Es war Wahnsinn, war total spektakulär, und man konnte 
fast jede Minute dort genießen, in diesem Stadium, und, ja. War 
absoluter Wahnsinn für uns.‘ 
Trainer: ‘Das war natürlich ein gigantisches Fest, beziehungsweise 
es ist es immer noch.‘
Athlet 2: ‘Ich kann‘s eigentlich immer noch nicht richtig fassen, 
ich glaub man muss da noch mal so in sich gehen, und, äh, 
das, äh, rückläufig noch mal betrachten, aber das war, das war 
sensationell.‘
Athlet 3: ‘Als das Feuer entzündet wurde, also das war... da hatte 
ich sogar Tränen in den Augen. Also das war echt Wahnsinn.’
The impressions that China’s networked spectacles made internationally 
were complex, and they were shaped by the discursive activities of 
numerous actors switched into the interactions at the events. In this 
chapter, I ask what ultimately becomes of the carefully programmed 
discourses once institutionally and ideologically diverse actors start 
reworking them for their own purposes abroad. I focus explicitly on 
foreign cultural producers and broadcasters in the context of the Beijing 
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Olympics, an event that was designed to be consumed internationally. 
This will include a discussion of how companies and NGOs used the 
symbols of the Beijing Olympics to make their own statements about the 
spectacle. Next, I take a closer look at telecasting outside the mainland, 
specifically at how two ideologically competing television stations in 
Taiwan broadcast the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. However, 
before proceeding to these cases, it is worth turning to a prominent 
concept that is frequently used to make sense of the Chinese authorities’ 
attempts to brand the nation to foreign audiences through staged 
spectacles like the Olympics or Expo: the concept of ‘soft power’.
7.1	 Soft	power	and	nation	branding	in	China
As I have discussed throughout this book, the networked spectacles that 
the PRC organised under the leadership of the Hu-Wen administration 
were partly designed to serve as public relations vehicles for the party and 
state. Such efforts are frequently associated with attempts to generate 
soft power. ‘Soft power’ is a term coined by Joseph Nye (2004: 76-77), 
and it refers to the ability to influence others to develop preferences and 
interests in ways consistent with one’s own. In public diplomacy, the 
term usually describes a government’s ability to influence foreign public 
opinion in its favour, and to generate goodwill among the citizens of 
other countries for its foreign policy.
Nye’s concept is popular with Chinese administrators and intellectuals 
alike, who believe (not entirely without cause) that foreign sentiments 
towards China are marred by threat perceptions, and that they are 
biased by discourses that hark back to Cold War thinking and orientalist 
prejudices about a sinister, untrustworthy, and ultimately belligerent and 
dangerous Chinese state. To many Chinese analysts, these perceptions 
are generated by the fact that the world does not know or understand 
the ‘real’ China (see Latham 2009). Much effort has consequently gone 
into improving the state’s capacities for reaching foreign audiences and 
promoting a more positive image of the country (see Brady 2008: ch.7, 
d’Hooghe 2015), for instance in African countries (see the contributions 
in Zhang et al. 2016).
As a consequence of these discourses within China about foreign 
anxieties and possible public diplomacy responses, and particularly in 
the wake of successful cultural diplomacy campaigns that neighbouring 
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Japan and South Korea rolled out in the 2000s, the PRC government has 
reoriented its foreign policy strategy to strongly incorporate a soft power 
dimension (see Brownell 2013: 68 and Li 2009). In 2007, Hu Jintao argued 
that the PRC needed to ‘enhance culture as part of the soft power of our 
country’ (Xinhua 2007), and his administration pursued an extensive 
cultural promotion campaign in the subsequent years (see Barr 2011 
and Cull 2008), which included establishing the Confucius Institutes I 
mentioned in chapter 6, but also expanding Chinese news services for 
foreign-language speakers (Zhang 2011: 183-188). It remains controversial 
whether this strategy has had any positive effects (see Brownell 2019), 
but the general sentiment behind it continues to shape Chinese foreign 
policy to this day. 
Importantly, the administration’s views on soft power were an 
important driver in how official actors envisaged networked spectacles 
such as the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo (see d’Hooghe 2015: 
ch.6 and Wallis & Balsamo 2016: 35-37). That said, and as popular as 
the term ‘soft power’ may have become in academic and policy-making 
circles alike, there are several reasons why it remains problematic as 
an analytical concept. Of immediate concern should be that soft power 
was not originally designed with analysis in mind. Nye did not coin 
the term to explain political behaviour but to influence it. Nye, who 
has worked both as an academic and a political advisor to successive 
US Democratic Party presidents and presidential candidates (Clinton, 
Kerry, Obama), has been a vocal critic of Republican foreign policy and 
a proactive lobbyist for a stronger US soft-power strategy. To accept that 
Nye’s concept accurately describes a fundamental aspect of international 
politics would obscure that it was Nye who actively made that concept 
a feature of such politics, effectively creating a self-fulfilling prophecy 
and reifying his own theoretical assumptions. One could argue that the 
most convincing example of soft-power usage has been Nye’s ability to 
convince academics and decision-makers that his ideology was worth 
adopting as a policy-making framework, but that says little about the 
actual effectiveness of national strategies to persuade foreign audiences 
through cultural means.
Ultimately, such strategies are informed by a specific rationale 
regarding culture and media: in the soft-power worldview, the value 
of cultural artefacts derives from their utility to help one nation-state 
prevail over another in perceived struggles over cultural attraction. It 
is this view that leads Nye to argue that Europe is ‘the closest competitor 
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to the United States in soft power resources’ (2005: 75; my emphasis). 
According to such logic, scientific achievements, economic welfare, and 
cultural expressions matter because they ostensibly provide politicians 
of a specific nation-state with the ability to sway foreigners to their cause 
and promote national interests in what is effectively a zero-sum game of 
cultural appreciation. Culture becomes a resource for manipulating the 
dynamics of great-power politics.
While such utilitarian and nationalist reasoning provides a 
reductionist and anti-humanist take on culture, criticism of this rationale 
is rarely reflected in the work of soft-power advocates. When I attended 
an international conference in Hong Kong on Chinese Culture on the 
World Stage (Hong Kong Baptist University, 14-15 June 2012), heated 
discussion ensued between Chinese scholars and pundits over how to 
apply Nye’s concept; the discussion drew heavily from nationalist and 
utilitarian tropes about how to make the PRC strong through cultural 
promotion, how to compete with the US on issues of cultural appeal, 
and how to identify and secure resources to create the kind of nativist 
ethno-epistemology I have discussed in chapter 6. A central concern 
was how to identify the ‘essence’ of Chinese culture that would generate 
attraction for the Chinese nation abroad (e.g. the Confucian classics, 
Daoist philosophy, Tang-era poetry, etc.). The debate did not, however, 
address whether Chinese culture had an essence to begin with, why such 
an essence needed active promotion, or why it should be understood first 
and foremost as an expression of an immutable ‘national’ culture (rather 
than, for instance, reflecting regional and historical changes). In short, 
there was little reflection on the idea that ‘national culture’ might itself 
be a discourse that actors evoke during historically-situated interactions.
The fact that soft power has become a central concept in academic 
debates and policy-making then does not exonerate the concept as 
an analytical device. Even if nation-states explicitly adopt soft-power 
strategies, the question still remains how to explain and assess such 
attempts to shape political attitudes abroad. In the growing corpus 
of soft-power literature, it remains unclear to me how the causal link 
is supposed to work between political agents, their cultural policy, 
the resulting cultural artefacts, the attractiveness that these artefacts 
possess, and ultimately the political preferences of those who consume 
these cultural artefacts (see also the criticism in Barr 2011). Considering 
these concerns, as well as a number of issues raised elsewhere (e.g. in 
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Zhang 2009), the explanatory value of the term ‘soft power’ becomes 
questionable. 
In what follows, I consequently do not try to assess the effects of 
Chinese soft-power strategies on ‘national’ audiences abroad. Instead, I 
view the concept as a cultural artefact in its own right; a concept around 
which actors create networks of meanings through their interactions. The 
discourse of soft power is relevant because it informs the public relations 
strategies of China’s networked spectacles, and it provides a rationale for 
organisers as they engage in a political campaign of cultural promotion, 
and as they ground their activities in Nye’s soft-power ideology to 
increase their legitimacy (see Callahan 2010: 4). As part of their activities, 
the actors behind China’s networked spectacles mobilised the popular 
discussions of soft power to conceptualise their activities as acts of public 
persuasion, and as interventions in a foreign discursive environment that 
many interpreted as hostile. The organisational practices that helped to 
create and communicate events like the Olympics or the Shanghai Expo 
were functions of these understandings of soft power.
7.2	 	Who	speaks	for	China?	Human	rights	NGOs	and	the	
Olympics	discourse
A particular challenge for the official actors trying to generate soft-
power narratives during events like the Beijing Olympics was that these 
narratives were not entirely under their control. Event-related symbols 
and their meanings often got away from the organisers as diverse foreign 
agents joined the meaning-making processes. In some cases, those 
agents intentionally and explicitly designed their discursive activities 
as antagonistic interventions meant to challenge the official efforts of 
branding the Chinese nation as a peaceful stakeholder in international 
affairs. Instructive examples are the advertising campaigns of rights 
organisations. Reporters Without Borders published posters titled 
‘Beijing 2008’, in which the organisers replaced the iconic Olympic 
rings with interlocking handcuffs. Amnesty International used similar 
symbolism in its own posters, for instance in one image designed by 
its Slovakian office (Amnesty 2008b), which depicted the Olympic 
rings as five circles of barbed wire before a bleak sky. This imagery was 
accompanied by a text that directly referred to the harmonious-society 
discourse of the time:
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In the name of ensuring stability and harmony in the country during 
the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chinese government continues 
to detain and harass political activists, journalists, lawyers, and 
human rights workers. Get involved.
Another poster, released in Denmark in May of that year (DDB 2008), 
showed a close-up of a young Asian woman’s face, with the PRC flag 
drawn onto her cheek in the fashion familiar from national sports 
events the world over, but this flag is smeared by a single tear running 
down the woman’s face. The caption commemorates the ‘memory of 
the Tiananmen Square crackdown’ and asks viewers to ‘put pressure on 
China to release the activists and secure a positive Olympic legacy’. In 
another case, the Hungarian design studio DDB created a poster called 
Shot, which depicted a track race, but with the referee pointing his start 
gun at a Chinese athlete who kneels in the starting position before an 
audience of spectators (Amnesty 2008a). The poster is accompanied 
by an info-text about capital punishment in the PRC. Meanwhile, the 
Australian section of Amnesty International repurposed the idea of the 
Fuwa dolls and created its own comic character Nuwa (怒娃), or ‘Rage 
Baby’, a monkey wearing a red headband like those commonly donned 
during the 1989 Tiananmen Protests (see Hutcheon 2008).
These campaigns already show how the watch signs of official discourse 
and the symbols of internationally networked spectacles can come to 
serve actors who are trying to create counter-discourses. However, this 
is not where the interaction chains of discursive assemblage ended. 
These practices provided yet more actors with the chance to switch 
themselves into the networks of meaning-making, and particularly the 
affordances of advanced digital information networks ultimately created 
sites for discursive assemblage that quickly moved in directions not 
under the control of the original actors who started these processes. 
Amnesty International’s attempts to create and publish materials critical 
of the Chinese authorities served numerous creatives as an occasion to 
showcase their visual design skills as well as their commitment to the 
cause of human rights protection. 
One designer (Drent 2008), for instance, created a poster that depicted 
a sports shoe, but with the red shoelaces repurposed to fold up and bind 
the front of the shoe, evoking associations with traditional Chinese foot-
binding practices. The title of the poster, ‘Beijing 2008’, uses the same 
visual trope of barbed wire that Amnesty International deployed in its 
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own posters, and the footer contains the Amnesty International logo (a 
candle wrapped in barbed wire) and the same text about the harassment of 
activists I have quoted above. In another case, two advertising companies 
expanded the analogy between sports and state violence that DDB had 
already used in the poster Shot, but now transferring that rationale to 
additional sporting contexts: MUW Saatchi & Saatchi in Slovakia put 
together a poster series titled ‘China is Getting Ready’ (an official PRC 
slogan), which in one instance had a Chinese-looking sports shooter aim 
his handgun at the back of the head of a kneeling man in ragged prison 
clothing; two other posters show prisoners dressed in the same rags as 
they are being beaten and abused by athletes in boxing and wrestling 
rings, respectively (MacLeod 2008b). In a similar vein, the French 
advertiser TBWA produced a series of advertisements depicting torture 
in Olympic sports settings, e.g. Chinese security forces waterboarding a 
captive in an Olympic swimming pool, a smiling security officer walking 
away from a prisoner tied to an archery target, and an abused woman 
chained to a weightlifting barbell (MacLeod 2008a). 
These cultural products were not official Amnesty International 
campaign materials, even if they were labelled as such. In fact, Amnesty 
International reportedly withdrew the Slovakian campaign and distanced 
itself from the French ‘torture ads’ (see Hutcheon 2008, Spencer 2008), 
but at that time the images had already been uploaded to the internet. It 
is hard to trace who precisely was responsible for this result; the French 
advertising agency TBWA later claimed that the images had been the 
brainchild of a rogue employee working on a pro bono account, and that 
the campaign was never meant to see the light of day (reported in Fowler 
et al. 2008). Presumably the controversial advertisements threatened the 
company’s other accounts, e.g. their contract with sports equipment 
manufacturer Adidas. Be that as it may, once the images made their 
way online, they powerfully drove debates about Chinese politics in 
the run-up to the Olympics. Chinese nationalists, for instance, viewed 
the campaigns as an affront, and they took to social media and online 
comment sections to curse Amnesty International and its advertising 
agencies in no uncertain terms. On one Chinese website showing posters 
from the aborted campaigns (Adfuns 2008), for instance, commentators 
questioned the ‘quality’ of ‘the French’ (法国人怎么这么没素质) and 
told the producers of the posters to ‘go and die’ (去死吧). I hesitate to 
make any claims about the representativeness of such comments; even in 
nationalist contexts, not all comments on China’s internet are necessarily 
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this chauvinistic (see also Schneider 2018: ch.7). However, these outbursts 
of online anger demonstrate, as Callahan (2010: 25) has noted, that 
‘Chinese nationalism is produced and consumed in an interactive and 
intersubjective process’, and this process involves diverse actors across 
the world who engage in discourses about the Chinese nation in often 
idiosyncratic ways.
Overall, human rights activists and organisations appear to have been 
fairly effective as they agitated against the Chinese authorities in the run-
up to the Olympics, and their often scathing criticism of the human rights 
situation gathered steam particularly in the wake of the Tibetan riots in 
early 2008 (see also d’Hooghe 2015: 241-246). It is telling that the Chinese 
authorities felt it necessary to reposition their own discourses vis-à-vis 
this strong focus on human rights. After the Sichuan earthquake, for 
instance, official media were quick to stress to their own citizens that 
‘human rights, at their most basic, mean respecting the human right to 
life and protecting the human right to a livelihood’ (尊重人权，最基本
的就是尊重人的生命权和维护人的生存权，因为这是一切人权的基
础; Luo 2008). Reporting aimed at foreign audiences similarly stressed 
that the PRC was protecting human rights by ‘putting people first’ (see 
Schneider & Hwang 2014b: 645 for examples). Foreign critics had skilfully 
forced a discourse into the event networks that threatened to shift what 
the values of the spectacle should be, to the point that official Chinese 
actors felt the need to respond with renewed programming efforts.
7.3	 How	China’s	Olympic	symbols	were	sold
These struggles over symbols and their meanings illustrate that meanings 
are not easily dictated top-down by official actors, even as these actors 
labour to create cultural products as forms of soft-power persuasion. The 
cultural governance approach that the authorities adopted during China’s 
networked spectacles arguably also facilitated struggles, opening the 
discourses up to diverse meaning-making efforts. 
I will discuss in the subsequent chapter how the cultural governance 
approach of the authorities led to highly diverse discursive statements 
during the spectacles themselves, with domestic and foreign actors 
programming their own meanings into the complex networks, even 
as they had to limit themselves to the discursive horizon that various 
constraints created during such events. In this chapter, I have so far 
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argued that this horizon expanded significantly once the event discourses 
became revamped abroad, for instance by transnational NGOs. Not 
all of these activities were driven by activist concerns. Much of the 
programming that went on at China’s networked spectacles involved 
large multinational corporations that intervened in the event discourses 
for commercial reasons.
For instance, sports equipment companies such as Adidas and Nike, 
as well as fast-food chains such as McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, used events like the Beijing Olympics as a platform to further 
promote their brands, both globally and in local Chinese markets. As a 
general communication strategy, the advertising agencies working for 
these corporations tended to fuse local event symbolism with globally 
recognisable symbols of the respective brand, a process also known as 
‘glocalisation’ (see O’Barr 2007 and Sinclair 2008), and this then entailed 
creating discursive statements about the event, the host country, and the 
role of the foreign brand in that context. In most cases, these meaning-
making activities of commercial actors outside China aligned fairly well 
with the discourses that the authorities had envisaged. The advertisers 
generally promoted feel-good narratives that promised to frame their 
specific commercial products as positive, natural components of the 
spectacle in question. It should not be too surprising that advertisers were 
trying to avoid alienating their audiences, but it is revealing that their 
efforts to stay within acceptable event discourses at times led to cultural 
content that arguably even outdid the soft-power campaigns of official 
actors. To achieve their commercial goals, many multinationals decided 
to tap into Chinese patriotic sentiments to promote their products in the 
PRC, while retaining the cosmopolitan implications of the Olympic spirit 
to appeal also to audiences abroad. Two Coca Cola commercials are good 
examples of this strategy: the spots Bird’s Nest and Unity. 
The Bird’s Nest commercial (Coca Cola 2008a), created by the 
Amsterdam branch of advertising agency Wieden+Kennedy (see MacLeod 
2008b), tells the story of five animated birds, each in the colour of one of 
the five Olympic rings. The birds collect straws from Coca Cola soft drinks 
to build a nest, and they carry the straws to Beijing from all around the 
world, passing famous Chinese sites like the Great Wall and the skyline 
of Shanghai on their way. Back in the capital, the birds put the straws 
together to build a miniature version of the National Stadium, and the 
commercial concludes with the five birds sitting together in their ‘Bird’s 
Nest’, watching the fireworks go off above the actual Bird’s Nest Stadium. 
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The second television spot, Unity (Coca Cola 2008b), was produced 
by Wieden+Kennedy’s Portland office (MacLeod (2008a). It starts as 
a 40-second animated video of the two basketball stars LeBron James 
(USA) and Yao Ming (PRC) before morphing into a live-action exchange 
between the two stars. At the outset of the spot, the two athletes face 
each other in a mock competition of their two nations. Each draws from 
a range of cultural symbols to win the fight: James is aided by cowboys, 
grizzly bears, and an American eagle, while Yao receives support from a 
dragon, panda bears, and a large fish (a Chinese symbol of prosperity). 
The two teams confront each other before the backdrop of American and 
Chinese skyscrapers. Realising that they are evenly matched, each of the 
stars reaches for his ‘secret weapon’: a bottle of Coca Cola. Once the two 
stars discover that they enjoy the same beverage, they exchange Coke 
bottles and have a drink. The animations melt away and are replaced 
by real footage of the two men, who now toast to each other – James in 
Chinese, Yao in English. The advertisement concludes with the campaign 
slogan, ‘unity on the Coke side of life’.
 Both these commercials are highly creative combinations of 
cosmopolitan and nationalist symbols, taken from the context of the 
2008 Olympic Games. What is significant here is that each draws from 
(and arguably reinforces) the discursive elements that shape the official 
national discourse. The Bird’s Nest commercial uses the national stadium 
as a symbol that signifies both China’s success and a feeling of belonging: 
the Bird’s Nest becomes a home from which the birds can watch the 
spectacle, just as the television audiences witness the event from the 
comfort of their homes. The Unity commercial depicts national symbols 
as resources of individual strength, dipping into essentialist discourses 
of what might define ‘China’ or ‘America’. What is more, cuteness again 
plays an important role in how the narratives are presented. Whether it 
is the little birds and their whimsical attempts to secure construction 
material for their nests or the cartoon characters in the Unity commercial, 
the nationalist discourse is framed by ‘lovable’ (ke’ai 可爱) imagery similar 
to that employed during the opening ceremony.
Intriguingly, each commercial implicitly taps into the harmonious 
society discourses that informed so much of the official political 
communication surrounding the event, and they produce their own 
understandings of harmonious co-existence. The national symbols are 
arranged to tell cosmopolitan and international stories, respectively: the 
birds come from all corners of the world to witness the Games, just as 
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foreign visitors and athletes from around the world flock to China for 
the event, and just as overseas Chinese communities return ‘home’ for 
the occasion — whether physically or in spirit. James and Yao set aside 
their differences by engaging in playful competition, and they ultimately 
become ‘united’ by sharing a consumer product. The Olympic spirit, and 
in this case Coca Cola, is depicted as bringing together different peoples 
as ‘One World’.
What should we make of this commercial use of national symbols? 
These two advertisements arguably achieve the kind of ‘flow’ that 
successful cultural productions require in order to invite buy-in. 
They are cleverly designed, meticulously produced, and eminently 
entertaining. One could make the case that they provide the kind of soft-
power narrative of which the Chinese authorities have been dreaming. 
In network terms, the Chinese authorities have successfully switched 
transnational actors into the network of national meanings. They have 
also successfully programmed these networks with a range of symbols 
that carry nationalist connotations, and they have created opportunities 
for non-state agents to re-use these symbols in commercial, cultural, or 
artistic contexts that still promote the national interest. 
In this view, the commercial actors reinforce the official discourse 
by drawing from and reproducing these symbols that official actors 
have either created or occupied for their nation-maintenance projects. 
To theorists like Michel Foucault (1976), such practices are precisely 
what sustains discourses in modern societies, which raises questions 
about whether these discourses should then really be seen as struggles 
between antagonistic groups trying to occupy the communicative high 
ground. To Foucault, by excessively focusing for instance on state power 
in communication practices, we risk ‘overlooking all the mechanisms 
and effects of power which don’t pass directly via the State apparatus, 
yet often sustain the State more effectively than its own institutions, 
enlarging and maximising its effectiveness’ (2007: 179). In this sense, 
Coca Cola’s commercials work because they are grounded in the same 
idea of inter-nationality that also fuels the authorities’ conceptualisation 
of a strong, proud, and harmonious China, and the commercial use 
of national symbols in turn helps to distribute a handy framework of 
national meanings to diverse audiences.
While this is certainly an important dimension of how cultural 
governance encourages the spread of official discourses in network 
societies, it is also worth pointing out that the commercial actors 
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are themselves active programmers of discourses. Just as domestic 
actors in China were reworking official discursive resources to make 
new meanings, so too did commercial actors reassemble the available 
symbolism to make sense of the spectacle for themselves and their 
audiences. What emerged was not necessarily in line with official visions 
for core concepts like harmony. Nevertheless, we should take Foucault’s 
warning seriously and consider how even interactions that are explicitly 
conceived of as struggles against official discourse may well reify many 
of the assumptions that went into making the official discourse in the 
first place. An interesting question then is what happens to the available 
discursive threads when foreign broadcasters rework them to weave their 
own mass media narratives.
7.4	 Making	sense	of	China’s	Olympic	efforts	in	Taiwan
For the Chinese organisers of networked spectacles like the Beijing 
Olympics, promoting soft power and branding the Chinese nation relied 
heavily on the first-order audience on the ground and, importantly, 
the second-order audience of reporters, anchors, and editors in the 
newsrooms and broadcast centres to relay messages to the third-order 
audience in front of television sets around the world. The organisers and 
media workers I interviewed a year after the event were keenly aware of 
the challenge they faced, especially considering the negative reporting 
that had preceded the event abroad.
To ensure that their intended, positive messages reached foreign 
audiences, the organisers took several measures. The first was related to 
the telecaster Beijing Olympic Broadcasting (BOB), which I mentioned in 
chapter 3. This joint-venture organisation prepared the visual materials 
for all foreign broadcasters, with the exception of the American National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC), and it consequently played a major role 
in setting the aesthetic and ideological parameters within which foreign 
stations would then arrange their own commentaries. Within the BOB, 
the Chinese authorities ensured that PRC officials featured prominently 
on the board of directors. This ‘numerical dominance of Chinese people’ 
ensured that the authorities remained switched into the broadcasting 
process at a crucial node, even as they experimented with arguably 
unprecedented forms of international corporation in the broadcasting of 
an event on Chinese soil (see Brownell 2008: 187).
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As a second measure, the Olympic organising committee BOCOG 
used its position within the networked spectacle to try and programme 
the discourse through its press conferences, media guides for foreign 
journalists, press materials like the 32 editions of the Beijing Olympics 
Newspaper, and previews for selected journalists (see also d’Hooghe 
2015: 235-237). In this way, the organisers created conduits for approved 
information, and in some instances they attempted to tether foreign 
media workers to these conduits through the promise of preferential 
treatment and privileged access. This practice was particularly common 
in interactions with journalists from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The media 
workers from Taiwan whom I interviewed in fact repeatedly emphasised 
this cultural proximity and admitted that the relationship between 
Taiwanese media and their PRC counterparts was much closer throughout 
the Beijing Olympics than the relationship between Chinese organisers 
and the foreign press. Through the Beijing International Media Centre 
(BIMC), established specifically for this purpose by the State Council’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office (国务院台湾事务办公室), Taiwanese journalists 
received additional PR material, the opportunity to attend dress 
rehearsals, and privileged access to colleagues and organisers in the PRC 
(interviews in Taipei, July 2009). How successful were these measures at 
convincing Taiwanese journalists to then relay the desired messages?
To answer this question, I have analysed how two different television 
stations in Taiwan broadcast the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony 
(see also Schneider 2019). The first of these stations was China Television 
(中国电视, or CTV), a broadcaster traditionally associated with the 
conservative pan-blue coalition of the Nationalist Party (国民党, or 
KMT); the second station was Formosa Television (民间全民电视, 
or FTV), whose editorial position leans towards the liberal pan-green 
camp led by the Democratic Progressive Party (民主进步党, or DPP). My 
analysis is based on a shot-by-shot protocol (see Iedema 2001) that lists 
the images shown on the two stations, juxtaposes them with transcripts 
of the respective Chinese commentaries, and compares the meanings that 
emerge with the broadcast that aired in the PRC, on CCTV (see chapter 
5 and 6). I have augmented this study of the telecast materials with 
interviews that I conducted with Taiwanese journalists and broadcasting 
directors in July and August 2009, through which I explored to what extent 
and in what ways these actors relayed or reworked the original discourse 
within their respective institutional settings.
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How, then, did the two stations relay the images that the BOB in 
mainland China provided, and how did they discuss the proceedings? 
Watching the opening ceremony on either of the Taiwanese stations 
is a very different experience from following the proceedings on the 
PRC’s national broadcaster CCTV. CCTV’s series of official propaganda 
statements contrasts strongly with the way in which the CTV and 
FTV commentators explain the event. The Taiwanese journalists 
adopt a telecasting format that is similar in style to that of American 
broadcasters (see Brownell 1995: 33); the journalists speak freely and 
largely spontaneously, often repeating certain phrases or adding speech 
particles such as ‘oh’ or ‘uhm’, as well as empty signifiers such as ‘well’ or 
‘that’ (some examples from the CTV and FTV broadcasts include repeated 
use of 哦, 啊, 啦, 那么, or 那个). 
With regard to the discourse, the effect is significant: Taiwanese 
television seems to provide spontaneous personal observations rather 
than canned official announcements, and its commentators speak with 
all the idiosyncrasies that colloquial speech produces. What is more, 
the commentators on CTV in particular speak almost throughout the 
entire ceremony, producing roughly twice the number of spoken words 
used on either CCTV or FTV. Throughout the broadcast, they add a host 
of background information that viewers of the other channels do not 
receive, thus disambiguating how the spectacle should be understood.
Both Taiwanese commentaries offer the potential to reinterpret 
the ceremony in ways that could very well stand in opposition to what 
the organisers in Beijing had in mind. At first sight, it indeed seems 
that the Taiwanese reporters are setting their programmes up as 
counter-discourses. The example of the flag-raising ceremony is again 
instructive, since audiences in Taiwan received a very different take on 
this sequence from CCTV viewers. On the pan-blue station CTV, male 
sports commentator Mei Shengmin (梅圣旻) explains, ‘Alright, next the 
national flag will enter the stadium, and this little friend will sing the 
Ode to the Motherland’. The station then relays the first eight shots of the 
sequence (i.e. the first of three minutes), showing the girl as she sings her 
first verse and the 56 children as they carry the PRC’s flag, but then the 
station abruptly cuts to commercials and does not return to the events at 
the National Stadium in Beijing until the first arts performance begins. 
The flag-raising ceremony itself, as well as the PRC anthem, is omitted 
on CTV.
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FTV similarly cuts to commercials. In the footage that the station 
kindly made available to me, the female commentator announces, ‘So, 
later on we’ll broadcast all of the splendid scenes for you — first we’ll 
take a quick break, and then we’ll immediately come back’. Yet where the 
commercial break should be, the footage instead includes a rare glimpse 
into behind-the-scenes discussions at FTV that the viewers were not privy 
to. With the microphone still open, the male announcer speaks to one 
of his colleagues. Only his side of the conversation is audible, but it is 
possible to infer what the discussion was about:
That’s something we don’t need to talk about. Actually, we don’t 
need to talk; it’s fine to just move forward naturally. Good! Because 
when we cut to commercials, the musical performance continues. 
Because I think some of these parts we don’t need to narrate, it’s 




As the images keep running, the male announcer starts to whistle along 
with the PRC’s national anthem. The first actual intentional on-the-air 
statement is then the introduction of the subsequent segment, which 
starts with the female announcer welcoming the audience back after the 
commercial break. This intermission suggests that the FTV broadcast 
team approached the ceremony with a particular attitude: the idea was 
not to lecture viewers with an ideologically informed interpretation, but 
to let the images speak for themselves as much as possible. What is more, 
the fact that the commentator is whistling the PRC anthem suggests that 
the event struck him as rather casual. 
This already hints at a marked difference between the CTV and the 
FTV broadcasts, and I will discuss additional differences below, but first 
it is worth exploring a linguistic practice that sets the two Taiwanese 
telecasts apart from the mainland Chinese broadcast, and that is the use 
of pronouns. On all three TV channels, the word ‘we’ (women 我们) is one 
of the most frequently used words (used 37 times on CCTV, 44 times on 
CTV, and 42 times on FTV), rivalled only by the use of the words ‘China’ 
(Zhongguo 中国; CCTV: 71, CTV: 50, FTV: 41) and ‘Olympics’ (Aoyun 奥
运; CCTV: 32, CTV: 57, FTV: 12). The context in which the pronoun is 
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used, and how it is juxtaposed with a word like ‘China’, is important here. 
Whereas the mainland broadcaster CCTV repeatedly uses ‘we’ to refer 
to the Chinese nation (e.g. ‘tonight, we send out this radiantly glowing 
peace dove’ or ‘let us make a great effort together to keep our promise 
and give the world a green Olympics’), the Taiwanese stations use the 
pronoun ‘we’ alternatively to signify the broadcasting team (‘we saw this 
earlier at the previews’, ‘we now turn to the next scene’, and so on) or to 
include the broadcasters plus their viewers (‘we now see...’). The PRC and 
its audience are not included as part of this ‘we’.
The scene depicting the dream of outer space provides a good example 
of how the Taiwanese stations instead refer to the PRC, and how they each 
attempt to position themselves and their viewers vis-à-vis the mainland. 
This is what the female announcer at FTV says as the segment starts (my 
emphases):
Ok, coming up next is the Dream segment. What is called a dream 
here is, as everyone can see, about astronauts. Well, everyone 
knows about China’s accomplishment of sending the astronaut 
Yang Liwei into space, so astronauts are relatively important to 






Note that the speaker refers to the PRC as ‘China’ and ‘they’, while 
reserving the pronoun ‘we’ for herself and her Taiwanese viewers. ‘China’ 
is constructed in this comment as an actor distinct from the speaker — 
an impression further enhanced by the use of evidentiality (‘everyone 
knows’), relativism (‘what is called a dream here...’), and the phrase 
that astronauts are important ‘to them during these Olympics’. CTV 
commentator Jian Zhengguang (简政光) makes remarks that are in a 
similar vein (my emphases):
Now astronauts are appearing in the stadium. This represents the 
recent link between China and the origins of its so-called space 
science. It seems that the Chang’e-ben-yue satellite that they 
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launched into space also is related to this space-flight programme, 




Again, ‘China’ is framed as a distinct other in this narration. This practice 
resurfaces in the CTV commentary whenever the focus is on the PRC as 
a state, for instance when the commentators refer to Chinese cadres as 
‘leaders of the mainland country’ (大陆国家领导人); in contrast, the 
pan-green station FTV never uses the phrase ‘mainland’ with reference to 
China). In fact, compared to the FTV commentary, the CTV remarks are 
far more politically charged, for instance pointing out which Taiwanese 
politicians were attending the ceremony. The commentary on the pan-
blue station, in contrast to that on the pan-green competitor, in fact starts 
out as explicitly critical of the PRC. For example, the CTV commentators 
begin their broadcast by pointing out how the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics was marred by the uprisings in Tibet earlier that year, and how 
public opinion only gradually become more positive abroad as China 
suffered the devastating Sichuan earthquake in May 2008. The scale of 
the opening ceremony also offers the commentators the opportunity 
to introduce critical and at times derogatory side-notes. Recall the 
somewhat condescending remark quoted above about China’s ‘so-called 
space-science’, which calls into question how seriously the viewers should 
take this space programme. On another occasion, the anchor takes a stab 
at the population size on the mainland: 
The mainland with its population of 1.3 billion may not have much, 
but it has a lot of people. From the beginning the strategy was to 




In short, there is a marked difference in how the pan-green and the pan-
blue broadcasters each position themselves with relation to the PRC: FTV 
constructs a dynamic in which ‘China’ and ‘Taiwan’ are distinct units 
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with a relationship at eye-level. Indeed, as one FTV executive told me in 
an interview (Taipei, July 2009), it was crucial for the pan-green station 
to clearly distinguish Taiwan from China, for instance during specific 
tournaments. CTV, on the other hand, creates the impression of a shared 
Chinese heritage residing in two distinct states, and it implicitly frames 
the PRC as inferior to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.
7.5	 Generating	awe	among	Taiwan’s	media	gatekeepers
The result of these ruptures and incongruencies is that the comments 
on both FTV and CTV seemingly stand in contrast to CCTV’s narrative, 
which collapses party, state, and the audience into one unit (i.e. the 
nation) and injects a strong degree of pathos into its commentary. Does 
this then mean that the organisers in Beijing lost discursive control over 
the opening ceremony and its meanings as the spectacle was broadcast 
elsewhere? As it turns out, while the commentaries do in fact include 
moments of counter-discourse, the Taiwanese broadcasts as a whole 
largely reproduced the public relations message that the organisers of the 
opening ceremony built into the event. There were two ways in which this 
happened. 
Firstly, it is apparent from the commentary that the journalists at 
FTV and CTV were overwhelmed by the splendour they were witnessing. 
Despite the intentions of the FTV commentators to let the images speak 
for themselves, and to let the audiences interpret the event as they see 
fit, the two reporters in fact rarely missed an opportunity to voice their 
amazement at the opening ceremony. Similarly, the CTV crew quickly 
departed from initial critical overtones in their reporting and instead 
provided what is essentially a very dense fan commentary. In both cases, 
the speakers expressed spontaneous awe (apparent from outbursts 
such as ‘oh’ 噢 or ‘wah’ 哇), described the enthusiasm with which the 
audience in the stadium were applauding and cheering, explicitly lauded 
the ceremony and its director Zhang Yimou, and repeatedly referred 
to the performance as incredibly splendid (feichang jingcai 非常精彩) or 
excellent (bang 棒). They were effectively swept up in the entrainment that 
the ritual produced. 
CTV in particular commented in detail on the stage design and the 
mechanisms behind the performances that viewers themselves could not 
see, and this commentary was infused with a certain sense of admiration, 
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suggesting that viewers were witnessing an incredible achievement. 
Recall the somewhat derogatory CTV statement regarding the mass of 
performers ten minutes into the opening ceremony, and compare this to 
the following statements by the commentators an hour later:
He: We can see that these fast synchronous movements by the 2008 
performers in the stadium, as well as their formation changes, are 
really quite difficult to do. When he first spoke of the difficulties 
that the opening ceremony faced, Zhang Yimou stated that the 
biggest challenge was the entrance and exit of the performers. 
How to make thousands of people disappear in thirty seconds 
while bringing several thousand new performers onto the stage 
really gave him headaches. What is more, the entrances and exits 
have to look good on screen, so he had to think up different ways 
to do this.
Mei: At the end of the day, this is completely different from the film 
techniques and atmosphere that he has been working with in the 
past. The changes in a film scene do not happen in the open like 
on a stage. Yet what everyone now sees on stage is really perfectly 











Aside from the continuously increasing expressions of awe, there is 
a second factor that similarly results in the Taiwanese commentators 
reinforcing the official PRC discourse, and that is the sense of a 
shared cultural heritage. The segments that showcased pre-modern 
Chinese history in particular seemed to resonate with the Taiwanese 
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commentators, leading them to often enthusiastically offer up their 
knowledge of major Chinese inventions such as moveable type or the 
compass. A good example is the section on writing, with its strong focus 
on Confucian-style harmony that I have discussed in chapter 6.
The CTV commentators relay this sentiment when they quote various 
passages from the Confucian Analects and then state that ‘of course China 
is a country of etiquette’ and that the performance ‘appears to symbolise 
a continuous stream of culture, flowing through all ages and changes’. 
What is more, the commentary explicitly reminds the viewers that ‘we’ 
(in this case: the commentators and their audience) use the same Chinese 
character for harmony as the one presented in this segment. 
It is quite remarkable that none of the commentators place the 
references to harmony into perspective by mentioning that the CCP 
leadership adopted the phrase as a cornerstone of its propaganda to 
establish a ‘harmonious society’. Instead, the female FTV commentator 
provides a favourable interpretation, remarking how aptly the director 
uses the symbolism in the opening ceremony:
Well, the reason the character he is used is that Zhang Yimou wanted 
to stress that Chinese culture specifically states that harmony 
should reign supreme. Yeah, and successive generations of 
thinkers have repeatedly discussed this concept. This includes the 
Analects, which state: ‘practise the rules of propriety, let harmony 
reign supreme, and all within the four seas shall be brothers’. The 






The case of FTV is indeed instructive in this context. The commentators 
repeatedly reiterate, and even praise, the same ‘flat’ myths throughout 
the opening ceremony that Barmé (2009) has criticised, and that today 
inform so much of official PRC historiography. It is ironically the pan-
green TV station – a station associated with the DPP’s advocacy for 
Taiwanese autonomy – that relays uncritically the same discourse on 
Chinese history that the organisers of the ceremony assembled. In fact, 
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a comparison between the official media guide to the opening ceremony 
(BOCOG 2008a) and the FTV commentary suggests that the anchors 
may have drawn heavily from this guide, essentially reproducing the 
arguments from this manual. Examples include referring to the terracotta 
warriors as the ‘eighth wonder of the world’, reframing Columbus’ voyage 
to America as an outcome of the Chinese invention of the compass, or 
attributing the invention of the kite to the pre-modern philosopher Mo 
Di.
At other times the commentators go beyond the official press material 
and introduce their own interpretations of Chinese history and culture, 
effectively adding to the overall patriotic sentiment that the organisers of 
the opening ceremony injected into the performances. The following is 
the FTV explanation of the Great Wall of China, which was emulated and 
enacted by the performers of the movable typeset:
The Great Wall is one of humankind’s historical world wonders, 
and that includes that all astronauts have said that from the moon 
you can see Taiwan... not Taiwan, haha... the only man-made 
structure you can see from the moon is the Great Wall, so that is 
why Zhang Yimou mixed the Great Wall into the performance. This 
is the Great Wall that was built 2000 years ago, in 221 BC, when the 






While I hesitate to over-interpret the Freudian slip in this passage, the 
error is nevertheless interesting, since it suggests how central the island 
of Taiwan is to the worldview of the speaker. However, more important 
are the numerous simplifications and errors that characterise the 
statement. Contrary to popular belief, the Great Wall is not, in fact, 
visible from space, and it was built over an extended period of time, not in 
221 BC. I suspect that several factors have come together here, effectively 
prompting the commentators to make questionable statements while 
reinforcing the PRC’s official public relations message of a strong yet 
peaceful nation with an impressive history of cultural splendour. 
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Firstly, the commentators are specialists in sports rather than the 
history or culture of China. They seem to reproduce their common-sense 
knowledge of Chinese culture, probably derived from schoolbooks and 
popular culture, and this knowledge draws from historical narratives and 
cultural tropes that are pervasive not just on the mainland. Secondly, as 
one FTV programme director explained to me, the journalists were very 
careful not to offend the mainland authorities with critical comments, 
since they were worried about future press access. They consequently 
focused on sports whenever possible while self-censoring potential 
political comments. Thirdly, as two Taiwanese journalists told me, most 
reporters considered the Beijing Olympics to be a sports event with no 
political meaning. It is hardly surprising that the commentators would 
then not consider the press materials they were using to be expressions 
of vested political interests. This combination of unfamiliarity with the 
subject, the need to self-censor, and the unquestioned shared background 
knowledge together worked in favour of the mainland organisers: not 
only was the discourse of a strong yet harmonious China relayed to 
Taiwanese audiences via local TV stations, the discourse was reproduced 
by believable speakers in accessible and authentic language, lending the 
resulting message a credibility that the stilted CCTV broadcast would 
have been unlikely to achieve in Taiwan.
7.6	 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined how various actors outside mainland 
China assembled the semiotic resources that the networked spectacle 
of the Beijing Olympics made available to them, and how they used 
these resources to further their own projects. For the Chinese state and 
its collaborators, these activities were aimed at ‘branding’ the Chinese 
nation, and they frequently related to the ongoing debates within the PRC 
about how to promote what is often called soft power. This idea of soft 
power strongly informed the ideological backdrop of China’s networked 
spectacles and their public relations campaigns, but, as I have argued 
in this chapter, the concept itself has limited analytical value when 
explaining how such campaigns work. Instead, tracing the interaction 
rituals and actor-networks in which various actors construct meanings 
about the spectacle provides a much more fruitful avenue for assessing 
the power dynamics in transnational mass communication.
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In this particular case, several foreign actors were able to insert 
themselves into near-global media networks and programme their 
own values into the discourse, drawing on many of the same symbolic 
resources as the authorities in China. Blending recognisable elements 
of the official discourse, such actors created statements that at times 
departed significantly from the official vision of what spectacles like 
the Beijing Olympics should be about, either commodifying nativist or 
cosmopolitan narratives for financial gain or creating cultural products 
that explicitly criticised the Chinese authorities.
Yet, as much as the emergent discourses clashed, there were also 
instances where the activities of organisers translated into positive 
messages for foreign audiences that aligned with official Chinese 
interests. This was true for certain commercial activities, such as the 
Coca Cola commercial that showed whimsical, animated birds flocking 
to the Bird’s Nest stadium — a cosmopolitan feel-good message that 
rivalled any that the authorities put on display, and that was to some 
extent enabled by, and readily usable in, the cultural governance approach 
that the organisers had adopted. It was also the case that many of the 
foreign broadcasts of the event relayed the overall sentiments that the 
organisers had programmed into it, and this was visible on Taiwanese 
TV, where local gatekeepers were swept away by the impressive spectacle, 
at least momentarily. The way in which well-planned mass events are 
able to create ‘entrainment’ extends to the second-order audiences of 
journalists and media workers, and in cases where the event organisers 
are able successfully to fuse the various components of their discourse 
with the experiences of their audience, the resulting ‘flow’ can indeed be 
convincing. 
This is not to say that the authorities were successful in their soft-power 
campaigns. It remains questionable whether the momentary effects of 
an attractive cultural product or convincing ritual interaction translate 
into sustainable sentiments that attach to such complicated categories 
as nation-states, let alone their policies. In fact, evidence from the US 
suggests that many audiences there experienced heightened concerns 
about China in the wake of the Beijing Olympics, much like the South 
Park character Cartman in the scene that opened this chapter. Despite 
overwhelmingly positive ‘feel-good’ reporting on NBC, it appears that 
word-of-mouth and online discussions about cheating Chinese athletes 
alongside a growing realisation of China’s success on the world stage 
frightened many viewers, leading Gries and his colleagues to conclude 
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that ‘Chinese organizers may have inadvertently contributed to greater 
American anxiety and wariness towards China’ (2010: 230). Such audience 
reactions notwithstanding, the example of the Beijing Olympics shows 
how official actors create the vocabulary and grammar of a specific 
spectacle, how these components then ‘travel’ through communication 
networks to shape political discourses abroad, and how carefully managed 
nodes in these networks can allow the actors to convince others to relay 
their values through foreign broadcast systems, even as the results may 
not always be what they intended.

8  Fractured Discourses, 
Idiosyncratic Interactions
It is another hot summer day at the Shanghai Expo, with temperatures 
surpassing 40 degrees Celsius in the shade. The waiting times outside 
most pavilions are so long that it takes several hours before visitors 
can enter the exhibits. I am looking at the impressive line outside the 
Australian pavilion, one of the most popular attractions. Waiting times 
are close to five hours. And yet ever more people are joining the queue. 
I am meeting with one of the organisers of the pavilion to discuss 
how the planning for such an exhibition space worked, but also what 
messages the Australian pavilion meant to communicate to audiences. 
‘The message is never delivered by the building. Expos tend to get carried 
away with the architecture’, he tells me as I ask him about the many 
impressive pavilion designs at the world fair. What, then, did his design 
team focus on? ‘Beaches!’ he laughs. ‘And furry animals. If there isn’t a 
furry animal in the room, you’re doing it wrong. If visitors don’t see those 
things, they think they’re in the Austrian pavilion’. Esoteric messages 
and didactic displays do not work, he believes. ‘It’s a bulk audience of 
multiple millions. You need icons and a base message’. Visitors may be 
pushing a pushchair through the exhibition, he points out, distracted by 
a crying child and an aggravated spouse. Maybe they had an evening of 
bad food, and then they had to stand in line in the heat. ‘These things 
influence how the message is received as well’.
The Australian pavilion’s core exhibit is straightforward: three 
children explain to visitors what kind of city they want to live in, and 
their stories touch on various themes associated with Australia. ‘We’re 
trying to build a connection between the straightforward elements and 
subtler messages’. One goal, my interviewee tells me, was to address 
the misconception that the laid-back beach life in Australia is a sign of 
laziness. ‘People see the beach but don’t realise at what price this life-style 
comes. The Chinese perception seems to be “it’s lucky that it’s like that”. 
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Instead, we want visitors to ask what had to happen to make Australia 
beautiful and relaxed’. 
We shift our talk to the popularity of the Australian pavilion. Every 15 
minutes, 1,000 visitors entered the exhibits. At the end of each day, 50,000 
people had passed through the building. I ask why he thinks people get 
in line in this heat, queueing for several hours. ‘I have no idea why people 
get in line’, he says, somewhat nonplussed. ‘Nothing is this good’.
This anecdote from the Australian pavilion shows how even pavilion 
organisers remained sceptical of their abilities to shape the views of 
audiences at a world fair, and it suggests that the interactions at such a 
networked spectacle may not easily collapse into readily digestible didactic 
messages. It is informed by pragmatic observations about what visitors at 
world fairs do, and the Shanghai Expo certainly contained its fair share of 
audience behaviour that raises questions about the effectiveness of such 
spectacles to communicate clear messages to preoccupied or stressed 
visitors (see Figure 8.1). 
Figure 8.1: Expo Tourists. Images © F. Schneider 2010.
Such an assessment stands in stark contrast to the way the Chinese 
state treated such events. In the previous chapters, I examined how 
the authorities calibrated the networked spectacles to encourage 
participants to create discourses and adopt didactic delivery strategies 
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that would relay the official vision for China’s role in the world at the start 
of the 21st century. While this cultural governance allowed for substantial 
creativity, often leading to diverse and at times conflicting meanings, it 
may nevertheless seem as though the overarching narrative remained 
firmly in place, and that it encouraged a wide range of official and non-
official actors to adopt the symbols and codes that the authorities had 
programmed into the events. In some instances, and as I discussed in the 
previous chapter, the official discourse even aligned with the assumptions 
of foreign actors in transnational communication networks, travelling to 
contexts outside the mainland that had not been governed by the same 
institutional rationales as Chinese media ecologies.
Despite such findings, there are good reasons nevertheless to remain 
sceptical of the idea that the official discourses of China’s networked 
spectacles became ‘hegemonic’. This chapter turns to the many ways in 
which carefully planned official discourses fracture, and how they become 
warped through idiosyncratic interactions. I first take another look at 
discussions that portray modern spectacles as technologies of mass 
persuasion, and in particular at arguments that see them as totalitarian 
simulations that prevent audiences from distinguishing between reality 
and ideology. Following these conceptual debates, I turn to numerous 
examples at the Shanghai Expo that illustrate how foreign pavilion 
organisers challenged what they perceived to be the dominant discourse 
at that event. Much like the activists’ strategies I explored in the previous 
chapter, such activities were often designed in explicit opposition to 
the efforts of the authorities. Nevertheless, the world fair provided a 
somewhat different setting from the international sports event of the 
Olympics, and at Shanghai’s Expo site the various actors had to engage 
in their communicative activities side by side, each contributing to and at 
times subverting the meanings that emerged there. 
Next, I turn to subtler fractures in the expo discourses, looking 
at the themed pavilions that the authorities commissioned, which 
provided diverse assessments of what ‘modernity’ might mean. These 
assessments frequently clashed with the official narratives of a beneficial 
and sustainable Chinese hypermodernity that I discussed in chapter 6. 
The discursive processes at these themed pavilions already hint at the 
way that domestic Chinese actors shift official discourses from within the 
official event networks, but one could argue that these networks are so 
closely linked to complex transnational meaning-making networks that 
they are fairly likely to produce divergent discourses. After all, many of 
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these pavilions were joint ventures between domestic and foreign design 
studios. However, attempts to reprogramme official Chinese discourses 
are not limited to such transnational contexts. Similar processes are also 
in evidence in purely domestic networks, for instance during the 60th 
anniversary of the PRC. To illustrate this, the chapter concludes with 
an analysis of how a major Chinese news organisation intervened in 
nationalist discourses on the day of that specific networked spectacle, 
and how it adopted the official semiotic parameters in order to shift the 
discourse in directions that directly contradicted what the authorities 
had envisaged for that event.
8.1	 The	hypermodern	spectacle:	a	simulacrum?
As I discussed in the introduction and chapter 2 of this book, a common 
perception of mass events is that they produce stable, hegemonic 
discourses, and that the spectacular delivery of these discourses is 
capable of seducing or overpowering participants with their ideologies. 
I have mostly eschewed terms like ‘hegemonic’ or ‘dominant’ in my own 
analysis to avoid suggesting that official discourses become all-powerful 
by virtue of being official. However, considering how actors like Chinese 
state officials unapologetically try to use networked spectacles to ‘guide 
public opinion’, not to mention the degree of effort and resources 
expended to establish the discourses these actors consider favourable 
for their own developmental and soft-power goals, it is understandable 
that critics worry about the power of these discourses. After all, mass 
events can be occasions for manipulation, and the authorities have made 
skilled use of this modern genre of mass communication to further their 
interests. 
This worry is compounded by the interactive dimension of many mass 
events, particularly of exhibitions like world fairs, where visitors enter 
into elaborate multi-media arrangements, designed to convince them 
of certain messages (see also my earlier discussion in Schneider 2013a). 
Mitchell (1989), for instance, has made the argument that the Orientalist 
representations at the Paris World Fair of 1889 were a ‘labyrinth without 
exit’ that created perceptions of the ‘world-as-exhibition’. In more 
recent iterations of the world-fair genre, exhibits have become ever more 
interactive, and it is telling that a watershed moment in this development 
was in fact called Labyrinthe, a theme pavilion at the 1967 Montreal Expo 
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that experimented with interactive multi-screen installations to provide 
visitors with an immersive experience (Expo 67 in Montreal n/d). 
Today, interactive installations often make use of advanced digital 
technologies and game mechanisms to entice visitors, and the perceived 
intrusiveness of these technologies has ensured that the metaphor 
of inescapable, labyrinthine mediated spaces remains popular. For 
instance, Callahan (2012) and Nordin (2012b) both cite their experiences 
at the Shanghai Expo’s Siemens Pavilion as an example of discourses that 
threaten to trap and co-opt the participants. At the entrance, the pavilion 
automatically took a picture of each visitor, which was then turned into 
a digital avatar that would sing the pavilion theme song together with 
the avatars of other visitors. Callahan (2012: 256) comments that through 
such mechanisms ‘visitors are recruited into the cosmopolitan message 
of material prosperity’. Nordin (2012b: 114) goes further, arguing that this 
use (and arguably abuse) of personal images in fact constitutes a violation 
of the self. In this view, the expo with its interactive technologies is an 
example of how ‘our bodies are more explicitly hijacked by screening, 
made to do things potentially against our will (and indeed through or in 
advance thereof ), proliferarted, taken apart’. She continues (ibid.: 115):
Through these technologies of the world/fair, not only our concepts 
of spatiality and temporality but also our notions of subject and 
object are displaced. ... We are copies of copies without original, 
simulacral avatars in virtual hyperreality.
To Nordin this then suggests that the Shanghai Expo functions as 
a simulation of the world that is so thoroughly overwhelming that 
it replaces the real with a perfect facsimile of itself. This is what the 
French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has referred to as the simulacrum. 
To Baudrillard (1983: 4) modernity is characterised by an endless cycle 
of self-referentiality, a system ‘substituting the sign of the real for the 
real itself ’. The only reality that subjects still have access to, in such a 
simulated world, consists of the ubiquitous signs that circulate through 
communication networks. Baudrillard’s ‘perfect model of all the 
entangled orders of simulation’ is the Disneyland theme park (ibid.: 
23), which seems to have been at least partially inspired by world fairs 
(ExpoMuseum n/d). Baudrillard writes (1983: 25):
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Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the ‘real’ country, all 
of ‘real’ America, which is Disneyland. ... Disneyland is presented 
as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when 
in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no 
longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is 
no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), 
but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of 
saving the reality principle.
For Baudrillard, Disneyland illustrates how the age of simulation works. 
It marks the end of all meaning, the end of ‘the society of the spectacle’ 
that Debord criticised, ‘the end of perspective and panoptic space’ that 
Foucault examined, and ‘the end of all dialectic’ (ibid.: 54 & 70). In this 
view, theme parks like Disneyland are so absurdly spectacular that they 
force visitors to abandon any critical view of the world outside the event 
site. As the simulacrum takes over, ‘power is no longer present except to 
conceal that there is none’ (ibid.: 46). 
This is a provocative way of envisaging the workings of complex, 
technologically advanced networks of information and communication. 
Baudrillard famously took his criticism to the extreme when he asked 
whether the Gulf War in 1991 had actually happened. ‘It is not war taking 
place over there’, he argued, since the only access that audiences in the 
coalition countries had to this event were the videogame-like images of 
guided missile strikes that were circulated through global broadcasting 
networks; instead, the event was ‘a masquerade of information’ that 
served as ‘the disfiguration of the world’, Baudrillard argued (1995: 40). 
Two decades later, Baudrillard’s provocations seem prescient, especially 
as digital media networks enable actors to divorce their politics almost 
entirely from any concern about facts. The actions of Donald Trump in the 
US or the Brexit proponents in the UK are viewed by many as symptoms 
of a drift towards ‘post truth’ (e.g. Ball 2017 and Levitin 2017; see also the 
discussion in Madison & DeJarnette 2018).
 While I sympathise with critics of hypermediated politics, I 
nevertheless remain unconvinced that Baudrillard’s idea of the 
simulacrum is the right heuristic device for understanding networked 
spectacles. One issue is conceptual: as Eagleton (1991/2007: 166) has 
pointed out, Baudrillard’s rejection of ideology and power deletes the 
agents from the processes of simulation. Just because it is increasingly 
difficult in complex communication networks to trace who has power 
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does not mean that power has disappeared altogether. Another 
issue is analytical: Baudrillardian arguments about the totality of the 
simulation may be empirically inaccurate. They potentially ignore the 
many ruptures that mark the discourses of networked spectacles, and 
they risk misrepresenting how participants interact with each other 
and the cultural objects of those spectacles. In short, Baudrillard’s 
critique of the simulacrum is certainly an intriguing intervention into 
hypermodern media ecologies, but it gets agency wrong, obscuring who 
tries to manipulate whom, and robbing those who are potentially subject 
to such manipulations of their ability to make up their own minds. In 
what follows, I show how actors at China’s networked spectacles indeed 
retain their agency, and how they intervene in communication processes 
to challenge the seemingly dominant ideologies that characterise these 
events.
8.2	 Subversive	expo	pavilions
An important site of discursive intervention was the foreign national 
pavilions at the Shanghai Expo. Almost 200 nation-states had hired 
architects and designers to brand their own nations through the complex 
processes I discussed in chapter 3, and the resulting communicative 
practices often challenged the assumptions that informed the expo’s 
overarching message of global modernity as well as the specific 
statements that Chinese official pavilions and exhibits created about 
contemporary China. This frequently happened in ambiguous ways. 
Take the example of the Dutch national pavilion ‘Happy Street’, which on 
the one hand presented the recognisable narrative of liberal modernity 
governed by nation-states. The technologies that the site showcased – 
water purification, deep-sea salvage, carbon-neutral construction – were 
conceptualised as progressive, and, importantly, as Dutch. On the other 
hand, the design team also understood their work as a critique of urban 
development practices. The structural designer Rijk Blok (2010) explained 
this normative ambition as follows: 
A good street should be a street full of life where people can meet, 
live, work, eat, play and shop. ... the solution should not be sought 
in making more gated communities with only apartments, where 
people only sleep at night, or planning more industrial areas where 
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people only work during the daytime, or large shopping malls, 
that will only be empty and unsafe at night. On the contrary, a 
good street should combine all these functions and offer a variety 
of buildings and activities thus ensuring a better quality of life: 
‘Better City, Better Life’.
The pavilion itself then represented the urban street as a twisted number 
eight (a lucky number in China), looping through the air like a rollercoaster, 
and clustered with haphazardly juxtaposed and often highly stylised 
buildings. The entire installation was a madhouse of postmodern design 
choices that escaped any single interpretation. Architect John Körmeling 
later won the Dutch Design Award, not just for the pavilion’s architectural 
style, but, as the jury put it, also for ‘proving that the Dutch have a sense 
of humour after all’ (‘het bewijst bovendien dat de Nederlanders toch 
gevoel voor humor hebben’; Architectenweb 2010).
An even stronger example of a pavilion that was designed explicitly as 
a discursive intervention was the Spanish exhibit. The theme ‘from the 
city of our ancestors to the city of our children’ allowed the designers to 
deconstruct the usual linear narratives of modernity that were in evidence 
at other pavilions by providing provocative reimaginations of what 
Spanish pre-modernity, modernity, and future might look like. Visitors 
were first guided through a violent, primordial world of meteor showers 
and storms, from which they were ejected into a fragmented postmodern 
present, suggestive of a newborn child ejected from the womb into 
the harsh light of the world. This interpretation was strengthened 
by a disturbing centrepiece of the pavilion, a large animatronic baby 
that confronted visitors with the deepest depth of the uncanny valley. 
Other controversial elements included representations of the Madrid 
bombings and animated short videos that promoted a pan-Hispanic 
transnationalism, arguably in direct opposition to Anglo-American 
globalisation (the videos were captioned solely in Spanish and Chinese).
As a pavilion organiser at the Spanish exhibition told me in an 
interview, the designs were explicitly intended to stimulate critical 
thinking. He explained to me that the team decided early on that it wanted 
‘to present ideas, not propaganda’ through ‘an emotional rather than 
intellectual approach’. In direct opposition to what the team perceived 
as heavy-handed propaganda on the part of the Chinese organisers, they 
left the responsibilities for the different installation designs to Spanish 
artists, allowing them to create their own visions on the theme, without 
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intervention from the Spanish authorities; an approach that, as the 
interviewee told me, caused much controversy in Spain. 
A particularly revealing example of how the Spanish team tried to 
reprogramme what they perceived to be dominant themes in Chinese 
discourse was the design of the pavilion uniforms. In the run-up to the 
event, the organisers had been disturbed by the way in which Chinese 
society deployed uniforms and insignia, a practice that reminded them 
of Spain’s fascist past. In response, the pavilion organisers decided that 
the uniforms at their site needed to embody a non-hierarchical approach 
to organisation, and they employed the Spanish fashion company Zara to 
create outfits that would defy Chinese expectations. 
It is not my intention here to judge these didactics or to assess how 
successful they may have been at communicating an alternative vision of 
the world to Chinese audiences. My point is that many participants in 
the expo’s organisation decided to generate meanings that they hoped 
would challenge visitors and provide alternative narratives to those on 
display elsewhere at the site. The Spanish efforts were arguably grounded 
in an enlightenment understanding of art and culture. Other designers 
were not as explicitly confrontational in their design choices. The Japan 
Pavilion, for example, picked up on the harmony discourse within China 
and related it to Japanese harmony discourses that had accompanied 
past Japanese expo efforts, for instance in Osaka (1970) and Aichi (2005; 
see Chiba 2010 for an official position). The pavilion’s theme was ‘WA 
– Harmony of the Hearts, Harmony of the Skills’, with ‘wa’ being the 
Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese character he (和). 
This commonality then allowed the Japan Pavilion organisers to 
build a public diplomacy strategy that was aimed at promoting harmony 
between the Chinese and Japanese people – not an easy task in China, 
where memories of the Sino-Japanese War and the actions of revisionist, 
nationalist Japanese politicians frequently cause strong resentments. 
To achieve their goal, the exhibition designer chose a communication 
approach that stood in stark opposition to the one that the China 
Pavilion designers chose on the other side of the expo’s Asia zone: the 
Japan Pavilion would tell stories of how ‘connections between people’ 
could lead to a ‘harmony of the hearts’ (Chiba 2010). The metaphor for 
a harmonious society was a living and changing organism, represented 
by the building’s architecture, which was meant to resemble a large 
silk cocoon that changed the hues of its purple exterior depending on 
the natural light outside. Presenting the building as ‘organic’ provides 
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a decidedly different discursive framework from the one that Chinese 
authorities used to make sense of harmonious design, and I return to this 
contrast below. 
Inside the Japan Pavilion, the idea of harmony was explicitly framed 
in transnational terms: the core installation was a multi-media theatre 
and film performance that told the story of the Japanese crested ibis, an 
endangered crane species. The bird became a symbol of Sino-Japanese 
collaboration: the efforts to reintroduce the ibis to Japan involved Chinese 
environmentalists and scientists, and it relied on genetically similar 
birds from the mainland for breeding purposes. Later, the resulting 
Japanese breeds would in turn be introduced into China, as part of local 
environmental initiatives. In this way, the ibis serves as a powerful analogy 
between the concrete, personal interactions of environmentalists and the 
relationship between the Japanese and Chinese people more broadly, and 
it is noteworthy that this discourse downplays the involvement of nation-
state actors. Instead, it emphasises cultural flows that transcend national 
borders, whether it is the exchange of birds or of ideas. As one official 
argued when describing the silkworm shape of the pavilion (quoted in 
Chiba 2010):
the process of spinning silk thread from silkworms was imported 
from China, thereby symbolising ties between Japan and China. ... 
the foundation of culture in Japan originated from China. Those 
foundations then developed into something uniquely Japanese, 
underpinned by harmony between nature and humankind and 
connections between people.
While statements such as these betray a certain nativist conception of 
culture (which is here ultimately still presented as ‘uniquely Japanese’), 
they also facilitate cosmopolitan visions of Sino-Japanese harmony 
and allow the exhibition designers to infuse popular discourses about 
harmony in China with rationales that do not fit the official PRC position 
on the concept.
As a final example of such programming activities, consider the case of 
the USA Pavilion, which I have also examined elsewhere (Schneider 2014b: 
109-111; see also Wallis & Balsamo 2016: 40-41 for another discussion). 
While the pavilion featured unabashedly neoliberal capitalist narratives, 
not to mention strong nationalist undercurrents, it created a very 
different discourse about nations and modernity from Chinese exhibits at 
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the expo, even as it employed the kind of public-diplomacy strategies that 
American scholars and politicians had promoted as meaningful forms 
of international persuasion, and that had also informed the soft-power 
quest at Chinese expo pavilions (see also chapter 7). However, in contrast 
to China’s national pavilion and its exhibition, the US communication 
approach addressed Chinese audiences directly, in a casual and self-
deprecating manner. It suggested to Chinese visitors that authentic 
Americans from all walks of life respected, and were interested in, China 
and its people. 
This sense of authenticity was cleverly designed, most notably in the 
arrival hall of the pavilion, where visitors were shown short impressions 
from the US as they waited to enter the first of the pavilion’s two film 
theatres. The short scenes showed Americans trying to say a simple 
greeting in Chinese, equivalent to ‘hello, welcome to the US Pavilion’ 
(你好，欢迎光临美国馆). The diverse set of people stumbled through 
various comical mishaps, accompanied by light-hearted music, until 
they finally managed to get the difficult pronunciation right. This short 
film then set the tone for the rest of the pavilion: whenever US officials 
appeared in the subsequent feature film, they directly addressed the 
audience in Chinese before explaining in seemingly casual yet rhetorically 
refined ways what the pavilion stood for. The first film at the pavilion 
started with Hillary Clinton, then the Secretary of State for the Obama 
administration, addressing her audience like this:
Ni hao! I’m Hillary Clinton, and it is my great pleasure to welcome 
you on behalf of the American people to the USA Pavilion at Expo 
2010. As you explore the pavilion, you will see core American values 
in action: diversity, innovation, and optimism. 
The quotation already illustrates how the pavilion presents the US as a 
community of shared values, an approach to nation-branding that differs 
markedly from official Chinese attempts to construct the PRC’s national 
image primarily by referring to a shared history and fate. The rest of the 
US Pavilion’s first feature film expands on this theme, demonstrating the 
‘core American values’ by showcasing ethnically diverse boys and girls 
who explain their dreams of a green future. These whimsical statements 
about fantastic technologies are juxtaposed with images of real-world 
technologies that promise to fulfil these science-fictional dreams (wind 
energy, solar energy, projects to create affordable housing). They are 
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further contextualised by talking-head commentaries from the pavilion’s 
various sponsors (representatives of Chevron, Habitat for Humanity, 
PepsiCo, and so on), who demonstrate that the youthful optimism of 
these children extends to American captains of industry and leaders of 
civil society. The message is up-beat, suggesting that America represents 
endless possibilities and is driven by entrepreneurial teamwork and a 
deep-seated appreciation of pluralism. In the film, these impressions 
are finally brought together by former US president Barack Obama in a 
concluding speech:
Ni hao! Congratulations to the people of China and Shanghai for 
hosting this remarkable world expo, which speaks to China’s rise 
as a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community 
of nations; a nation that draws on the strength and creativity of 
its people. Welcome to the USA Pavilion, where we are proud 
to showcase the spirit that has always defined us as Americans; 
a nation of immigrants from all corners of the world, working 
together with a sense of community and common purpose to 
overcome adversity, and a sense of possibility and optimism that 
the future is what we make it, that we can build a better life for 
our children. Of course, these are not simply American qualities, 
as I said when I visited Shanghai last year. We are bound by our 
common humanity, and our shared curiosity. This includes the 
hopes we share with the people of China, and the people around 
the world, to work together to realise a healthy, sustainable and 
prosperous future. Thank you for visiting us today, and on behalf 
of the American people, we look forward to being your partner, 
and hopefully someday welcoming you and your families to the 
United States of America. 
I have quoted this passage here in full because it contains two crucial 
discursive moves that generally characterised the communication strategy 
of the USA Pavilion. The first was to present liberal individualist values as 
foundational to US national identity, and the second was to then subtly try 
to naturalise liberalism as universally applicable. In the Obama speech, 
this is apparent from the strong, liberal-democratic understanding of 
‘community’, which is then explicitly sold as self-evidently universal.
The exhibition followed this pattern throughout. It was imbued with 
a strong liberal discourse, which implied that the problems of the planet 
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could be solved by individuals through creative optimism. The second 
feature film, called The Garden, represented this argument in the form of 
a heart-warming story of a community that comes together to improve 
the environment. The communication approach could hardly have 
been more different from the one that informed the bombastic feature 
films at the China Pavilion: in The Garden, a young girl tries to create a 
community garden in the backyard of her bleak apartment block. To 
this end, she elicits the aid of her neighbours, who are each comically 
different individuals with their own strengths: a hulking bodybuilder, an 
old immigrant, a black hardware store owner, a group of street kids, and 
a Chinese lady. After a series of setbacks, the members of this community 
realise that they can overcome adversity by each contributing their diverse 
personal strengths to the project and working together. Close-up camera 
angles, a confined mise-en-scène, and a folksy acoustic guitar song all 
create a sense of intimacy.
The strong liberal messages were then packaged in ways that were 
meant to connect specifically with Chinese audiences at a personal level. 
In numerous cases, the feature films and the commercial exhibits in 
the final hall of the pavilion featured Americans of Chinese ancestry or 
presented the stories of successful Chinese immigrants to the US. One 
commercial display, for instance, cleverly presented the ‘old hundred 
names’ (laobaixing 老百姓), the common Chinese surnames that in 
China also serve as a metaphor for ‘common people’. Zooming in on 
individual characters, the video installation would then show famous 
American citizens who shared that specific last name. In another case, 
commercial advertising featured a Chinese woman using an oversized 
brush to paint calligraphy, emulating a scene from the Beijing Olympics 
opening ceremony. In this way, state and commercial actors in the US 
tried to use their access to the communicative network of the world 
fair to programme the discourse of that spectacle with liberalist values, 
using Chinese cultural tropes to anchor their ideology within existing 
discourses in the PRC.
8.3	 Modernity	revisited
It was not just foreign national pavilions that creatively reworked the 
discourses of the world fair. Particularly intriguing sites of semiotic 
assemblage were the official theme pavilions (see also my earlier analysis 
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in Schneider 2013a: 7-12). These five pavilions were examples of the 
kind of cultural governance outcomes I discussed in chapter 3: they had 
been commissioned and approved by the Chinese state, but they had 
not been designed by the Chinese propaganda department. Instead, the 
authorities relied on a wide range of domestic and foreign actors to put 
together these core exhibitions, often collaboratively, and for the largest 
part these actors indeed retained creative control over their projects. 
This is not to say that the five pavilions were divorced from official 
propaganda narratives. In fact, two of the five pavilions were organised 
by official actors, and they indeed closely followed the scripts of China 
as a hypermodern, harmonious civilisation, effectively connecting with 
the narratives of other official exhibits like those in the China Pavilion. 
An example of this was the Pavilion of Footprints (Chengshi zuji guan 城市
足迹馆), which had been created by the Shanghai Museum ‘to explore 
the footprints left in urban history to bring out the wisdom of human 
civilization’, as the official guidebook to the theme pavilions puts it (Xu 
2010: 76). It contained cultural artefacts from around the world that 
illustrated how cities evolved throughout history, giving it an arguably 
transnational dimension, but overall the narrative of the exhibition 
was firmly rooted in a dichotomy between ‘East’ and ‘West’, with every 
achievement outside China juxtaposed with a domestic example. Local 
urban-planning precedents were envisaged as part of a linear national 
narrative, as elements in ‘a 5000-year history of wonders and shocks’, 
as one exhibit was titled. The pavilion also reproduced the ‘harmonious 
society’ understanding that the Hu-Wen administration preferred, with 
one exhibition space featuring a large character for ‘harmony’ that then 
became contextualised by the statement that ‘society needs order and 
government’ to flourish.
Another example of a themed pavilion that reproduced the official 
Chinese discourse was the Pavilion of City Being (Chengshi shengming guan 
城市生命馆), a joint venture between the China Central Academy of 
Fine Arts and the London-based design consultancy Land Design Studio 
that mostly told a straightforward story of modernity and progress. 
Visitors were guided through large halls that featured, for instance, a 
stylised railway station, an underground sewage system, and the physical 
infrastructure of an electrical system. They were then shown five short 
films in a 360 degree cinema, each introducing a particular city plaza and 
the unique ‘spirit’ (jingshen 精神) that infuses that space: the passion of 
the Tango in Buenos Aires’ May Plaza, the energy of street musicians in 
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Nairobi’s Freedom Plaza, the bustle of Bombay’s Railway Square, and 
the elegance of Edmonton’s City Square. The Chinese contribution was 
Wenchuan Square in the city of Hanwang, which witnesses the tear-jerking 
story of a young boy searching the rubble of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake 
for his dead father’s chess board (Figure 8.2). The film was meant to 
encapsulate the ‘enlightened, tough, and self-reliant’ character of this 
earthquake-stricken Chinese city (豁达坚韧与自强不息; translation in 
the original film; see also Xu 2010: 51).
Figure 8.2: Feature Film at the City Being Pavilion – A Boy Commemorates his Father, Who Died at 14:28 
during the Sichuan Earthquake. Image © F. Schneider 2010. 
While these exhibits generally promoted the nationalist and modernist 
discourses that informed official statements across China’s networked 
spectacles, they were not without ruptures. The portrayals of pipes 
and cables in the Pavilion of City Being situated these displays of 
modern urbanism in a somewhat different context from the exhibits 
about urban systems in the China Pavilion that I discussed in chapter 
6. Instead of adopting a mechanistic understanding of such systems, 
the designers of the City Being Pavilion used the metaphor of a living 
organism to portray the city. The exhibit was called ‘Circulation System: 
Experiencing the Metabolism of the City’ (循环管道： 经历城市代谢, 
translation in the original); as the guidebook explains, it was meant 
to ‘make people better understand the complexity and vulnerability of 
the city as an organic living being and the relation between its different 
components’ (the Chinese text is phrased slightly differently, but to the 
same effect: 人民在行进中，既经历通道，也能得到城市生命系统
有机运行且脆弱关联的信息，这些都值得人们对城市生命健康展
开思考; Xu 2010: 46-47). This discourse still lends itself to statements 
about the progressive power of modernity and its technologies, but it 
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also complicates such statements by tapping into discourses of organic 
organisation, which imply a wholly different axiom for understanding 
modernity from the one suggested by mechanistic discourses. As one 
scholar of organisations has put it, ‘mechanistic organizations seek to 
maximize efficiency and standardization’ whereas ‘organic organization 
seeks to maximize satisfaction and development’ (Lunenburg 2012: 
6). It is an open question whether the curators of these exhibits were 
trying to make such a paradigmatic statement about mechanistic versus 
organic urban organisation (see Hage 1965: 305), not to mention whether 
visitors would have appreciated such a statement and its implications. 
However, it is intriguing that a core pavilion designed at least in part by 
official actors would depart from Taylorist and Fordist understandings 
of organisation on display elsewhere and opt instead to creatively open 
up discourses about harmony and scientific development that moved in 
different directions. 
Other theme pavilions departed even more markedly from official 
discursive frameworks, at times providing spaces for alternative 
imaginations about modernity that could be interpreted as the types 
of ‘utopian enclaves’ that Jameson (2007: 15-16) has discussed: spaces 
‘within which Utopian fantasy can operate’ and in which participants in 
the interactions might adopt ‘a kind of mental space in which the whole 
system can be imagined as radically different’ (Jameson 2007: 15-16). 
The Urban Planet Pavilion (Chengshi diqiu guan 城市地球馆), for instance, 
envisaged the future of urbanism in ways that contrasted markedly with 
the hypermodern skylines amid green jungles that many official Chinese 
pavilions presented. The German designers Triad Berlin whom the 
authorities had commissioned to create this environmental showcase 
opted for a dystopian approach that featured imagery of urban sprawl, 
scorched earth, and polluted seas (see Triad 2010 for impressions). To 
present its critique of how urbanisation depletes resources and harms 
the environment, the designers chose to adopt the harmony discourse 
that the authorities had flagged in their own communication practices, 
embedding their narrative in references to ‘ancient Chinese philosophy’, 
specifically the harmony between the traditional five elements of metal, 
wood, water, fire, and earth. The guidebook explains in English and 
Chinese (Xu 2010: 64-65):
They [the five elements] respectively interpret what has happened 
to mineral resources, natural environment, water resources, 
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energy and waste treatment. Overpowering images show urban 
development undermines people’s living environment, and sound 





This message about the danger that unchecked urbanism poses to 
‘harmony’ was juxtaposed with images of children from around the 
world, along with bilingual information about their likes and dislikes, 
their hopes and dreams. Each of the exhibits concludes with the child’s 
answer to the question ‘what would be different in the city of your dreams’. 
Visitors thus learn that five-year-old Bastet from Cairo would like his city 
to smell better, that four-year-old Emil from Berlin would like there to 
be more space for animals, that five-year-old Gabriela from Mexico City 
would like her dream city to be filled with trees, and that twelve-year-old 
Xu Junhao from Shanghai would like there to be no cars but only forest 
– hardly an endorsement of ‘China’s love affair with the car’ (Watts 2011) 
and its impact on urban environments (Zheng 2017). 
Granted, the Urban Planet Pavilion also engaged in a fair bit of capitalist 
solutionism, for instance presenting a ‘Road to Solutions’ that consisted 
of low-carbon construction techniques and green energy technologies 
often designed by (German) multinational corporations. However, the 
pavilion rejected the interpretation that capitalist modernity would 
simply fix itself, as exhibits in the nearby China Pavilion suggested. The 
concluding showpiece of the exhibition was a film titled The Only Planet 
We Have, which aimed to illustrate ‘how mankind [sic] existed in balance 
with the earth for a very long time, and how this relationship ended up 
in its present fundamental crisis’ (Triad 2010). The film’s iconography 
arguably constructed a romanticised vision of nature that contrasted with 
scathingly critical images of industrialisation, but whatever one might 
think of the exhibit’s ideology and didactics, it did not jell with official 
discourses in China where the problems of economic development can 
be solved with more economic development.
The same could be said for the way that another pavilion reimagined 
global modernity: the somewhat awkwardly named ‘Urbanian Pavilion’ 
(Chengshiren guan 城市人馆). The authorities had employed the Dutch 
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exhibition architects Kossmann.dejon to design the exhibition, and 
the team opted for an up-close and personal answer to their guiding 
question ‘what is the quality of life?’ (for an official introduction, see 
PICNIC 2011). The pavilion told the stories of six families from cities on 
six different continents (Melbourne, Phoenix, Rotterdam, Sao Paolo, 
Tema, and Zhengzhou). In non-linear, non-hierarchical installations, the 
exhibition juxtaposed footage and information about the six families, 
inviting visitors to identify with their journeys through a representative 
cycle of everyday life (see Figure 8.3). Visitors would first enter a wax 
figure cabinet that contained a diorama of each family along with an 
introductory video about the family members and their respective home 
city. In the subsequent halls, the exhibition presented five elements 
of urban life: home (jiaju 家居), work (gongzuo 工作), connectivity 
(jiaowang 交往), learning (xuexi 学习), and health (jiankang 健康). Each 
hall combined personal artefacts and looped video installations of the 
various individuals going about their routines, often synchronising the 
short films to suggest that the members of the different households are 
engaged in similar activities at the same time, across the six continents. 
It may then seem as though the exhibits construct a linear narrative of 
modernity, especially considering how strongly the exhibits use watches 
and clocks as devices to frame the everyday narratives. Nordin (2012a: 241) 
has for instance criticised the pavilion for creating a ‘sequentialization 
in time’ that she argues portrays some families as more advanced than 
others: ‘we all do the same thing; it is just that some are a bit behind’. 
Nordin is right to point out that the expo featured ‘clocks, ticking 
pendula, and hourglasses’ to repeatedly enforce stories of progress 
through time, but I hesitate to draw the conclusion that the Urbanian 
Pavilion provided an easy judgement of the families it portrayed. I have 
placed footage from the various video instalments on a time-line and 
have compared the imagery and captions to check whether the organisers 
framed the narratives to prompt conclusions about who might be more 
‘advanced’. While some families indeed use more advanced gadgets, 
e.g. an electric toothbrush in the case of a Dutch entrepreneur, I have 
not found a sustained effort to use such signs as aspirational markers. 
In fact, in the introduction to the various households, the families are 
portrayed during their leisure activities, with the American family playing 
table tennis, the family from Ghana playing pool, the Brazilian family 
meeting for a picnic, the Australian couple watching TV at home, the 
Chinese family meeting for dinner, and the Dutch entrepreneur working 
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long hours. If anything, there seems to be subtle critique embedded in 
these depictions, suggesting that the kind of high-octane single life of a 
Dutch upwardly mobile man is no better (and possibly worse) than the 
social activities of families in Africa or South America. 
Any ostensible endorsement of linear modernity that these video 
installations might contain ultimately breaks down when confronted 
with the video captions. Throughout the videos, the designers introduce 
random facts and statistics about the different life-styles, and so 
the visitors learn that three minutes of work in Rotterdam buys one 
Figure 8.3: Synchronous Everyday Life: Rotating Screen Installation at the Urbanian Pavilion. Images © 
F. Schneider 2010. 
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hamburger, whereas eight minutes of work are needed in Zhengzhou. 
They are informed that the Dutchman works 80 hours per week and 
spends 40 per cent of his income on housing, whereas the Chinese man 
works 50 hours and spends 20 per cent of the family income on housing. 
It seems to me that the designers are setting up various discursive 
interventions to highlight for visitors that ‘quality of life’ can take many 
forms, and can at times remain elusive, even in contexts that might be 
viewed as ‘developed’.
8.4	 Fractured	visions	of	the	future
Much like the other theme pavilions, the exhibition that was explicitly 
dedicated to showcasing visions of future cities did not fit into official 
discourses of hypermodernity. The Pavilion of the Future (Chengshi weilai 
guan 城市未来馆), which had been designed for the authorities by the 
Spanish design agency INGENIAqed, featured installations by foreign 
and Chinese artists, and it presented multifarious science-fictional 
imaginations of future urbanism. As with many other exhibits, some of 
the pavilion’s discourses remained grounded in the familiar stereotypes 
and problematic assumptions about ‘East’ and ‘West’ that are so 
common at world fairs; Callahan (2012: 255-256) has rightly criticised 
one installation at the Pavilion of the Future for telling a highly gendered 
and Orientalist narrative of American or European men and their 
Chinese wives. At the same time, many of the exhibits complicated such 
reductionist narratives by constructing provocative utopian discourses. 
The pavilion designers flagged their utopian ambitions early on, in a hall 
called ‘Dreams and Practices’ (mengxiang yu shijian 梦想与实践) that paid 
tribute to important utopian writers such as Thomas Moore, Charles 
Fourier, and the Chinese philosopher Guanzi (管子). They also welcomed 
visitors with video installations playing clips from iconic science-fiction 
films in the section called ‘Dreams of Yesterday’ (zuori zhi meng 昨日之
梦), for instance showing scenes from the films Ghost in the Shell, Moebius 
Strip, Immortal, The Island, and Metropolis. 
The pavilion also featured various avant-garde art pieces that resisted 
simple modernist interpretations. It showcased nine sculptures, each 
speaking to a core concept that the designers associated with urban 
modernity: a peaceful life (anju 安居), perfection (wanmei 完美), networks 
(wangluo 网络), city planning (chengshi guihua 城市规划), basic necessities 
Fractured Discourses, Idiosyncratic Interactions 249
(jiben xuqiu 基本需求), nature (ziran 自然), sustainable development 
(kechixu fazhan 可持续发展), opportunities (jihui 机会), and harmony 
(hexie 和谐). The artworks were frequently ambiguous, taking no clear 
position on the issues they represented, but instead prompting visitors 
to derive their own meanings. For instance, the idea of ‘networks’ was 
translated into a set of interlinking tubes, the concept of ‘city planning’ 
was represented by a huge anthill, and the sculpture for ‘nature’ was a 
gigantic Taihu stone made out of stainless steel. In other cases, the 
sculptures were more explicitly subversive, for instance when ‘basic 
necessities’ were represented by an over-sized toilet, or when ‘sustainable 
development’ became a scale that had to balance a skyscraper against a 
tree, suggesting to visitors that one might come at the cost of the other. 
The sculpture for ‘harmony’ provides another powerful example of how 
different actors repurpose official watch words: the artwork consisted of 
colourful silk strings that formed a dazzling display of constantly shifting 
colour and light. The artwork avoided any sense of hierarchy or closure, 
which arguably created a very different sense of harmony from what 
popular Confucian interpretations had made of the term at the time. 
These at times bizarre interpretations of urban concepts were followed 
by what was probably the most scathingly critical artwork in the pavilion: 
the ‘Fantasy City’ installation (Huanying chengshi 幻影城市). It consisted 
of a block of junk that had been suspended from the ceiling, and that 
was lit in such a way that the discarded refrigerators, televisions, stereos, 
and car parts cast a shadow on the wall that resembled the skyline of a 
hypermodern city (Figure 8.4). Reminiscent of Plato’s cave allegory, in 
which inhabitants of a cave do not have access to reality but only to the 
shadows it casts, the artwork confronted visitors with the illusion of a 
utopian cityscape, only to reveal to them what that vision is actually made 
of: a pile of garbage. The guidebook presents a similar interpretation in 
its Chinese description (Xu 2010: 110, my translation):
On the one hand it is city rubbish, on the other hand it is a 
fashionable  city, but which one is truly real? This work, titled 
‘Fantasy City’, seems to warn people: as we pursue urban 
development, and as science and production achieve ever greater 






Figure 8.4: ‘Fantasy City’ Artwork. Image © F. Schneider 2010.
After this vision of a fractured modernity, visitors were guided through 
a hall that contained dioramas of successful urban-planning examples 
(showcasing Ningbo, Freiburg, Dar Es Salam, and Canberra), as well as 
the video of the future wedding that Callahan has commented on. Finally, 
the tour reaches its feature installation: a utopian vision of five different 
kinds of cities, designed by the Chinese animation artist Bu Hua (卜桦), 
and showcased in a hall titled ‘Harmony Plaza’ (Hexie guangchang 和谐
广场). The cities were each presented through short FLASH animation 
films that were projected onto a large screen. 
The choice of artist for this centrepiece of the pavilion is already 
telling: in 2008, Bu Hua had created an animated film called Savage 
Growth (Yeman congsheng 野蛮丛生) that provided a psychedelic critique 
of Shanghai’s urban development. In the short film, Bu Hua’s alter ego, 
a little girl dressed in the uniform of a Communist Youth League young 
pioneer, tries to protect the creatures of her fantasy world against sinister 
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war planes. As she searches for the origin of this blight, she discovers 
two hollow statues that are battling each other in a match of who can 
mass-produce the largest number of modern artefacts like fighter jets. 
As she observes the two combatants, they each start churning out iconic 
buildings from Shanghai’s Pudong skyline, until they ultimately destroy 
each other, leaving behind a smoking urban landscape.
For the pavilion videos at the expo, Bu Hua also deploys her alter ego, 
this time accompanied by a group of children who travel through five 
different utopian cities: Eco City (shengtai zhi cheng 生态之城), Energy City 
(nengyuan zhi cheng 能源之城), Water City (shui zhi cheng 水之城), Space 
City (taikong zhi cheng 太空之城), and Intelligence City (zhihui zhi cheng 智
慧之城). These cities consist of minimalist, open spaces that are sparsely 
populated but in which the inhabitants live in close connection with each 
other and nature. The final instalment, Intelligence City, is particularly 
critical of industrialist modernity: in the film, the children and their 
animal friends are confronted with acts of environmental destruction, 
such as deforestation and industrial waste (Figure 8.5). In one case, a 
tank ploughs across a field, crushing plants with its tracks. Only Bu’s alter 
ego is able to turn back time with her magic flute and bring the science-
fictional cities from the other videos into synchronicity, thus saving the 
planet. This is a very different depiction of the future from the one that 
Chinese officials were drawing up at the time. 
What are we then to make of the expo’s official Pavilion of the Future? I 
believe the exhibition is best understood as a utopian space, ‘an imaginary 
enclave within real social space’ (Jameson 2005: 15) in which audiences 
entertain possibilities, no matter how radical (see also Geuss 2010: 
131). It is a space that encourages visitors to blend all manner of inputs 
into fantastic speculations about the future, providing an experience of 
creative thinking and potentially critical reflection. 
It is important to recall that the mechanisms of conceptual blending 
do not force specific understandings on actors by virtue of providing 
specific input spaces. Experiencing the installations at the Pavilion of 
the Future, or the expo more generally, is not the kind of simulation 
Baudrillard (1983) envisaged. Mediated experiences such as visiting the 
multi-media exhibitions at the expo theme park do not abolish reality. 
They encourage analogies, prompting our minds to take one input space, 
such as our conception of the international world order, of harmonious 
co-existence, or of modern cities, and then blend the information from 
that space with a second input space, for instance our conception of 
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a theme park, of futuristic space travel, or of a pile of rubbish. What 
emerges is a complex structure of meanings that is more than the sum of 
its parts and that has its uses as actors experiment with the insights that 
these mental exercises provide. However, this blended space still retains 
its link to the inputs: subjects are capable of distinguishing between the 
blend, for instance the meanings they attribute to their experiences at the 
Shanghai Expo, and its inputs, for instance the actual international order 
and theme parks like Disneyland. What is more, visitors are able to assess 
the ontological value of each of these units and reflect on their meanings.
This is why a theme park like the Shanghai Expo does not function 
as a simulacrum. The extravaganza does not force visitors to mistake 
ideologies outside the expo as unequivocally real because their ‘reality 
principle’ has become confused through exposure to an explicitly 
artificial spectacle such as a world fair. Instead, the utopian spaces of the 
Shanghai Expo allow those who interact in them to entertain a fantasy 
and to play out various creative impulses, while simultaneously being 
firmly rooted in the real world. In this sense, and despite the constraints 
that the Shanghai Expo Bureau had set in the interest of the Chinese state, 
the networked spectacle nevertheless enabled the designers of themed 
Figure 8.5: Overcoming Industrial Modernity with Bu Hua’s Science-Fictional FLASH Animations. Figure 
adapted from screenshots. 
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pavilions like the Pavilion of the Future to create highly imaginative 
science-fiction visions of the future, just as it allowed visitors to enter 
these visions and creatively explore their possibilities.
8.5	 	How	one	state	media	conglomerate	revisited	nationalist	
discourse
The discussion so far has illustrated that while China’s networked 
spectacles offered propaganda specialists the opportunity to carefully 
define their vision of global modernity and China’s role in it, they also 
offered other actors the chance to reprogramme official discourse in 
line with their own values. The way that the official theme pavilions 
went about telling their subversive stories of human connection and 
environmental consciousness was a case in point. Also, as Callahan has 
shown (2012), various intellectuals and artists used the occasion of the 
expo to get involved and create their own political statements, often in 
opposition to those which the authorities had created. However, such 
activities were not limited to multicultural collaborations or artistic 
interventions during transnational events like the expo, which arguably 
facilitated multifarious interactions and fragmented discourses by virtue 
of the open-ended cultural governance framework that the authorities 
used to manage the affair. Attempts to reprogramme the discourses of 
China’s networked spectacles also extended to non-official actors during 
events that had a more domestic focus, and this was visible during the 
PRC’s 60th anniversary.
In chapters 5 and 6, I showed how official actors used the anniversary 
creatively to revamp CCP ideology, but I side-stepped the question of how 
other domestic actors participated in these endeavours. An intriguing 
case of how such actors reappropriated official frameworks of meaning 
for their own purposes was the example of state news conglomerate 
Southern Media Group and its front-page reporting on the day of the 
anniversary. As mentioned earlier, Chinese news generally adopted the 
recurring tropes of nationalist discourse to appeal to readers and sell 
their narratives about the nation’s ‘birthday’, but not all publications 
simply toed the party line. Many drew from the nationalist discourse only 
to tell divergent stories, for instance problematising the environmental 
and social costs of China’s networked spectacles. 
254 Staging China
To appreciate these activities fully, it is important to recall that China’s 
news media industry is overwhelmingly in state hands, and even private 
outlets have to work within the complicated state-administered system 
of licences and regulations, ensuring that no media organisation is 
entirely able to side-step the influences of the CCP’s propaganda system. 
That said, the Chinese news market is extremely diverse (see Stockmann 
2012 and Zhao 1998, 2008), and journalistic agendas and methods vary 
widely, even among the state-owned conglomerates. The result is a news 
environment that features official propaganda next to tabloid-like current 
affairs news and hard-hitting investigative journalism that has to work 
within the constraints of China’s political norms (see Repnikova 2017 for 
an analysis).
The Southern Media Group (南方报业传媒集团) is a famous example 
of a state-owned news organisation that produces fairly liberal content, 
including articles that can at times be highly critical of the authorities. 
The group is built around the official party paper Southern Daily (Nanfang 
Ribao 南方日报), but like most state-owned media conglomerates (see 
Zhao 2000) it draws most of its commercial revenues from its tabloid and 
weekend editions: the popular Southern Metro Daily (Nanfang Dushibao 
南方都市报) and the intellectually-minded Southern Weekly (Nanfang 
Zhoumo 南方周末). Both are excellent examples of the strategies that 
domestic Chinese actors use to intervene in political discourses without 
triggering the state and party censorship system. 
Take the front page of the Southern Weekly on 1 October 2009. That 
day it featured only a single article (Guo 2009), titled ‘Let every Chinese 
person also stand up!’ (让每个中国人也站起来!) – a reference to the 
phrase ‘The Chinese people have stood up’ (中国人站起来了), famously 
but possibly erroneously attributed to Mao Zedong (SCMP 2009). The 
article is oddly ambiguous. It uses a strongly nationalist and at times 
militarist rhetoric to extol the great progress that the PRC has made since 
its foundation, especially in terms of securing the people’s livelihood. 
However, halfway through, the text suddenly shifts gear, departing from 
the familiar script about the state and party’s ability to ensure common 
developmental rights. Instead, the text starts promoting liberal civic 
rights. The article can be read as a strong critique of Maoist politics, and 
of the official nationalist discourse about the nation and its human rights 
record, and yet this interpretation is not explicit. It has to be inferred 
by reading between the lines, and by situating the seemingly hyperbolic 
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endorsements of the article within the context of the paper’s well-known 
liberal editorial stance. 
The article is accompanied by an image that is worth closer analysis 
(see Figure 8.6). It shows the outline of the PRC’s territory, including 
Taiwan, but formed by a mountain range or the mouth of a grotto. The red 
sky features the sun next to a cloud formation in the shape of the numeral 
6, together forming the number 60. Along the ‘eastern’ edge of the map, 
a person is abseiling along the cave wall. The image is accompanied by 
the tag line ‘it is possible to look back, but not to turn round’ (可以回顾,
不能回头).
Figure 8.6: Southern Weekly Imagery of the Nation on 1 October 2009. Image adapted from ccmccm1988 
(2009).
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Several meanings are extractable from this set-up. If readers opt to use 
the patriotic official discourse about the anniversary as the frame for 
understanding this analogy, then the analogy between the cave and the 
country becomes a positive story of national renewal: the climber is 
emerging from a dark cave into the light of a rising sun to then potentially 
stride into an optimistic future. However, if the reader pays attention to a 
number of subtle cues in the image, then a different frame can be applied 
to combine the two input spaces: that of satire. 
In such a reading, the climber is rappelling into the cave as the sun sets 
above, descending into the darkness of China’s revolutionary past. Cues 
that prompt such an interpretation include the deteriorating or decaying 
font that the graphic designers used to render the caption, the title of the 
article below, and possibly also the way the rope is fastened to the wall and 
to the climber (indicating a downward movement, rather than a climb). 
Once readers make this connection, additional features on the page come 
into focus as part of an overarching criticism of contemporary Chinese 
politics. For instance, the number ‘6’ divides the country into an eastern 
and a western part, evoking the substantial developmental differences 
between these regions; the climber is attached to the prosperous eastern 
coast, which is also where the sun is located. Another subtle feature is the 
way in which the table of contents is rendered on the page, using as bullet 
points the graphic design of a voting ballot, implying a connection with 
democratic electoral politics.
The Southern Media Group’s other two core publications also 
designed their front pages in ambiguous terms (see Figure 8.7). The party 
paper Southern Daily features as its central image a picture of a crowded 
shopping street, decked out in Chinese flags. Again, a simple patriotic 
interpretation is available, but the fact that patriotism is here juxtaposed 
with neon signs and advertising also places Chinese revolutionary imagery 
in an awkward relationship with the symbols of capitalist consumption. 
The Metro Daily similarly presents readers with resources for multifarious 
meaning-making activities. It featured a series of three images showing 
the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing at different moments in time (1949, 
1970, and 2009), creating a seemingly linear progression through time 
that at first sight reproduces the official discourse on modern progress. 
The headline reads ‘Tiananmen, Witness the Republic Growing Up’ 
(天安门，见证共和国成长). Again, a conventional, mainstream 
interpretation might associate these images with the same modernist 
narrative of progress that the authorities were promoting during the 
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anniversary. However, several elements on the page signal a more critical 
understanding of the passage of time.  
Figure 8.7: Visual Discourses on the Front Pages of the Southern Daily (Top) and Southern Metro Daily 
(Bottom) on 1 October 2009. Images adapted from Jiang (2009).
Note how the images of Tiananmen are not, in fact, arranged linearly, but 
rather in a circular pattern, opening up the idea that history might repeat 
itself rather than move ‘forward’. The choice of dates is also telling: the 
designers could have picked numbers at exactly 30-year intervals, but 
instead the second image marks the height of the Cultural Revolution, 
which is still a taboo topic in Chinese public discourse. Finally, while the 
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contemporary image of Tiananmen is cast in splendid gold light, it is 
noteworthy that it is a night-time image that features a dark, even gloomy 
sky; the image is also completely devoid of people, making the set-up 
a highly impersonal affair. Again, no single interpretation inevitably 
emerges from these elements, but the design gives readers the space 
to blend the possible meanings in various ways, opening up potentially 
critical interpretations of Chinese history and politics. 
These examples show how actors critical of official narratives redeploy 
the watch words and watch signs that the authorities use in their own 
propaganda to subtly intervene in nationalist discourses, but without 
stepping outside the parameters of what China’s censors find acceptable. 
In fact, these actors cleverly play with the parameters of mainstream 
discourse to maximise the chance that their intervention will enter the 
PRC’s networks of political meaning-making. Consider the sequence 
of decisions that unfolds as such an ambiguous news item reaches the 
respective censorship office (see Figure 8.8).  
The censors will either recognise the satirical message or they will 
miss it. If they miss it, the article is published. If the censors recognise the 
critical thrust of the discursive statement, there is always the possibility 
that they may secretly concur with the message, even if it is politically 
unacceptable. The ambiguity of the media product allows such censors 
to turn a blind eye and let the piece be published, safe in the knowledge 
that they can later deny having understood the subversive message. In 
that situation, the journalists have cleverly given potential allies in the 
censorship system an excuse to endorse discourses they would otherwise 
need to block from entering China’s mass media networks. Finally, if the 
censors recognise the potential criticism and disapprove, they have to 
make a difficult choice: block the news item and possibly create a scandal 
(in which case their actions may actually end up drawing more attention 
to the offensive discourse) or let the item pass. Again, the ambiguity gives 
the censors an excuse to feign ignorance and let the critics prevail. 
Granted, the example of Southern Media Group reporting on the day of 
the 2009 national anniversary provides only a snapshot of programming 
practices in Chinese media networks. It should also be pointed out 
that the discursive horizon of this particular media organisation 
has shrunk significantly since the organisation was entangled in a 
censorship scandal in 2014, severely harming its reputation and at the 
same time allowing conservative Chinese censors to expand their efforts 
to bring controversial reporting in line with the CCP’s official agenda. 
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Nevertheless, the examples I have discussed here are meaningful, since 
they demonstrate how Chinese discourses can be reprogrammed from 
within domestic media networks during a crucial networked spectacle. 
Even a carefully planned and calibrated national anniversary provides 
opportunities for actors to fracture, fragment, and generally complicate 
political discourses.
8.6	 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined different ways in which the discourses 
of China’s networked spectacles became fractured. Despite the efforts of 
official actors to pull together various discursive strands into a convincing 





















Figure 8.8: The Censor’s Dilemma: Judging Ambiguous Political Discourse in Chinese Media. Image © F. 
Schneider 2019.
260 Staging China
approach that the authorities adopted also relied on actors that did not 
necessarily share the same agenda as the party or state. The Shanghai 
Expo was a prime example of how both international and domestic actors 
went about creating new meanings that departed markedly from the 
official discourses visible in China’s national pavilion. This sometimes 
meant challenging the official narratives intentionally and explicitly. 
At other times, it meant subtly shifting the discourse or programming 
networks with values that promised to unhinge the rationale behind 
official meaning-making processes, for instance when mechanistic 
understandings of modernity were reinterpreted through the use of 
organic metaphors that suggested entirely different conclusions about 
what social organisation and ‘harmonious’ living might entail. 
Frequently, these subtle reprogramming activities took place within 
the parameters of official semiotic systems. In the run-up to spectacles 
like the PRC’s 60th anniversary, Chinese propaganda officials and media 
workers had created symbols for the occasion, developed new frames 
of understanding, and recruited existing frames into their meaning-
making processes. These resources then became available to a multitude 
of actors as they generated their own discursive interventions. The 
clever manipulations of China’s ‘galaxy of meanings’ among Chinese 
newspaper journalists is a case in point, but such activities also extended 
to interactions in television, across social media, in art galleries, urban 
planning exhibits, and many other contexts. The multifarious affairs 
that emerged during these interactions thus defy understandings of 
semiotic activities as a simulacrum, that is an inescapable machine of 
circular signification that denies any chance for actors to exert agency 
over meanings. 
What is more, the collaborative and subtle ways in which actors 
programme meanings during networked spectacles also complicate 
theoretical arguments about discourses as struggles between those 
who dominate and those who resist. Such struggles surely take place, 
especially where actors directly confront certain discourses with 
antagonistic counter-discourses, but more often than not the process 
of making political meanings is subtler. Actors collaboratively move 
discourses along and steer them in different directions, but without any 
one actor having the power to dictate where the meanings will go. 
9  Conclusion: The Legacy of 
China’s Mass Media Events
It is 30 July 2017, and the People’s Liberation Army is celebrating its 90th 
anniversary. In Inner Mongolia, top-of-the-line military equipment 
and crack troops are lined up along a dusty tarmac strip at the Zhurihe 
Training Base. An all-terrain vehicle with licence-plate number VA-02017 
is driving past the neat line of uniformed soldiers. In the back stands Xi 
Jinping, dressed in camouflage fatigues. ‘Comrades, you have worked 
hard!’, he calls from the back of the vehicle. ‘We serve the people!’, yell the 
soldiers in unison (NCTV 2017). Barely a month earlier, Xi had conducted 
a similar ceremony in Hong Kong, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the 
territory’s return to the PRC in 1997 (see CNTV 2017). Dressed in a classic 
black Sun-Yatsen suit, he was driving past rows of soldiers, armoured 
vehicles, and attack helicopters, exchanging the well-known phrases with 
his troops. The ritual continued for about 20 minutes, until Xi reached the 
end of the line-up. Then China Central Television cut to a reel of images 
from around Hong Kong: a PLA soldier hugging a child, a PLA soldier 
helping an old lady across the street, people cheerfully applauding during 
a PRC flag-raising ceremony. 
Two years earlier, Xi was also driven past PLA formations, greeting 
the troops and assuring them that they had worked hard, but on that 
occasion his Red Flag limousine had headed east on Beijing’s Chang’an 
Avenue, the same route that his predecessors had travelled during past 
ritualistic troop inspections. That year, in 2015, the occasion had been the 
70th anniversary of the end of the War of Resistance against Japan, now a 
national holiday on 3 September. As Xi was circling back towards the Gate 
of Heavenly Peace, his ride past the tanks and troops was accompanied 
by the well-rehearsed CCTV commentary familiar to viewers from other 
official events, with the narrator explaining how the technologically 
advanced armed forces illustrated the revival of the Chinese nation and 
its prowess as a Great Power, which would use its weapons to secure 
domestic borders and safeguard world peace (CCTV 2015).
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The parallels between these festivities (Figure 9.1) and the PRC 
anniversary eight years earlier are striking. Indeed, despite the frequent 
arguments that Xi Jinping’s administration has broken with many of the 
principles that seem to have informed his predecessors’ rule, the mass 
communication strategy under Xi continues many of the earlier practices. 
This was also visible in 2016, when the G20 summit in Hangzhou was 
accompanied by a grand opening ceremony that took many of its cues 
from past occasions like the Beijing Olympics. The event was again 
designed by Zhang Yimou, who has become China’s resident spectacle 
director. At the time of writing, it remained to be seen whether he would 
also direct the opening or closing ceremonies of China’s next prestigious 
networked spectacle: the Beijing Winter Olympics that are scheduled for 
February 2022.
Figure 9.1: Xi’s Parades. Images assembled from screenshots of the CCTV, Xinhua, and CNTV broadcasts. 
Throughout this book, I have argued that mass events are an important 
component of what Gluck (2011) has called ‘modernity’s grammar’. They 
allow actors to showcase their modern credentials, they have profound 
transformative impacts on the host cities, and they promise to serve as 
vehicles through which elites communicate their ideologies to the much-
evoked ‘masses’. At the same time, I have suggested that we update 
our understanding of such events, better to capture how they serve as 
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that ‘networked spectacles’ are all about interactions and connections, 
and that this is relevant at three levels: firstly, such spectacles are sites 
where participants engage in chains of ritual activities (Collins 2004) 
through which they ‘assemble the social’, as Latour (2005) would put it; 
at this micro-sociological level, the networked spectacle unfolds all of 
its complexity and reveals the many idiosyncratic ways in which actors 
attribute meanings to each other and the objects they encounter, and it 
reveals how group sentiments and collective background knowledge can 
emerge from these networked activities. Secondly, networked spectacles 
create ‘local’ sub-networks that resourceful actors connect to wider, often 
transnational communication and interaction networks. At this macro-
sociological level, diverse actors may switch themselves and each other 
into webs of meaning-making to programme discourses and push certain 
rationales onto their recursive interactions. Finally, like any complex 
communication process, meaning-making at spectacles like Olympic 
Games, world fairs, or national commemorations invites actors to blend 
networks of signs into new discourses (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). The 
meanings that emerge at this psychological level are not easily managed, 
even though official actors continuously try to guide them in directions 
consistent with their political agendas. 
As a result of these networked interactions, authoritative discourses 
often emerge as seemingly ‘hegemonic’ assemblages of ideological 
statements, containing forceful claims about the nature of the modern 
world and the status of different people in it. The spectacular, multi-
mediated communication practices at networked spectacles can make 
the subsequent narratives seem inescapable; they may even appear to 
drown out reality with barrages of free-floating signs, as Baudrillard 
(1983) would probably have suggested. As these signs proliferate, often 
with nearly global reach, actors that were not originally involved in the 
event’s ‘local’ context on the ground become linked into the networks 
as second-order and third-order audiences (Rauer 2006), and they 
spread the event discourses even further through their own interactions. 
However, contrary to what Baudrillard would suggest, these multifarious 
interaction chains allow actors to reappropriate the semiotic resources 
that authoritative agents like states and corporations have designed for 
the event. At times, audience members and participants indeed adopt 
and endorse the meanings that organisers programmed into their events. 
At other times they reject those meanings in favour of new associations. 
They juxtapose available input spaces of meanings to blend them 
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creatively into innovative ideas, and they feed those ideas back into the 
networks, effectively reframing and reprogramming the discourses in 
distinctive and sometimes wildly eccentric ways.
In China, networked spectacles have become part of the ruling party’s 
repertoire of modern mass communication technologies, and this has 
had both organisational and ideological implications. In this concluding 
chapter, I revisit several of the core findings of this book, and I relate them 
to more recent communication politics under Xi Jinping’s administration, 
a government that has been criticised as reviving the most authoritarian 
practices of China’s past and forcing discursive interactions into 
carefully controlled spaces. While the discursive horizon in China has 
arguably shrunk under Xi’s administration, I want to suggest a different 
interpretation, and a different assessment, of these processes. My 
argument is that Xi’s administration is continuing many of the practices 
that its predecessors established, often in technologically refined ways, 
but that this then also leads to the familiar multifarious interactions that 
generally characterise the cultural governance of networked spectacles 
and that do not readily collapse into a singular discourse. 
9.1	 The	CCP’s	networked	approach	to	power
At the start of the 21st century, China’s networked spectacles served the 
authorities as important catalysts for national and urban development, 
and they became occasions for state agents to unleash the powerful 
transformative effects of this genre of modern politics. This included the 
infrastructure development projects that accompanied these spectacles 
in cities like Beijing and Shanghai, but also plans to develop tourism, 
commerce, foreign trade, and to some extent civic institutions in the 
form of volunteer work. In this way, China’s networked spectacles affected 
millions of people and left a permanent mark on urban landscapes, for 
instance in the form of expansive metro networks, new airport terminals, 
and iconic sports complexes.
Aside from these material effects, the events also offered the 
administration opportunities to experiment with organisational and 
communication techniques, and to hone their abilities to conduct 
ideological work. Continuing the CCP’s tradition to view itself as the 
guarantor not just of material progress but of spiritual wellbeing, the party 
and state refined their efforts to guide public opinion, and they brought 
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the party’s propaganda system into the new century. This propaganda 
system has indeed come a long way since the mass-mobilisation and 
thought-work strategies of pre-reform China (see also Brady 2008). 
The system still retains some of its ‘top-down’ structure; it is headed 
by leadership groups at the centre and reaches down hierarchically into 
all levels of administration and across all parts of the country. However, 
the CCP’s propaganda experts have long discovered that their didactic 
messages only work if they are appealing and entertaining. As the national 
symbolism of the Beijing Olympic Games shows, propaganda in today’s 
China does not so much attempt to control all facets of meaning rigidly. 
Instead, it tries to comprehensively frame communication processes in a 
way that allows certain interpretations rather than others. This also means 
that the state has loosened its monopoly over cultural expressions. It has 
allowed a network of social, political, and economic actors to contribute 
to the rich tapestry of meanings in contemporary China.
This process of generating meaning is no longer an act of 
straightforward governing, but is best described as ‘cultural governance’, 
a term I have borrowed from Callahan (2006) and Shapiro (2004), and 
which I have here interpreted as a collaborative effort between state and 
non-state agents to regulate the discursive contexts in which political 
interactions take place. These agents all feed their own understandings 
of society and the meaning of being Chinese into the networks of 
contemporary China. China’s networked spectacles are a prime example 
of how these cultural governance activities work. They illustrate how 
actors insert themselves into existing international and domestic event 
circuits, switch themselves and others into organisational practices, and 
at times create new networks to manage event-related activities. During 
the Hu-Wen era, the consequence was that various forces continuously 
negotiated the meaning of Chinese modernity and of the nation’s identity. 
Throughout all of this, state agencies and party institutions remained in a 
strong position to shape these negotiations, prompting a large number of 
diverse non-state actors to assemble cultural artefacts and still generate 
surprisingly consistent discourses. 
The organisers of the spectacles assured these outcomes through 
their networking activities and through their efforts to create a shared 
galaxy of signs that contributors were then invited to use in their own 
communication practices. Many indeed did. In this sense, the CCP and 
the Chinese state updated what it meant to be ‘powerful’ in a rapidly 
changing network society (Castells 2009) such as China. The authorities 
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retained their substantial switching power, that is, the ability to include 
certain actors in the process of meaning-generation, while excluding 
others. They further exerted significant programming power: through 
various media and in various modes, the authorities injected selected 
symbols into communication processes and ensured that these symbols 
were arranged in ways that relayed unambiguous and highly emotional 
messages. Finally, the authorities tied the various messages together by 
supplying a specific set of codes that situated them within the broader 
discourse; a discourse for which audiences had been primed through 
long-term exposure, and that authoritative actors ‘flagged’ as the relevant 
frames for the ritual interactions that unfolded during China’s networked 
spectacles.
As Collins (2003: 61) has pointed out, ‘some groups have more 
resources for carrying out their rituals than others’, and ‘these ritually 
privileged groups have more impressive symbols and fill their members 
with more emotional energy’. China’s ruling elites were precisely such 
a ‘ritually privileged group’, able to position themselves at crucial 
nodes in communication networks and manipulate both material and 
ideological incentives to align the interests of many different actors with 
their own. This level of power was particularly evident in cases where 
the authorities could rely on diverse actors to share similar background 
knowledge and the seemingly ‘banal’ symbolism that encapsulated that 
knowledge during ritual interactions. In such instances, actors frequently 
reproduced the discourses that the authorities had ‘flagged’, for instance 
prompting participants in China’s event networks to unapologetically 
sell the nation as a core component of personal identity-maintenance or 
promote neoliberal capitalist production and consumption patterns as 
common-sense features of modernity. 
The fact that these ideological positions and the assumptions that 
inform them are not unique to the Chinese context but are flagged in 
other societies as part of the kind of global ‘Euromodernity’ that Dirlik 
(2011a) has discussed, only made the overall narrative more compelling, 
both domestically and abroad. In cases where actors were able to 
fuse the symbols of recognisably local and global modernities, they 
generated the kind of flow that allowed these blends of meaning to travel 
transnationally, as was arguably the case during international events like 
the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo.
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9.2	 	China’s	cultural	governance:	learning	to	live	with	
fragmented	discourses
Nevertheless, the fact that the state retained a strong position within 
networked spectacles should not be mistaken for an indication that 
the discourses that emerged from these networks necessarily collapsed 
into unified, stable grand narratives. In fact, even among official actors 
the meanings of core concepts like harmonious society or scientific 
development were matters of contention. Some official actors tried 
to programme the discourses that surrounded such concepts with 
conservative, nativist meanings; others tried to construct cosmopolitan 
rationales that implied very different conclusions. 
The cultural governance paradigm that the authorities deployed 
further ensured that the discourses were open to contributions from 
non-state agents, such as celebrities like Jackie Chan, NGOs like Amnesty 
International or Reporters Without Borders, domestic enterprises 
like news organisations or volunteer groups, and large multinational 
corporations like McDonald’s, Nike, Coca Cola, and many more. At 
times, the messages that these various agents relayed to their publics 
indeed tied into the official discourse, for instance when Jackie Chan 
blended the concepts of ‘home’ and ‘nation’ to call on all Chinese to love 
their country, or when Coca Cola sold the idea of a benevolent China in its 
commercials. However, at other times, the complicated arrangement of 
symbols that these actors produced sat awkwardly next to the discursive 
activities of the authorities. Jackie Chan, for instance, has famously 
offended citizens in China’s capital with his nationalist antics, and Coca 
Cola’s Olympic commercials, with their stereotyped use of Chinese 
national symbols, arguably shifted meanings into new directions.
In a similar vein, participants at the Shanghai Expo were frequently 
able to stage their own interventions into the spectacle’s discourses. The 
organisational decisions and implementations that led to this outcome 
were frequently messy, and they contained no small amount of ideological 
work that did not neatly align with a single, authoritative position designed 
by propaganda cadres at the central level. The architects of China’s 
national pavilion mined the pre-modern past for allegories that would 
describe their design practices in terms of the official ‘harmonious society’ 
discourse, and in the process they developed a cosmopolitan narrative 
about diversity and pluralism that moved in intriguingly postmodern 
directions. In the officially commissioned theme pavilions, foreign 
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and Chinese collaborators came up with visions of the hypermodern 
present and the utopian future that departed noticeably from the kind of 
developmental paradigm that the central authorities seemed to prefer at 
the time. Simultaneously, the various foreign national pavilions entered 
the discussion of what China’s place in the world might be, by picking 
up on popular Chinese discourses but infusing them with their own 
values, for instance promoting American liberalism or radical European 
enlightenment ideas through cleverly arranged exhibition designs.
That these activities took place in this fashion, within a media ecology 
that is carefully monitored and guided by the Chinese authorities, shows 
the degree to which the Hu-Wen administration’s cultural governance 
approach ‘leaned’ into the ambiguities of networked discourses. Indeed, 
several of the more contentious exhibition organisers I spoke to were 
surprised that their intentional interventions into political discourses did 
not cause any backlash from the authorities. It is hard to say precisely why 
this was the case. It is possible that censors simply did not recognise the 
often subtle moments of critique; perhaps they were not worried about 
visitors being influenced by such messages. It is also plausible that the 
censors approved of what was on display, for instance as evidence that 
a confident China could stomach multiple ideological views during its 
prestigious spectacles. Whatever the rationale, the outcome was overall 
a pluralistic affair that inspired hope among many of the participants 
I spoke to that the discourses of ‘harmony’ might indeed become a 
justification for a generally more cosmopolitan approach to politics in 
China.
9.3	 From	Hu	to	Xi:	the	media	management	of	a	strongman?
After the close of the Hu-Wen era, this optimism among foreign observers 
seemed to have initially carried over into the first term of the new 
president and general secretary Xi Jinping. However, views of Chinese 
politics quickly regressed to the kind of China Threat perceptions that 
the previous administration had tried so hard to counter with its soft-
power strategies. As Xi’s administration tightened control over domestic 
discourses and rolled out a harsh anti-corruption campaign, foreign 
observers were quick to cast China’s leader as a new Mao. In a Foreign 
Affairs article, Elizabeth Economy (2014) pointed out how ‘Xi has 
moved quickly to amass political power and become, within the Chinese 
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leadership, not first among equals, but simply first’. Her description of 
how ‘Xi has made a power grab – for himself, for the Communist Party, 
and for China’ was accompanied by an image of a dragon that greedily 
smothers the whole world in its clutches. Popular news media reports 
were equally bleak. In an opinion-editorial in the Financial Times, Jamil 
Anderlini (2017) described domestic crackdowns under Xi’s leadership 
and concluded that China now looked more like a dictatorship ‘than at 
any time in several decades’. The Guardian’s Tom Phillips (2018) provided 
a similar assessment: ‘China’s 64-year-old leader has waged war on 
dissenters, both inside and outside the Communist party, in a drive to 
establish total control, crushing civil society and jailing rivals to ensure 
his coronation as China’s most powerful leader since Mao at last year’s 
party congress’. When the PRC’s National People’s Congress extended 
the term of Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2018, Pei Minxin contextualised 
the move by arguing that the PRC had never been ‘your garden-variety 
dictatorship, but a successor to a totalitarian regime’ and that it was 
today ‘both far more ruthless and determined to protect its power than 
an average dictatorship’ (quoted in Frum 2018).
I do not mean to dismiss concerns about the CCP’s revitalised 
authoritarianism under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Many of the repressive 
politics that have come out of this administration have been truly 
frightening, for instance the detention and ‘re-education’ of Muslims 
in the western region of Xinjiang. It is understandable that such illiberal 
activities would prompt many observers to return to the vocabulary of 
totalitarian dictatorship, and yet there are a number of reasons why 
casting Xi as a dictator or comparing him to Mao Zedong is ultimately 
misleading. As Kerry Brown (2017) points out, rightly I believe, it is 
unhelpful to reduce the complex interactions that make up China’s ruling 
party to a single cadre like Xi, even if that specific man is increasingly 
holding all the core positions of power in the country. Xi Jinping is also 
a product of the party and state system, and he was placed in a position 
of supreme visibility because China’s leaders were deeply disconcerted 
by what they viewed as a crisis of legitimacy at the close of the Hu-Wen 
period. Brown writes (ibid.: 25):
Looking solely at Xi as a political figure, wondering at his power 
and its reach, means being seduced by the symptoms of a system, 
rather than truly understanding their underlying causes. Xi has only 
ever spoken in a context where he is within, working for, a party of 
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the Party, its servant if you like. And without an understanding of 
that institutional context, his powers make no sense.
Under Xi, the party has indeed rolled back many of the liberal policies of 
its predecessors. This is not to say, however, that they have abandoned 
the cultural governance approach I have described here. If anything, this 
approach has become more refined. As Pieke has aptly put it (2016: 33), 
...the Communist Party does not govern. Instead, it leads, controls 
and inspires all institutions of government and governance. The 
Party’s continued control over the people who lead and administer 
the institutions of governance continues to be the most vital 
feature of China’s uniquely socialist mode of governance.
In network terms, the PRC’s leaders have recentralised many of the 
country’s increasingly distributed networks. While some sub-networks 
have taken on distinctly hierarchical shapes, for instance in the state-
run media, where the Party has forcefully reestablished its ideological 
monopoly, in other cases such networks have continued to involve diverse 
actors and agendas, for instance when the leadership switches large 
corporate actors into its policy-making and implementation processes. 
Examples are recent state experiments with sophisticated digital 
monitoring and analytical tools, for which the authorities are recruiting 
companies like Alibaba and Baidu, and these actors in turn carry their 
commercial interest into the political interactions. 
My colleague Rogier Creemers (2016) has called this a ‘strategic nexus’ 
between capitalist enterprises and ruling elites. I would even argue that 
the CCP has turned itself into a platform: a network that sits between 
disparate sectors of society and that connects these multi-sided segments 
through its switching activities (see Steinberg 2017 for a discussion of 
this platform idea). In that sense, the CCP continues its earlier attempts 
to create a ‘consultative’ version of its Leninist politics (Teets 2013), but 
without abandoning its ability to make use of the ‘centralism’ implied in 
Leninist ‘democratic centralism’ (see also Tsang 2009). As Brown (2017: 
23-24) has noted, under Xi Jinping’s rule the party is ‘the network of 
networks’, an ‘epistemic community’ that promises to tie together the 
disparate elements of a complex, hypermodern China.
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9.4	 	Xi’s	networked	spectacles	and	the	future	of	CCP	
propaganda
When it comes to how the CCP has been managing China’s network 
society, there have been far more continuities than ruptures with 
the immediate past. As Zhao Suisheng (2016) points out, ‘Under Hu 
Jintao, the maintenance of political stability became the regime’s 
top goal. Xi has only intensified this trend’. This logic applies not 
only to the organisational patterns I have discussed, but also to the 
political discourses that the leadership tries to mobilise for its cause. 
Specifically, the Xi administration has forcefully continued the Hu-Wen 
administration’s attempts to put the CCP’s appeal onto a broader footing 
by essentially aiming to transform the Party into a ‘Volkspartei’ that can 
legitimate itself to constituencies of diverse ideological persuasions, 
ranging from Maoism through Confucianism to neoliberalism. 
The ‘China Dream’ campaign under Xi Jinping is an excellent 
example of this. In 2013, the administration published several series 
of propaganda posters and advertisements that promoted this China 
dream, and the discourses that these posters tapped into covered the full 
spectrum of available ideological traditions. Tropes from the Mao era 
were as much in evidence as semiotic components that harked back to 
the early modernist period of the 1920s and 1930s, but also to pre-modern 
ideas such as filial piety and other nominally Confucian virtues (see 
also my earlier discussion in Schneider 2013b). As Sun (2017) explains 
this juxtaposition of themes, ‘the majority of the visual symbols used in 
the posters are transposed from the sign systems of Chinese traditional 
culture and the revolutionary discourse of the Communist Party of China’, 
and with the proliferation of these various signs ‘in public spaces, the 
visual propaganda of the Chinese Dream has turned it into a mundane 
movement of political culture’, that is the banal background resources 
that I have discussed throughout this book. 
Gow (2017) has similarly explored recent propaganda under Xi 
Jinping, focusing on the ‘core socialist values’ that the administration 
launched in 2012. These values have strongly informed the ‘China Dream’ 
discourse ever since. Gow describes how the proliferation of the core 
socialist values relies not just on the state, even though state institutions 
play an important role in disseminating these concepts. The twelve 
values are an invitation to civil society actors to join the meaning-making 
efforts in contemporary China. As Gow writes (2017: 111), ‘the strategic 
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intertwining of Confucian values with those proscribed in the Chinese 
Dream discourse increases significantly the likelihood that CCP values 
will find traction with Chinese people and, over time, become constitutive 
of common sense in contemporary China’.
Indeed, as propaganda efforts continue under Xi, diverse actors are 
again joining the networks that make ‘common sense’ of these concepts. 
These efforts are often aspirational, framing what the core values of 
Chinese society should mean, rather than what Chinese society is actually 
like, but as such they have the potential to provide utopian outlets for 
the imagination, and possibly for future politics. Take the cases that I 
have represented in Figure 9.2. It shows an official propaganda poster 
in Beijing (top), which lists all twelve of the core socialist values, and 
two paintings near a junior high-school in Shanghai (bottom), which 
interpret these values in their own way. The paintings take their cue from 
the watch words of Xi-era discourse, but they creatively come up with 
their own versions of what those concepts might mean. On the bottom 
left, the artist or artists decided to interpret the term ‘equality’ in terms 
of gender equality, placing a spunky female character in celebratory pose 
as her side of a scale evens out with her male counterpart. On the bottom 
left, the painting contextualises the concept of ‘liberty’ by showing a 
woman who apparently went shopping during a sale. While arguably an 
accurate portrayal of what ‘liberty’ signifies for many in today’s China, 
this neoliberal consumerist interpretation does not sit comfortably with 
the idea of ‘socialist’ values. 
9.5	 Conclusion
China’s networked spectacles, during the Hu-Wen administration as 
much as during the current Xi administration, are far more than mere 
propaganda statements by a state that has arguably perfected its mass-
communication strategy. They are occasions for diverse political and 
commercial actors to engage in networked politics, legitimate themselves 
and their agendas, and ultimately recalibrate the very meaning of 
modernity at the start of the 21st century. As I have argued above, studying 
these processes in the Chinese context is not just about China. It is also 
about politics in societies dominated by often transnational capitalist 
media ecologies. The PRC strategy for how to utilise the networks that 
constitute these ecologies is one solution to a wider challenge: how to 
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govern vast, complex, technologically advanced societies. There are other 
solutions, each coming up against different problems and constraints. 
Personally, I remain sceptical whether it is fruitful to recalibrate complex 
social and communication networks into centralised, hierarchical 
forms, effectively building them round updated versions of established 
institutions like nation-states and corporate conglomerates. Be that as it 
may, if we hope to improve the way human societies work today, we need 
to explore how different solutions play out, what their potentials are, and 
where their limits lie. 
One important lesson that China’s networked spectacles can then 
teach us is that mass-mediated discourses are never dictated by any 
individual actor, regardless of how powerfully they are represented in 
a network of interactions. Discourses still need to be interpreted and 
reused by audiences. In modern China as much as elsewhere, audiences 
are active, well-informed, transnationally connected, and in the 
possession of advanced communication technologies. For some social 
groups, national symbols may develop a life of their own. Chauvinistic 
Figure 9.2: Making Sense of China’s Core Socialist Values. Image © Schneider 2018.
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online discussions or aggressive torch relay demonstrations show that 
there is no guarantee that citizens will internalise the intended official 
meanings of the harmonious Chinese nation. While China’s networked 
spectacles during the Hu-Wen era can be understood as an attempt by 
the Chinese authorities to pragmatically reinvent the Chinese nation as 
modern, cultured, harmonious, and international, the continuing use 
of nationalism as a framework of meaning nevertheless remains outside 
anyone’s control. As various actors rework that framework through 
their own chains of  interactions, it ultimately creates a brand that is 
unmanageable. 
Identity formation is a complex process that I shall not discuss in 
detail here. What is important is that identities are not based on one 
social role, or one set of values. Individuals draw from a broad range of 
cultural artefacts to make sense of who they are and how the world around 
them functions. As media analyst Henry Jenkins has argued, this process 
is highly creative and remains beyond the control of any social or political 
institution (2006: 39): individuals venture out into the fields of symbols 
that the cultural industries have tilled, but they then use the fruits that 
have grown there as they see fit; audiences are not mere consumers but 
much more ‘poachers’ of meanings. Jenkins shows how this process 
works within American fan culture, and his descriptions of fan reactions 
to the perceived abuse of ‘their’ symbols exhibits many parallels to the 
reaction of, for instance, Chinese nationalists when the symbols of their 
nation are not deployed in ways of which they approve (ibid.: 55): 
The ideology of fandom involves both a commitment to some 
degree of conformity to the original ... materials, as well as a 
perceived right to evaluate the legitimacy of any use of those 
materials, either by textual producers or by textual consumers.
The Chinese authorities have established their own grammar of 
modernity as a central frame for understanding China, pointing out to 
the citizenry that national symbols like the flag, the national anthem, 
the various national monuments, or the patriotic vocabulary of the state 
media are central to the nation’s cultural and historical ‘essence’. In doing 
so, China’s leaders have managed to create a common language that 
all citizens can share to make sense of the world, but at the same time 
they have set in motion a process of individual identity formation that 
in the final instance escapes the control of the governing agents. Even 
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when the frame of reference is set, the actual users of national symbols 
communicate with each other and with non-state agents, reprogramming 
political discourses in the process. After this process has started, any 
perceived misuse of the framework of symbols, whether by foreign or 
domestic actors, becomes an attack on the individual’s identity and 
elicits the kinds of strong emotional responses and political (re)actions 
that we witness from interconnected publics today. Indeed, the Xi era is 
no different from the preceding Hu-Wen period in this regard, as it is 
indeed no different from complex discursive activities elsewhere in the 
world. As Foucault (1978/1990: 101) has put it:
... discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but 
also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes 
it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.
My analysis of China’s networked spectacles suggests that the discourses 
that emerged from these events were indeed as ‘fragmented’ and ‘fragile’ 
as Foucault suggested, and that this was the outcome of complicated 
interactions between a multitude of actors with often diverging interests. 
As the Xi administration continues many of the cultural governance 
practices that its predecessor established in China at the beginning of 
the 21st century, it will remain confronted with the hindrances and 
stumbling-blocks that ritual interactions perpetually produce, creating 
spaces for creative meaning-making despite any attempts to control 
discursive activities through strongman politics. 
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Glossary
Actor: any creature or thing that changes its own state or that of another 
creature or thing.
Blended space: a mental space in which an actor consciously or 
subconsciously assembles elements of different inputs into new, 
emergent meanings through a process of conceptual blending.
Capitalism: an economic arrangement in which the means of production 
are owned privately and are worked by wage labourers, and in which 
goods and services are traded for profit in competitive markets, using 
a commonly accepted medium of exchange and following the logic of 
supply and demand.
Censorship: any authoritative act that intentionally influences the 
production, release, or circulation of information, based on a claim to 
protect the public interest.
Complexity: any system of interlinking components that exhibits non-
trivial adaptive, emergent, and self-organising behaviours.
Conceptual blending: the complex mental process of creating new 
meanings out of different inputs by selectively recombining elements 
from the inputs in line with certain frames.
Context: the span of traceable interactions within a network.
Cultural governance: the process of indirectly regulating society by 
regulating culture, that is: any authoritative action that aims to 
manage the symbolic and discursive context within which a political 
issue is situated. 
Cute nationalism: a seemingly inoffensive symbolic representation of 
the nation that suggests benevolence and innocence and that lends 
itself to being filled with meanings and emotional attachments from 
a broad range of audiences.
Discourse: communication practices that systematically construct our 
knowledge of reality as commonly accepted truths.
Emotional governance: the process of indirectly regulating society by 
inviting or prompting actors to invest themselves emotionally in 
certain governing principles, that is any authoritative action that aims 
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to manage the emotional context within which a political issue is 
situated. 
Entrainment: the process of heightening emotions by synchronising 
one’s behaviour with others. 
Frame: any principle that structures and calibrates networks of meaning 
during conceptual blending processes.
Framing: using sets of signs to force a particular code onto a commu-
nication process, thereby guiding the perception, understanding, or 
interpretation of the communicated information.
Generic space: a mental space in which an actor consciously or 
subconsciously compares elements of different inputs during the 
process of conceptual blending. 
Governance: any attempt to govern by reaching beyond the level of the 
state and including private institutions and actors in the process, 
usually in ways that redefine the governing process in terms of 
allegedly cost-effective and efficient market exchanges.
Ideology: a system of mental concepts, their values, and their relations 
that a person or group sets forth as an explanation of and normative 
guide to the human condition. Ideology can be viewed neutrally, 
negatively, or positively: neutrally, ideology refers to any framework of 
thought; negatively, it refers to a collective false conscience maintained 
by powerful elites to obscure systems of oppression; positively, it 
refers to sets of ideas that empower the holder to recognise their own 
interests.
Imagined community: any group of human beings with a common belief 
in a collective purpose, culture, history, or ancestry, in which some 
members do not maintain direct personal ties with each other.
Information: any piece of data to which a sentient being has attributed 
meaning.
Input space: a mental space that serves as an input to an actor’s process 
of conceptual blending.
Interaction ritual chain: a series of interpersonal encounters in which 
actors create self-reinforcing feedback loops of meaning-making and 
emotional investment through their mutual focus on shared symbolic 
resources and processes of entrainment.
Large-scale event: an organised occasion for a large number of actors to 
witness and/or engage in chains of ritual interactions. 
Glossary 309
Mass event: a large-scale event designed and staged to attract mass 
participation by mobilising modern subjects as citizens and/or 
consumers. 
Media ecology: the complex systems of people, hardware, and software 
that create and spread discourse in various media, according to the 
logic inherent in the system and its institutions.
Media event: a mass event in which organisers rely on modern 
broadcasting technologies to relay the proceedings to wider audiences 
at a previously announced moment in time.
Medium: the container or conduit through which actors transmit or store 
data or information.
Modernity: a set of human actions and cognitive frameworks that have 
emerged in Europe during the late middle ages and that actors 
across the world have since adopted to radically restructure their 
worlds across increasingly interconnected economic, environmental, 
political, social, and ideational domains.
Multi-modal communication: communication that combines different 
levels of symbolic representation to relay its messages, for instance 
by stacking both visual and acoustic signs in the service of the same 
communication process.
Nation: any group of people who imagine themselves as a territorially 
bound community, based on a belief in a collective purpose, shared 
history, culture, language, and/or ethnic ancestry, and aspiring to 
maintain or establish political autonomy (i.e., a nation-state).
Nation-state: any state that claims political autonomy in the name of a 
nation.
Nationalism: the sentiment and cognitive framework in which the nation 
features as a major element of personal identity and as the primary 
locus of political organisation.
Neoliberalism: an ideology that emphasises personal responsibility, 
efficiency, private property rights, and the presumed ability of 
allegedly unregulated, competitive markets to bring about the best in 
self-interested individuals.
Neoliberal policies: a set of often intrusive regulations grounded in neo-
liberalism, theoretically aimed at deregulating economic processes, 
establishing (global) free trade, and making social interactions more 
efficient by promoting austerity, privatisation, and a nominally lais-
sez-faire approach to the economy; in practice, a set of measures that 
strategically concentrate wealth in the hands of a few through uneven 
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fiscal policy, invasive audit cultures, expansive bureaucratisation, and 
draconic state-backed violence when private ownership rights are in 
question.
Network: a system of interconnected actors or things, each represented 
as a node and connected to other network elements through links.
Network society: a set of diverse actors, such as states, enterprises, and 
non-governmental organisations, which pursue their agendas within 
advanced communication and information networks.
Networked spectacle: an elaborate mass event, designed to be aesthetically 
striking, during which actors use switching power and programming 
power to reconfigure organisational and ideational networks in the 
service of their respective political projects.
Nexus: a node or cluster of nodes that connects several sub-networks 
within a larger network.
Node: an actor in a network.
Parasocial relation: an imagined social relationship that generates an 
emotional bond in the absence of reciprocal, interpersonal exchanges.
Pathos formula: a trope meant to trigger a specific emotional response.
Priming: the act of anchoring meanings, associations, and emotions 
through continuous exposure to certain signs.
Programming power: the ability to set the values of a network by infusing 
it with specific discourse.
Propaganda: intentional communicative action explicitly meant to relay 
the position of a political actor.
Ritual: a group activity in which members generate a shared reality that 
invites attachment to the group and its ideology through emotional 
entrainment and the collective production of symbolic resources.
Securitisation: the construction of issues as existential threats that 
require emergency measures that take place outside the sphere of 
established rules.
Sign: something that stands for or points to something else.
Society: disparate sets of highly contextual networks that actors construct 
through their recurring inter-subjective activities.
Spectacle: an event or scene that spectators find striking due to the elabo-
rate, often multi-modal aesthetics. Here: a staged event intentionally 
designed to have such an effect. 
State: a formal set of political institutions that regulates human behaviour 
within a given territory through recourse to a monopoly on violence.
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Switching power: the ability to establish or interrupt links within a 
network.
Synecdoche: a rhetorical device that suggests that a part stands for the 
whole or vice versa.
Technology: any systematic, practical application of human knowledge.
Tifa: Chinese political watch words that flag a specific ideological frame 
for making sense of politics.
Trope: a recurring pattern of signs that, based on a previously established 
and social convention, is connected to a specific meaning.
Watch sign: a visual trope that flags a specific ideological frame for 
making sense of politics.
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